

OUR GENERATION

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA • SIMON
FRASER UNIVERSITY • REVOLUTION
IN MEXICO**

**TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL
INTEGRATION**

by Martin Oppenheimer

**SOCIALISM FROM ABOVE
OR FROM BELOW**

by Hal Draper

RADICAL PERSPECTIVES 1969

by Herbert Marcuse

Vol. 6 - No. 3



OUR GENERATION

VOLUME 6 — NUMBER 3

EDITORIALS :

Historical Perspectives 1968 3

Stalin is dead but Neo-Stalinism lives 5

Radical Perspectives 1969

by Herbert Marcuse 9

Why the Soviets Intervened in Czechoslovakia

by David Horowitz 15

Mexico's New Movement

by Nardo Perello 27

What's Happening at Simon Fraser University?

by James Harding 52

The Two Souls of Socialism

by Hal Draper 68

Participative Techniques of Social Integration

by Martin Oppenheimer100

The Movement, its structure and community—a discussion

by Watson Thompson, Evan Stark, and Jody Palmour.....110

REPORTS :

from Paris re: Vietnam, Toronto

Halifax, Montreal129-133-137-139

BOOK REVIEWS :

The Dialectical Sociology of Georges Gurvitch (Bosserman)

by Philip Resnick142

The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckman)

by Charles Taylor146

Cocksure (Richler)

by Patrick Coleman150

Risinghill (Berg)

by Kenneth-Charles Du Puis155

Dialogue with Erik Erikson (Evans)

by Raymond Prince157

Canadian Labour in Politics (Horowitz)

by Ed Finn161

OUR GENERATION Literature List

Student Radicalism, Québec, Vietnam, Education169

OUR GENERATION Discount Book Club173

Books Received167

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Editorial notes

Historical perspectives

1968 was as extraordinary a year as 1848. In that year the old empire and absolutism throughout Europe was shaken at its roots. The advocates of the new values were at first mostly defeated, but their ideas and actions left a permanent imprint upon the development of that continent and the world. The revolutions of 1848 were part of the political and social consequence of a profound industrial revolution slowly being born.

In 1968 all modern industrial societies whether capitalist, socialist or social democratic underwent upheavals under the advance of an onrushing revolutionary technology with the most complex social and political problems arising from it. This movement has jarred the international political and economic systems which have grown up around industrial states. In over *twenty-five* countries youth led rebellions have left a mark on the social order in 1968. The war in Vietnam, the student revolts and general strikes, the threatened collapse of the Western monetary system, Czechoslovakia, the wars and civil wars in Africa and the Middle East, the manned flight around the moon, China's "cultural revolution" suggest a growing struggle between revolution and counter-revolution.

What is most significant is that events like those that took place in the spring of 1968 have a momentum of their own, and the degree to which individual men appear to be inspiring or controlling them in a significant way is more oftentimes than not an illusion.

NORTH AMERICA

In North America the year 1968 has witnessed an extraparliamentary upsurge in Mexico, the USA and Québec. The major segments of this society thus engaged were students, blacks, Québécois, other ethnic and radical groups, certain sections of the new and industrial working classes. There were more strikes in 1967 and 1968 than in any year since 1947.

College and university students led protests across the continent on an unprecedented scale, joined for the first time by an increasing number of high school students. This extremely significant development beacons new areas for radical organising, because high schoolers and their decisions determine not only the tempo of future insurgency on campuses but also the nature of the future labour force. This last October for example, of far greater importance than the 55 ter-

rorist bombings by the Front Liberation du Québec was the general strike of 50,000 students in the technical and junior colleges which lasted in some cases up to six weeks. This wave of school occupations was a qualitative advance in the forms of direct action used and it inspired the class conscious working population (winning nominal trade union support) and the laxer university students.

Pompus FORTUNE magazine recently reported that approximately 40% of American college students show a "lack of concern about making money" (their italics), and tend to "embrace positions that are dissident and extreme."

FORTUNE hired an opinion research firm to conduct a survey of people in the 18 to 24 age bracket last October to be told that about 750,000 students now 'identify with the new left'. Further that such radical notions are affecting the thinking and behaviour of the rest of the student population.

TOWARDS A REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH MOVEMENT

Significantly in 1968 greater clarity was sought by the new left as to where it must go and how. The Students for a Democratic Society, for example moved into the area of a new class analysis on the theoretical proposition that what must now be built is a revolutionary youth movement. Although the resolution adopted at its National Council meeting in Ann Arbor was unclear as to what "the working class" consists of, and its relation to the class character of the proposed youth movement, SDS maintained that:

Youth around the world have the potential to become a critical force. A youth movement raises the issues about a society in which it will be forced to live. It takes issues to the working class. They do this because, in America, there exists an enormous contradiction around the integration of youth into the system. The period of pre-employment has been greatly extended due to the affluence of this highly-industrialized society and the lack of jobs.

Institutions like the schools, the military, the courts and the police all act to oppress youth in specific ways, as does the work place. The propaganda and socialization processes focused at youth act to channel young people into desired areas of the labor market as well as to socialize them to accept without rebellion the miserable quality of life in America both on and off the job.

The ruling class recognizes the critical potential of young people. This is why they developed so many organizational forms to contain them. Many young people have rejected the integration process that the schools are supposed to serve and have broken with and begun to struggle against the "establishment". This phenomenon has taken many forms, ranging from youth dropping out as a response to a dying capitalist culture, to young workers being forced out by industry that no longer has any room for the untrained, unskilled, and unorganized. Both the drop-out and the forced-out youth face the repressive nature of America's police, courts, and military, which act to physically and materially oppress them. The response from various strata of youth has been rebellion, from the buildings at Columbia to the movement in the streets of Chicago to Haight-Ashbury to the Watts uprising.

We agree with the *Guardian* Viewpoint which stated :

"The great strength of the new left has come from its ability to change course when the demands of political struggle indicate change. We view the present transition in that light. One great weakness of the new left, however, has often been the failure to implement theoretical developments in practice. We hope the youth movement resolution will produce more than a new level of rhetoric."

We should add that such a position on youth has been maintained in Québec for some years now. It was here after all where the concept of student syndicalism was first born in North America. This was followed by the concept of a revolutionary youth movement whose primary objective was national liberation, supplemented substantially this year by the concept of a libertarian social revolution.

Stalin is dead, but Neo-Stalinism lives

Many of us expected the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Years of studying the nature of the super-powers, the history of Soviet socialism, and the contradictions in socialist theory on the questions of nationalism and imperialism could not suggest otherwise. But when three of our editors visited Prague during August 1968 the unbelievable optimism of the Czechs and Slovaks that we meet did not allow us to dare to pose the question without being smiled at.

Editors Lucia Kowaluk, Jogues Girard and Dimitrios Rousso-poulos meet a great stream of personages while in Prague. Members of the Prague new left, of the Union of Czech Journalists, the Union of Writers, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Ministry of Education, Radio Prague, Literary Listy, Union of Students and so on. We experienced the exuberant feeling of not only being in one of the most beautiful and cultured cities of the world, but also one of the freest. Everywhere there was a spirit of reconstruction, a new sense of purpose, a feeling of experimenting with new forms "democratizing the socialist revolution", and above all debate. Debate about workers councils, decentralisation, new concepts of education, new forms of economy, de-bureaucratisation of institutions and society. Many positions were taken, but it is important to note that while we were there (and we left four hours before the Warsaw Pact troops marched in) the future of Czechoslovakia was not determined. All important orientations were to be determined at the crucial Communist Party congress slated for

early September. Therefore, other than the guidelines set down by the Action Programme of April, the currents of the debate, and over and above the newly established civil liberties it is not possible to speculate as to the outcome of the impact debate, would have on that society. Even so with no "ifs" or "buts" we condemn the Soviet-led invasion by the Warsaw Pact of Czechoslovakia.

WHAT IS A FRIEND ?

From an article which appeared under the title "From Warsaw to Bratislava" in Prague's Literární listy (August. 8, 1968) we have the following prophetic insight :

Despite all the propaganda of our "friendly socialist countries," the West did not prove itself our ally when we were in difficulties. Although it has not been publicly admitted, the world is divided into power blocs, and in certain situations, the West adheres correctly both to the secret agreements and to the status quo. If our country were occupied, the same situation would occur as has occurred several times before in Europe. When a group of our students asked a prudent and well-informed citizen of an important European country what his country would do if our country were to be occupied by its allies, he answered composedly: "Gar nichts, liebe Freunde" (absolutely nothing, dear friends). A few divisions perhaps would be flown to our western frontier, but that would be all. As a matter of fact nothing would be better for the West than the occupation of a territory which they have written off as being outside their sphere of interest. They would achieve an enormous propaganda victory without the slightest effort on their part...

The Rumanian and Yugoslav communists proved to be very useful allies. Rumania and Yugoslavia were the only two countries which publicly supported our cause and "recognized our new regime." Other helpful allies were the communists in many European and other parties who welcomed, or at least tolerated, our post-January development, and the majority of democratic and socialist public opinion throughout the world, which considered the fate of Czechoslovakia to be part of the fate of democracy and socialism itself.

Undoubtedly, we also had supporters in those friendly communist parties and countries which signed the Warsaw letter. We don't know what the citizens of East Germany, Poland or the Soviet Union thought about Czechoslovakia and the danger of a counterrevolution. We are inclined to believe that they were scarcely convinced by the tales of our ruin reported in the official information media, perhaps even less convinced than we were at the time of the propaganda campaign about the fascism of Marshal Tito and his clique. The 1968 anti-Czechoslovak campaign has differed little from the anti-Yugoslav campaign of 1948. In fact, it seems to have been inspired by the latter. In those countries which signed the Warsaw letter, those who know us a little must have found it difficult to believe that the Czechs and Slovaks "have suddenly been seized by the desire to stage a counterrevolution." We can count on sympathies among these people, even if they cannot publicly express them...

THE RESISTENCE GROWS

In the deliberate, public sacrifice of his own life 21-year-old student Jan Palach has managed to encompass, the pain, the pride and the spirit of resistance of the Czechoslovaks under Soviet domination.

He believed that the truth could be most powerfully realised in flames fed by his own body, and his further purpose of encouraging protest against the Russian occupation is being fulfilled as Czechoslovaks are moved from shock and anguish to resistance.

Tens of thousands of Czechoslovaks honoured the young student as they filled Wenceslas Square.

As we go to press, there is news of another self-immolation in Czechoslovakia—this time by a young brewery worker in Pilsen—and in Budapest, Hungary, a 17-year-old boy also set fire to himself.

These acts of protest are not isolated, but represent an almost inevitable development of the remarkably courageous campaign of passive resistance to Russian domination which is being sustained across Czechoslovakia.

Workers and their unions, students and intellectuals, are taking the lead in this resistance movement, which seems to be developing independently of the Dubcek Government.

The Czechoslovak resistance will not have wanted these acts of suicide, but will be challenged incalculably to maintain its struggle for dignity and freedom. Jan Palach may yet be a second Jan Hus.

From a variety of reports, some appearing in the *Economist* (Nov. 28, 1968) and *Die Zeit* (Oct. 18, 1968) and from friends in Paris and London we know that many young people in other socialist countries have been arrested. In the Democratic Republic of Germany for example there have been a number of closed trials. For distributing typewritten sheets condemning the invasion, Thomas Brasch, a son of the German deputy minister of cultural affairs, got 27 months. Rosita Hunzinger, a sculptor's 18-year-old daughter and Erika Berthold daughter of Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism were given suspended sentences of 20 months. Sandra Weigl, a relative of Brecht's widow was given two years and Horst Bonnet, Director of the Berlin comic opera got two and a half years and his wife two years prison. The two teen-aged sons of Prof. Robert Havemann, the marxist scholar have been arrested. Actions of protests against the occupation took place not only in Moscow but also in the three capitals of the Baltic Soviet Republics, in Charkow and in the Caucasus. In Leningrad a group of 5 people was arrested because they collected signatures for a document which called for solidarity with the Communists in Prague. Two of them, the chemist Danilov, and the engineer Studenkov, were put immediately into a lunatic asylum. The other three, the jurist Gendler, the chemist Gladschewskij and the engineer Schadlenkow are charged with 'anti-soviet agitation'.

It is significant that when the SDS in Germany marched on and occupied the Soviet Military Mission in Frankfurt in protest

against the invasion, the Russians caught under-staffed called upon the American Military Mission to help them evaluate the students. It is significant that Bertrand Russell, who set up as International Tribunal on Vietnam, is now in the process of setting up a commission on Czechoslovakia.

The world continually convulses with this kind of authority, maintained by a generation that has many of the same instincts throughout the world. The force that sends young Poles and Russians, Germans and Hungarians into Czechoslovakia is the same force that sends young Americans into Vietnam, that beats up young people in the streets of Paris, Madrid, Chicago, Berkeley and Rome. Systems groping to perpetuate themselves, cause and condone death every day.

We have tried in OUR GENERATION to concentrate our energies primarily in understanding North American society and helping the peace and freedom movement here. We have covered developments outside of this context only when we have something to learn from those struggles for our own work. If we do not deal with every critical question that appears on the world scene it must not be construed that we are not concerned. In our expanded Literature Department we shall be adding pamphlets, reprints from the work of our friends in other countries on such questions as Biafra, Greece, NATO, Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia to mention a few.

OUR GENERATION

invites you to submit manuscripts.

The program of the journal is the encouragement of a revival of radical analysis, scholarship and action. In line with this goal, the policy of the editors is to publish articles and reviews by new left radicals of the whole movement.

Since we are a new and young journal, we cannot afford — as yet — to pay a fee. Articles should be 15-25 double-spaced typewritten pages; or book reviews 10-15 double-spaced typewritten pages accompanied by return addressed, postage-paid envelopes.

RADICAL PERSPECTIVES 1969

by Herbert Marcuse

The following is the complete text of a talk given by Herbert Marcuse at the 20th anniversary program of the Guardian, as taped by Radio Free People and transcribed unedited by Liberation News Service. Marcuse was introduced by Bernadine Dohrn, Inter-organizational Secretary of SDS, who called him, "a writer, philosopher, a man whom The New York Times called 'the ideological leader of the New Left.'" Prof. Marcuse is author of "Reason and Revolution", "One-Dimensional Man", "Soviet Marxism", and "Eros and Civilisation".

I'm not responsible for what the New York Times calls me. I never claimed to be the ideological leader of the left and I don't think the left needs an ideological leader. And there is one thing the left does not need, and that's another father image, another daddy. And I certainly don't want to be one.

There's one thing, I would like to resume what Carl [Oglesby] just said. We cannot wait and we shall not wait. I certainly cannot wait. And not only because of my age. I don't think we have to wait. And even I, I don't have any choice. Because I literally couldn't stand it any longer if nothing would change. Even I am suffocating.

I want to give you today as realistic a picture of the situation of the left as I can think of. This will require some theoretical reflection for which I do not really apologize, because if the left gets allergic against theoretical consideration, there's something wrong with the left. (Applause.)

Let me start by pointing out the two contradictions with which our movement — and I say our — is faced. On the one hand, we all feel, we experience, we have it in our bones, that this society is getting increasingly repressive, destructive of the human and natural capabilities to be free, to determine one's own life, to shape one's own life without exploiting others.

And we — let us not only mean we here in this room, it means all those who are repressed, who are enslaved by their jobs, by the unnecessary and still so necessary performances that are required from them, by the morality that is required from them, all those who are exploited by the internal and external colonization policy of this country — this large *we*, in bad need of change, but, on the other hand, I think we have to admit that in large part if not the majority of this population does not really feel, is not aware, is not politically conscious of this need for change. This presents, as I can see it, the first great problem for our strategy.

The second great problem for our strategy — we are constantly faced with the demands, "What is the alternative?" "What can you offer us that is better than what we have?" I do not believe that we can simply brush aside this question by saying, "What is necessary is to destroy; afterwards we will see what comes." We cannot for one very simple reason. Because our goals, our values, our own and new morality, our *own* morality, must be visible already in our actions. The new human beings who we want to help to create — we must already strive to be these human beings right here and now. (Applause.)

And that is why we cannot simply brush this question aside. We must be able to show, even in a very small way, the models of what may one day be a human being. But the alternative, precisely in these terms, I still believe the alternative is socialism. But socialism neither of the Stalinist brand nor of the post-Stalinist brand, but that *libertarian socialism* which has always been the integral concept of socialism, but only too easily repressed and suppressed.

Now, if this is the alternative, how do we transmit it, because people will look around and will say, "Show us, where is this kind of socialism". We will say, it is perhaps, it is probably going to be built up in Cuba. It is perhaps being built up in China. It is certainly fighting in Vietnam [against] the supermonster. But they see it, socialism is what we have in the Soviet Union. Socialism is will look around and say, "No, this isn't socialism. Socialism, as we the invasion of Czechoslovakia." Socialism, in other words, is a crime.

And how can we meet this contradiction? The two contradictions which I just outlined, I think, can be telescoped into one. Radical change without a mass base seems to be unimaginable. But the obtaining of a mass base — at least in this country — and in the foreseeable future — seems to be equally unimaginable. What are we going to do with this contradiction?

The answer seems to be very easy. We have to try to get this support. We have to try to get this mass base. But here we meet the limits of democratic persuasion with which we are confronted today. Why the limits? Because a large, perhaps a decisive, part of the majority, namely the working class, is to a great extent integrated into the system; and on a rather solid material basis, and not only superficially. It is certainly not integrated for ever. Nothing is forever in history.

And the contradictions of corporate capitalism are more serious than ever before. But this does not and cannot and should not foster the illusion that such an integration, temporary integration, has indeed taken place, that can be loosened only if the contradictions within the system become more aggravated. They do, we have seen it during the last years and it is our task — since such a disintegration will never happen automatically — it is our task to work on it.

The second item — why we are here faced with the limits of democratic persuasion — is the mere fact that the left has no adequate access to the media of mass communication.

Today, public opinion is made by the media of mass communication. If you cannot buy the equal and adequate time, if you cannot buy the equal and adequate space, how are you supposed to change public opinion, a public opinion made in this monopolistic way.

The consequence: we are, in this pseudo-democracy, faced with a majority which seems to be self-perpetuating, which seems to reproduce itself as a conservative majority immune against radical change. But the same circumstances that militate against democratic persuasion also militate against the development of a revolutionary centralized mass party, according to the traditional model. You cannot have such a party today, not only because the apparatus of suppression is infinitely more effective and powerful than it ever was before, but even more and perhaps more so, because centralization today does not seem to be the adequate way of working for change and obtaining change. I will come back to this in a few moments.

Here I want to add one more thing. I said that the contradictions of corporate capitalism today are as serious as ever before, but we have immediately to add that today the resources of corporate capitalism are equally strong and they are daily strengthened by the cooperation, or shall I say, the collusion, between the United States and the Soviet Union. What we are faced with, and I think this is one of the old-fashioned terms we should save and recapture, is a temporary stabilization of the capitalist system, and in any such period, the task of the left is a task of enlightenment, a task of education, the task of developing a political consciousness.

I would like to discuss under three headings very briefly the target of the strategy of the New Left, the methods and finally, the organization of the New Left. *First*, as to the target: we are faced with a novelty in history, namely with the prospect or with the need for radical change, revolution in and against a highly developed technically advanced industrial society, which is at the same time a well-functioning and cohesive society. This historical novelty demands a re-examination of one of our most cherished concepts. I can here of course only give you a kind of catalog of such re-examination.

First, the notion of the seizure of power. Here, the old model wouldn't do any more. That for example; in a country like the United States, under the leadership of a centralized and authoritarian party, large masses concentrate on Washington, occupy the Pentagon and set up a new government, seems to be a slightly too unrealistic and utopian a picture (laughter).

We will see that what we have to envisage is some kind of diffuse and dispersed disintegration of the system, in which interest, emphasis and activity is shifted to local and regional areas.

The *second* concept that should be re-examined is the role of the working class. And here I would like to say a few words to one of the most defamed notions today, namely the concept of the new working class. I know what can be said against it, and what has been said against it. It seems to me that the concept of the new working class simply comprehends and anticipates tendencies that are going on before our own eyes in the material process of production in capitalism, namely that more and more highly qualified salaried employees, technicians, specialists, and so on, occupy a decisive position in the material process of production. And even in orthodox Marxian terms, just in this way become members of the industrial working class. What we see, I submit to you, is an extension of the potential mass base over and beyond the traditional industrial working class to the new working classes that extends the range of the exploited.

Now this extension, which indicates a large but very diffuse and dispersed mass base, changes the relationship between what we may call leading minorities or cadres of the left, politically militant, and the mass. What we can envisage is not, as I said, this large centralized and coordinated movement, but local and regional political action against specific grievances — riots, ghetto rebellions and so on, that is to say, certainly mass movements, but mass movements which in large part are lacking political consciousness and which will depend more than before on political guidance and direction by militant leading minorities.

A few words on the strategy of the New Left. To the degree to which the pseudo-democratic process, with the semi-monopoly of the conservative mass media, creates and constantly reproduces the same society and a largely immune majority, to that degree must political education and preparation go beyond the traditional liberalistic forms. Political activity and political education must go beyond teaching and listening, must go beyond discussion and writing. The Left must find the adequate means of breaking the conformist and corrupted universe of political language and political behavior. The Left must try to arouse the consciousness and conscience of the others, and breaking out of the language and behavior pattern of the corrupt political universe, a pattern which is imposed on all political activity, is an almost super-human task and requires an almost super-human imagination, namely the effort to find a language and to organize actions which are not part and parcel of the familiar political behavior, can perhaps communicate that what is here at work are human beings with different needs and different goals which are not yet and I hope never will be co-opted.

In terms of the establishment and in terms of the rationality of the establishment, such behavior would and must appear as foolish, childish and irrational, but that may very well be the token attempts, and a temporarily successful attempt, to go beyond, to break out of the repressive universe of the established political behavior.

Now, to the organization of the New Left. I already mentioned the obsolescence of traditional forms of organization, for example, a parliamentary party. No party I can envisage today will not within a very short time fall victim to the general and totalitarian political corruption which characterizes the political universe. No political party, but also no revolutionary centralism and no underground — because both are all too easy victims of the intensified and streamlined apparatus of repression.

As against these forms, what seems to be shaping up is an entirely overt organization diffused, concentrated in small groups and around local activities, small groups which are highly flexible and autonomous.

I want to add one thing here that may almost appear as heretic — no immature unification of strategy. The left is split! The Left has always been split! Only the right, which has no ideas to fight for, is united! (much laughter).

Now the strength of the New Left may well reside in precisely these small contesting and competing groups, active at many points at the same time, a kind of political guerrilla force in peace or in so-called peace, but, and this is I think the most important point, small groups, concentrated on the level of local activities, thereby foreshadowing what may in all likelihood be the basic organization

of libertarian socialism, namely councils of small manual and intellectual workers, soviets, if one can still use the term and not think of what actually happened to the soviets, some kind of what I would like to call, and I mean it seriously, organized spontaneity.

Let me say a few words on the alliance which I think should be discussed in the New Left. I would suggest not an alliance even with evil, as Lenin said, because the Devil today has become much too strong. He will eat us up. No alliance with liberals, who have taken over the job of the un-American Committee (applause). Who have taken over the job of the un-American Committee in denouncing the left, doing the job the Committee has not yet done, and I think I don't have to mention names, you know perfectly well. But instead, alliance with all those, whether bourgeois or not, who know that the enemy is on the right, and who have *demonstrated* this knowledge.

Let me come to the summary of the perspectives for the New Left. I believe, and this is not a confession of faith. I think this is at least to a great extent based on what you may call an analysis of the facts. I believe that the New Left today is the only hope we have. Its task — to prepare itself and the others, not to wait or to prepare today, yesterday and tomorrow, in thought and in action, morally and politically, for the time when the aggravating conflicts of corporate capitalism dissolve its repressive cohesion and open a space where the real work for libertarian socialism can begin. The prospects for the next year, the prospects for the New Left are good if the New Left can only sustain its present activity. There are always periods of regression. No movement can progress at the same pace; sustaining our activity would already be a success.

And, a word on a friend or enemy on the left. Those who denounce especially the young of the New Left — those who fight for the great refusal, those who do not conform to the fetishism and the fetishist concepts of the Old Left and the Old Liberals — those who denounce them as infantile radicals, snobish intellectuals, and who in denouncing them, invoke Lenin's famous pamphlet; I suggest to you that this is a historical forgery. Lenin struck out against radicals who confronted a strong revolutionary mass party. Such a revolutionary mass party does not exist today. The Communist Party has become and is becoming a party of order, as it itself called itself. In other words the shoe is today on the other foot. In the absence of a revolutionary party, these alleged infantile radicals are, I believe, the weak and confused but true historical heirs of the great socialist tradition.

You all know that their ranks are permeated with agents, with fools, with irresponsibles. But they also contain human beings, men and women, black and white, who are sufficiently free from the aggressive and repressive inhuman needs and aspirations of the exploitative society sufficiently free from them in order to be free for the work of preparing a society without exploitation. I would like to continue working together with them as long as I can.

WHY THE SOVIETS INTERVENED

By David Horowitz

David Horowitz is the author of "The Free World Colossus" and editor of "Containment and Revolution", both dealing with the cold war. Mr. Horowitz is on the staff of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. This article first appeared in the Guardian.

"Victorious socialism must necessarily establish a full democracy and, consequently, not only introduce full equality of nations but also realize the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to free political separation. Those socialist parties that do not show by their whole activity, that they will liberate the enslaved nations and build up relations with them on the basis of a free union—and free union is a false phrase without the right to secede—those parties will be betraying socialism."

These words written by Lenin and embodying one of the central principles of the original program of the Russian Bolsheviks, express a truth which is still obscured for many after the long night in which Stalinism weighed down upon the horizons of the socialist left. The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia stands condemned first of all in the name of socialism itself, which the Kremlin leaders have betrayed by their arbitrary, brutal and oppressive actions.

This recrudescence of Stalinist methods points to the underlying cause of this tragic pass of events: the incompleteness and arrest of de-Stalinization and the failure to institute socialist forms and organizational relations based on the principles of equality, democracy and self-determination either within the Soviet bloc, in the decade following Khrushchev's famous denunciation of Stalin in 1956.



Grave digger

The Stalinist system which became entrenched in the course of Stalin's revolution from above in 1929-30 and reinforced by the terror necessary to sustain it, has undergone many changes in the course of de-Stalinization. In a sense, Stalinism was its own grave digger, for it created new social conditions in which the repressive system could no longer thrive. Many of its trappings have been of necessity cast off by the Soviet leaders.

The train of de-Stalinization and liberalization was in due course set in motion. But from the very outset, the Soviet leaders acted to ensure that this process would have definite and ultimately very severe limits.

The Kremlin leaders denounced Stalin, but they acted to prevent a real probing of the Stalin era and the Stalin phenomenon, a fact expressed in their failure to rehabilitate to this day the most important victims of Stalin's purges, towering figures of the Russian Revolution like Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev. The post-Stalin leaders liquidated the Stalin terror and much of the apparatus of that terror, and even permitted a significant liberalization of the political and cultural atmosphere, but they acted to preserve the bureaucratic-manipulative structure of the Soviet system and to prevent the emergence of any authentic democratic political forms. The trade unions are still appendages of the stage, as are all other organs of potential opposition, criticism and dissent. The fundamental rights to strike, to organize, to publish freely are denied to the Soviet people by the present Soviet rulers.

Even the much-vaunted economic reforms which have been encouraged can be seen as basically administrative measures to avoid recognition of political realities. The basic source of misallocation of social resources, and the source of social tension in the Soviet system, is that the economy is under bureaucratic, not social, control. Russia is still a privilege-ridden society (one of Stalin's most sustained attacks was against the egalitarian demands of the socialist-Marxist tradition) and decisions are concentrated in the hands of the privileged, minority stratum.

At the outset of the de-Stalinization, intentions appeared generous; serious steps were taken to remedy the injustices of the preceding period. The Yugoslavs, who had been denounced as fascists for defending their sovereignty against Russian chauvinism, were accepted back into the fold with suitable apologies. The joint-stock companies which had been instruments of Russian economic exploitation of her weaker allies were liquidated.

Chinese sabotaged

Aid to China, an important index of Soviet internationalism, was stepped up, and attained the most generous levels to date. But the impulse did not last, and the restoration drive began. The drive resulted in the Sino-Soviet split, precipitated by the ruthless withdrawal of Soviet technicians and their blueprints from China in 1960, a sabotage of that underdeveloped ally.

In short, in foreign affairs as at home, the Kremlin rulers showed themselves incapable of pursuing the logic of de-Stalinization to its natural conclusion: the liquidation of the legacy of the Stalin era and the return to the egalitarian, democratic socialist program of the Leninist party which it claims as its heritage and invokes as its inspiration.

What accounts for this? Why has de-Stalinization been carried out hypocritically and incompletely, with consequences like the debacle in Czechoslovakia which has all the air of a *deja vu* about it? Briefly, the answer is that de-Stalinization has been carried out by the Stalinists themselves. Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin are all men whose stars rose in the darkest night of the Stalinist epoch. Their liberalism was pressed on them from the outside rather than felt from within.

Fear of the past

The old Stalinist distrust of the people, the fear of opposition, the penchant for manipulation backed by naked force—all of these factors are still present. Moreover, there is on the leadership's part a positive fear of confronting the facts of the Russian past, or of looking the system in the face. The leaders' very existence is historically and existentially at stake. It is they who are the privileged beneficiaries of Stalin's stratified system, the heroes of the rewritten Stalinist history. The basic Stalinist program, including "peaceful coexistence" revolving around the Great Russian Center (with all the other socialist revolutions bowing to the needs and requirements of the First Socialist State and waiting on its future triumphs) is the program to which they have dedicated their political lives. Despite the verbal denunciation of the "excesses of Stalin," they are not likely to abandon this program.

It is thus no accident that this Stalinist faction, which rules the Soviet Communist party, fears "ideological coexistence," fears the freedom which would expose itself to the harsh light of historical truth and to the demands of socialist forces from below.

Of course, there are forces in Czechoslovakia which want freedom to push for a capitalist restoration (although the forces of classical reaction are probably far weaker in Czechoslovakia than in most

East European countries). But it is naive to imagine, as some misguided defenders of the recent intervention do, that the Soviet leaders understand and can estimate the forces of Czechoslovak reaction and counterrevolution better than the Czechoslovak Communist party itself, which would be decimated and destroyed in any restoration. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten by socialists and Marxists with any sense of history that the present Soviet leaders and their faction in the Russian party executed the whole Bolshevik old guard under the pretext that they were attempting to restore capitalism. This has been the staple excuse for sundry persecutions, jailings and so forth. which are often later deplored as errors.

Soviet security

However, this is not the only major factor in the present situation, nor the only determinant of Soviet policy. The Soviet Union is trying to establish its security vis-a-vis an imperialist system that aims at world domination and has perpetrated the most flagrant aggressions on socialist and colonial countries. The Warsaw Pact was formed in 1955 as a response to the rearmament of West Germany and its integration into NATO, which is one of a series of Western military alliances which form an encircling net around the borders of the Soviet Union. To understand the dynamics of the events in Czechoslovakia and the vicissitudes of the policy co-existence, it is necessary to review in a general way Russia's relations with the West and with her Communist allies in and out of power.

The defeats suffered by revolutions in Europe and elsewhere after World War I led to the isolation of the Soviet regime. Thus was inspired the program of self-sufficient "socialism in one country" which endured through World War II. This policy, with its thinly veiled appeal to nationalist sentiment, changed Bolshevism's attitude towards socialist revolutions in other countries.

Stalin's new foreign policy discounted the possibility of such revolutions and sought instead to achieve and preserve an international status quo which gave the Soviet Union breathing and living space, however precarious. "Not an inch of foreign territory" became the slogan of Russian foreign policy, peaceful coexistence its goal.

Manipulation

Far from being encouraged to make actual revolutions, foreign Communist parties were manipulated and persuaded by the Russians to act as pressure groups on their capitalist governments to pursue friendly policies toward the Soviet Union. Agitation in India against the British Empire was discouraged for the greater interest of Soviet trade with England. Chiang Kai-shek was invited to take an honorary

seat on the Communist International and the Chinese communists were instructed to subordinate themselves to his "progressive" leadership, with the result that 40,000 communists were massacred in a blood purge not dissimilar to that in Indonesia in 1965. (It was as a result of this costly lesson that a young Mao Tse-tung learned to pursue his own path, free from Russian tutelage, to ultimate victory.)

Perhaps the supreme example of the Kremlin's manipulative attitude towards foreign communist and leftwing movements was the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The tactical justification for the pact from the Russian point of view is not subject to much dispute. The unwillingness of the Western powers to form a collective security arrangement with Russia left the Kremlin few options. However the Soviet leadership revealed a callous disregard for the intense political emotions that pervaded the anti-fascist popular front movements in the West, and which had been inspired by the Communist parties in days when Russia hoped to form an alliance with the liberal capitalist states against the Nazi axis. Thus Stalin hailed his pact as making possible a permanent withdrawal from what had now become merely an inter-imperialist conflict; Molotov said fascism was a question of "taste." The Germans were even described by Moscow as peace-loving. The result was the demoralization of the greatest left-wing mass movement of the inter-war period.

The pact also represented a radical departure from the self-containment principle of Soviet foreign policy, as Stalin's armies moved abroad to occupy buffer regions of the *cordon sanitaire* established by Western capitalism to isolate the revolution. Such was the genesis of the "absorption" of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and the attempted conquest of Finland which were to play such a significant role in the coming Cold War.

The way the war was fought, after Russia had been attacked in June, 1941, could not but confirm some of Stalin's worst suspicions as to the irreducible hostility of the West to the Soviet state. For though aid was generously offered when Russia was attacked, and a Second Front to relieve Russia was promised for spring 1942, the aid turned out to be mainly materiel while the vital Second Front was not opened until June, 1944, when the Red Army was already advancing towards Berlin. Because of the great delay in opening the Second Front, the Russians engaged more than 90% of the German armies for most of the war, and never less than 75%. The result was that Russia suffered more devastation and greater loss of life in World War II than any country in history. A second consequence of the West's willingness to allow the European war to take on a predominantly Russo-German character was the emergence of the Red Army throughout the whole of Eastern Europe as an occupying and liberating force.

With Germany for the moment prostrate, the object of Soviet foreign policy became the preservation of the wartime entente with

the Western allies, particularly the U.S. The famous spheres of influence deal between Stalin and Churchill, which was formalized at Yalta, became the basis of Soviet policy and its manipulative attitudes towards revolution in the various zones. The powerful Communist parties of Western Europe were instructed to support conservative figures like De Gaulle.

Chess game

Communists in East Europe sought to secure governments 'friendly' to the Soviet Union, but not socialist (which might anger Washington and destroy the coexistence spirit). The most brazen instance of this chess game with world revolution was perhaps Yugoslavia. There Stalin tried to prevent Tito from consolidating the revolution and tried to convince him instead to form a coalition regime and even to restore King Peter (Yugoslavia was on the border of the two Churchill-Stalin zones and had been divided 50-50 between them).

However, as the Cold War heated up—as Washington with its atomic monopoly, its string of bases encircling the Soviet Union and its overwhelming economic power began its global campaign to roll back Soviet influence—the Kremlin attitude towards its strategic buffer began to change. With each new U.S. blow in the developing Cold War, Soviet reins on the region were tightened. Independent governments fell. One by one, the East European regimes were integrated into the Soviet defense system.

Proclaimed as a socialist community by its Russian founders, Eastern Europe was organized along Russian nationalist and bureaucratic lines. Not unmindful of Eastern Europe's intensely anti-Russian and anti-communist past (Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were exceptions, the latter on both counts) the Russians did not want to form a truly international economic community with an international plan. Instead they wrote tough bilateral treaties with each of the satellite regimes. In that way, as Sartre has pointed out, they succeeded at the same time in humiliating and arousing national passions.

Defensive machine

All of the construction plans, moreover, were Russian-conceived and were geared to the overriding necessity, as seen from the Kremlin, of creating a defensive war machine to fend off the threat from the West. Capital goods production became the order of the day, not necessarily a bad thing for underdeveloped Romania and Bulgaria, but a disaster for Czechoslovakia's sophisticated light industrial economy. The seeds of national resistance to Russian domination in

Eastern Europe were sown at the outset, and were dealt with in the purges of national communist leaders like Rajk, Slansky, and Clementis.

The national forces for democratization of the Soviet bloc thus parallel the liberal forces in their challenge to the Stalinist Soviet leadership. Indeed, the link up goes much further. A spearhead of the liberalization drive in Czechoslovakia has been the Slovak wing of the Communist party led by Alexander Dubcek, whose nationalism had been outraged by the chauvinistic policies of the Novotny regime. Even more interesting is the fact that the national minorities of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians in particular, have been pressing for greater cultural autonomy and national representation within the existing structures of party and government.

Thus the defensive buffer erected by Stalin has become the source of powerful pressures against the Stalinist leadership (though not, as many Western leaders would hope, against the social base of the communist system).

However, there is more to the story than this, for liberals and conservatives alike in the bloc countries (like their counterparts in the West) must look over their shoulders at the international situation and the forces which control the millions of foreign troops in the heart of Europe.

Lenin on Nationalism & Self-Determination

"In my writings on the national question I have already said that an abstract presentation of the question of nationalism is of no use at all. A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small nation.

"In respect of the second kind of nationalism we, nationals of a big nation, have nearly always been guilty, in historic practice, of an infinite number of cases of violence; furthermore, we commit violence and insult an infinite number of times without noticing it...

"That is why internationalism on the part of oppressors or 'great' nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies), must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice. Anybody who does not understand this has not grasped the real proletarian attitude to the national question, he is still essentially petty bourgeois in his point of view and is, therefore, sure to descend to the bourgeois point of view."

Last Testament, December 31, 1922

The Russian policy of coexistence contains not only self-contradictions, but also expectations about Western behavior which have not been fulfilled. The liberalizations and nationalist uprisings of the 1953-1956 period were accompanied in the West by German rearmament, the first Quemoy-Matsu crisis and the imperialist invasion of Suez in 1956. Since the detente of 1963, the high-tide of the coexistence policy, the Kremlin leaders have watched the U.S. conduct a massive aggression in Asia, and a lesser one in the Caribbean. U.S.-NATO inspired coups have toppled governments in Brazil, Indonesia, Ghana and elsewhere, and the military-industrial complex in Washington has successfully lobbied for an anti-ballistic missile system, reopening the arms race as a major source of world tensions. In brief, Soviet moderation (many in the Kremlin must be calling it appeasement) has been responded to by U.S. aggressiveness on a scale unmatched since the early Cold War period. Accordingly, the reflex reaction of the Kremlin to the events in Czechoslovakia, which it regards as a weakening of the alliance, is no cause for surprise.

Who benefits?

The irony of all this is that the Kremlin seems to produce the action it seeks to avoid. The chief beneficiaries of the August invasion of Czechoslovakia have been the right wings of the various NATO powers, and the German right wing in particular.

But not all the ironies are negative. Indeed, the most intriguing irony of all is indicated by the opposition to the invasion by communists in the West, and, one can only glean, in the communist countries themselves. For the forces of democracy and self-determination, both historic demands of the socialist movement, are in the end irresistible. By attempting to prevent democratization in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet bloc, the Soviet leaders may well have hastened its advent in the USSR.

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A NEW LEFT OPEN LETTER TO FIDEL CASTRO

DEAR FIDEL :

We are writing to you in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and East Germany. An invasion which you have described as a flagrant violation of Czech sovereignty, but which nevertheless you have gone on to justify in political terms.

Having read your speech on the subject we gather that your main excuse for supporting Czech intervention was your belief that the new regime was : "marching towards capitalism and inexorably towards imperialism—we did not have the slightest doubt about that".

We disagree with you Comrade. There was not the slightest evidence to suggest that the socialised property relations which prevail inside Czechoslovakia were in danger. Does this mean that we justify the economic policies of the Dubcek regime. No ! A hundred times no ! But then there is very little difference between the economic trends in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries including the Soviet Union. If the Czechs were moving "inexorably towards capitalism" then so are the Russians, so are the Poles, the Bulgarians and the Rumanians. Surely you know of the financial deals the Soviet bureaucracy has contracted with capitalism. Surely you know the deal made with Italian capital to produce Fiat cars in the Soviet Union—to name but one firm !

There is also talk of 'imperialist elements' in Czechoslovakia. What elements are these ? West German tourists ? There are more of them in Bulgaria ! Americans ? There are more of them in the Soviet Union itself ! Capitalist propaganda ? It flourishes throughout Eastern Europe.

No Fidel ! What the leadership of the CPSU feared most was the penetration of critical COMMUNIST ideas inside a communist state. They are frightened that the example might spread as indeed it will. What they fear is NOT the penetration of capital but the penetration of ideas. What they fear is that soon the new generation inside the Soviet Union itself will begin

to demand that the platform of the Left Opposition be published! That the butchery, both physical and intellectual, perpetrated by Stalinism be exposed for once and for all and that the present bureaucratic regime in the Soviet Union be exposed as having betrayed the fundamental tenets of Leninism.

Fidel you IMPLY that a few 'honest revolutionaries' asked for Soviet intervention. The Koldar clique—all three of them—are neither honest nor revolutionaries. They are the most backward and Stalinist elements inside the bureaucracy who want to preserve the status quo. They are the Escalantes of Eastern Europe!!

Of course there are bourgeois forces present in Czechoslovakia as there are in most communist countries but they had been politically sterilised by the actions of the Czech communists. If anything has revived them it is the Soviet intervention. The Dubcek regime had laid the BASIS for a genuine political revolution which would have progressed with the growth of a genuine revolutionary movement in the whole of Europe. The Stalinists in the Kremlin have tried to crush this, but in the long run they will not succeed. How can they. (History is begining to catch up with them...)

Fidel you know better than us that revolutionary socialism cannot be forced down people's throats at bayonet point. If it is politically justifiable for a Communist country to intervene in order to remove a regime it DISLIKES, how can we argue that it is wrong for Yankee Imperialism to try and preserve its client states by military force? The moral base of Marxism must not be debased.

Stalinism has converted the ideas of Marx and Lenin into a sterile dogma in much the same way as a Roman Catholic catechism. Stalinism has made Eastern Europe completely apolitical so that it cannot understand the nature of the struggles taking place in Vietnam, Latin America and Africa. It will take time for revolutionary politics to flower inside Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union again but flower they will and when they begin to bloom it will sound the death-knell of neo-capitalism in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union refuses to recognise that the main enemy is U.S. Imperialism. How can it with it's declared aim of 'peaceful co-existence'. The Soviet Union prefers to concentrate its wrath on 'German revanchism'

which it knows full well is merely an off-shoot of a larger monster.

Soviet intervention has come as a blow to the anti-imperialist movement in the West.

It is for all these reasons that we are saddened by your support of the Russian intervention because we, Fidel, never thought that you could ever be on the same side, albeit objectively, as men like Monje and others of his ilk in Latin America, men who have dishonoured Marxism and are betraying the Revolution. All of us have supported the achievements of the Cuban Revolution ! Most of us have visited Cuba since its liberation ! We still do ! We are in complete solidarity with the struggle begun by Che in the jungles of Bolivia and we shall continue to help in the struggle against U.S. Imperialism. But it is precisely because of our political position on these questions that we ask you Fidel : WHY ? ? ?

*Tariq Ali,
Clive Goodwin,
David Mercer,
Roger Smith,
Irving Teitlebaum, London, England.*

PUEBLO, UNETE A TUS HIJOS ! — NO QUEREMOS OLIMPIADAS;
QUEREMOS REVOLUTION — GRANADEROS ASESINOS ! — PREN-
SA VENDIDA ! — AÑO DEL OLIMPICO RIDICULO ! — LIBROS
SI, BAYONETAS NO ! — PORFIRIO DIAZ ORDAZ ! — LIBERTAD
O MUERTE ! LIBERTAD O MUERTE ! LIBERTAD O

MEXICO'S NEW MOVEMENT

by Nardo Perello

Nardo Pesello is a pen-name for a Mexican activist who sent this article to OUR GENERATION. This article has been slightly edited.

1—(written August, 1968)

The student upheavels which broke out in Mexico City at the end of July still have the country attentive to the demands of a strong and unified national student strike. Not since 1958, when the Railroad and Electrical workers paralyzed the country for eight days, has the government been so threatened. The present situation marks a first in Mexican political history.

In the first place, most observers here feel impressed by the fact the students are able to hold their extremely intelligent and valiant position in the face of the clever methods of a government which is an old hand at "playing" with its opponents as well as its people, and a press campaign which has been, and continues to be, absolutely sold out to the government (the Administration provides paper for all large newspapers, thus assuring coverage in its favour).

Perhaps it was the monumental humiliation of the Olympic preparations, perhaps it was the brutal greeting of the legal demonstrations of the 26th and 29th of July, more probably it was a complex combination of forces that finally broke the student resignation — and by the effort and example of the student vanguard the apathy of an entire country.

The 1958 uprising produced the new "crime" of *Desilusion Social* (Clauses #145 and #145-bis. of the Mexican Penal Code, and a point under attack in the present crisis) and there are still several hundred political prisoners serving indefinite sentences under that pretext. Demetrio Vallejo, head of the Railroad Workers' Union, has been behind bars for these ten years and was on the 18th day of a hunger strike when the current uprising broke out. The past few years have been marked by demonstrations demanding the release of Mexican political prisoners, among other indications of dissatisfaction, but the Mexican government — "revolutionary but institutionalized" — knows how to deal with its opposition.



**CUANDO UN
GOBIERNO
ABUSA DE LA
FUERZA, SE
CONVIERTE EN
DICTADURA!**

¡VENCEREMOS! - CONSEJO NACIONAL DE HUELGA

"When a government abuses force, it becomes a dictatorship."

In Mexico, bribery and "official coercion" are the routine of every day. The quietest middle-class citizen lives this as much as anyone, and the poor know it as an albatross too heavy to be removed by anything but Christian death. Entering the country, the customs official is the first to hold out his hand. Hardly a motorist in the country accepts a traffic violation ticket; ten or twenty pesos is almost always enough to urge the friendly cop to forget that you did or did not run through that red light. The "did" or "did not" is not important. Mexico's government offices have been dubbed "the Aurchwitz" of Latin America with the paperwork reduced by a palm greased here and there.

For years — indeed, since the famous revolution in 1910 — attempts at any kind of organization or reformation among the peasants in the provinces has resulted in outright assassination of the agitators. There has never even been an attempt to adequately cover the news of these killings. In the capitol, attention to the "rules of the bribe game" supposedly saves one from this fate.

Conditions, even of bribery, are no longer simple. Mexico wants to imitate her neighbor to the North in every way possible; this includes the "civilized veneer." Sometimes it is difficult to know who to pin the folded bill to. This is the land for things being what they're not, and not being what they are. As complexities increase, the graft mounts in size and scope. Forged military cards are easy to come by (many Mexicans avoid doing their year of military service this way) but it may take time to find the General or Major who wants to make that extra 500 pesos (\$40). Thousands of university professors and other teachers yearly wait six to eight months for their first pay cheque (then are paid the six or eight months' salary at once). The situation is accepted (unions are almost all government run) and chalked up to "bureaucratic mismanagement." The truth of the matter rests in the hands of several employees of the Treasury Department who yearly make a half a million peso profit on their investments of payroll money.

Do we hate the traffic policeman (or *mordilones* as they are disrespectfully called here), or do we accept them as an evil part of the system? Up until the current strike, unfortunately, we have done both.

* Throughout this article there are a number of figures given and events recorded as "fact." In other articles about the Mexican situation, figures may differ slightly; facts may be slightly different. It should be remembered that the entire development of the student strike as well as the repression which followed it — and still follows it — has taken place in an atmosphere of lies and distortions on the part of the authorities. Mexico city has a population of almost 7,000,000, newspapers and radio give out the "official line" at all times, and contact with the provinces has been virtually cut off as far as the movement is concerned. The figures and facts adhered to in this piece are usually a result of a number of coinciding and authoritative sources, and whenever possible they are the result of eye-witness accounts.

The system generates itself; the Mexican citizen will automatically flee the scene of a serious accident even if it means leaving his own vehicle and/or the dead or dying. No one in his right mind would stop to attend an accident victim in Mexico; not because the Mexican has acquired anything near the New York City indifference for human welfare and life, but because he knows from bitter experience that in Mexico "involvement" makes one an accessory, and an accessory is worse than a victim any time.

Note of Similarity with Canadians

Something in the collective and cultural inferiority complex from which the average Mexican suffers is also undoubtedly responsible for the "sheep's" attitude in acceptance of a self-generating and degrading system. Colonialization, from the Spanish 500 years ago to the subtler but just as powerful North Americans of today, has a great deal to do with this collective complex. The Mexican is still not sure if he is Spanish, Indian, 20th-century American, or none of these. Or all of them. His national pride is a dispersed and complex thing. Unfortunately, in an article of this size, these aspects can only be suggested. (Read *The Labyrinth of Solitude, Life and Thought in Mexico*, Octavio Paz, trans. by Lysander Kemp, Grove Press, New York, 1951. Exceptionally probing essays on the Mexican mind and emotions).

Mexico is shown off to foreign investor and tourist alike as the "advanced" country of Latin America, the most economically stable, the most replete in social aids, the most caring of its poor. Enormous Social Security plants are *almost* passed off as socialized medicine. Great housing projects are displayed without the added information regarding the bribery involved in securing one living unit in these projects. Mexico City's many parks and fountains make it one of the greenest and most beautiful cities in the world; tourists rarely enter the half of the city's neighborhoods which are without running water.

What about the 20 million Indians who barely know Spanish, let alone are able to participate in the necessary social and cultural advantages of modern life? What about the treatment given the poor or *humildes* when they present the same *Seguro Social* card as their better off neighbor at the local *Seguro Social* clinic? What about the teachers who are rarely in their classrooms in the schools in poorer neighborhoods? (Their salaries, even when not held up, usually necessitate their holding two, and sometimes three jobs): What about the students of these teachers? What about the three women to a bed in the General Hospital's maternity pavillon? And so on... We live with all this, until recently it was easier not to ask questions.

The students have taught us to "ask questions." PUEBLO, UNETE
A TUS HIJOS! (People, unite with your sons and daughters !)

Mexico is held up as an example among the countries of Latin America, and it is certainly true that here the misery is less apparent, less widespread and, if it makes any difference, less extreme. It's still misery. Imperialism exploits its colonies to the degree it is able to withstand the international prestige limits at any given time and place. Given the country's natural resources, foreign trade, technical advances and monetary stability, Mexico should be five times as advanced as it is — with the logical benefits to all levels of society. Advanced, that is, as regards people — but it's a long way from government to people, and there are a lot of pockets in between.

Here the Mexican Revolution is a myth which continues to be used as rhetoric by the government to placate the masses. "We've *had* our revolution; ours is a *revolutionary* government." The PRI (official party, *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) is just what it's name implies. In Mexico the government employs the leading leftists in government positions, thus assuring their complete control. Many of the "intellectuals" were on safe government stipends, assuring low-voiced dissent.

The government even permitted and underwrote a certain amount of dissenting literature, to keep the avenues of "free press" evident. The Communist Party is semi-official, and although periodically used by the government as a scapegoat for disturbances, it is actually quite safe and dead. (*Just before the current upheaval the central committee of the Mexican Communist Party had met with President Diaz Ordaz regarding plans for a more official status, legalization, etc., and the CP divergence with the idea of armed struggle is well known by now all over the world.*)

Why, then didn't we just go right on accepting the everyday, the ordinary? Undoubtedly, the Olympic preparations had a great deal to do with both sides of the question. Expensive and ostentatious planning has been a constant sore point during the past year. A variety of taxes were raised without prior warning (such as the sudden doubling of the yearly automobile tax). Along with the incredible Olympic installations and general renovation of the parts of the city which would be used by the visitors, the Olympic Committee (through the city's department of *Accion Social*) had the audacity to paint the fronts of the squalid community housing in the poorest neighborhoods bright, Mexican colors! If an Olympic tourist happens to wander into one of these terrifying and suffocating neighborhoods, appearances will still be "picturesque." *

* Montrealers remember similar efforts by their Municipal Government to cover up the slums of the city during EXPO '67.

It was obvious that the most militant leftists (perhaps student groups in the majority) would plan some kind of demonstration of disagreement during the game. The government, on July 26th, began to provoke this ahead of time, thereby hoping to have the key troublemakers in jail or dead by Olympic time. (Here, again, a lesson well-learned from the "neighbor" to the North: King's death as a provocation to abort summer ghetto violence.)

Whatever the multiple factors in provoking the current situation, the most important aspect to date is the continuing strength and unity in a movement which does not yet command total support from either the workers or the public at large, and which arose from a very disperse and politically undeveloped 500,000 students! Before attempting to analyse the current movement in any depth, however, I will go over the major events leading to the situation to date.

July 26

On July 26th the CNED (*Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democraticos*, a Communist Party-affiliated youth group) organized a march of solidarity with the Cuban revolution's date. The FNET (*Federacion Nacional de Estudiantes Tecnicos*, a right-wing government student organization) held its own march the same day. Their expressed reason for demonstrating was in protest for an incident on Tuesday, July 23rd, in which a riot squad had entered Vocational School #5, injuring several students and teachers and reportedly killing one girl student. Authoritative sources say there had been some trouble in Vocational School #2 and that, with its usual ineptitude, the riot squad had been called to and entered the wrong school. All informed sources, however, acknowledge the fact that the obvious reason for the FNET's march was to draw attention away from the march offering solidarity with the Cuban Revolution.

Why did a student death at the hands of a city riot squad bring no dissent on July 24th? Why not July 25th? (The FNET has long been known as a group formed to control student dissent throughout the nation. Every year the more naive and unsophisticated students from the provinces are urged — to the tune of expensive orgies including blond women and plenty of promises — to join the FNET. These are the future members of the PRI...).

Both marches took place in the center of Mexico City. Things progressed in a more or less orderly manner, until a group of students from the National Polytechnical Institute decided to go to the *Zocalo* (central square, bordered by the Presidential Palace and other public buildings) to protest more forcefully the violence which took place at the Vocational School #5. The FNET tried to prevent this but the Polytechnical students succeeded in getting to the *Zocalo*. (It is now known that the leader of the FNET himself was responsible for calling out the riot squad, and he tried to clear himself

of this accusation by the only means at his disposal: a public letter, printed in the local newspapers, from the Mexico City chief of police!)

In the city's central square the first blood bath began. Riot squads began beating the students, leaving many of them unconscious on the streets. Onlookers immediately took the students' side and began throwing flower pots and rocks at the police. This public solidarity with the students seemed a constant as regards the *on the spot incidents* during the first weeks of violence (the witnessing of actual brutality, incidents in which cars were stopped and people asked for money and aid.) but the totally distorted press campaign had the mass of public opinion against the students — at least during the first two weeks of upheaval.

All during the afternoon of July 26th the students — in various factions — and the police and riot squads battled back and forth between the Zocalo and the *Hemiciclo Juarez*, on the city's main avenue some 15 blocks away. At one point a number of windows were broken in the elegant shops along the *Avenida Juarez*; police estimates say a million pesos worth of merchandize was looted from jewelry stores and other establishments. Later, near the Zocalo, the police confused a group of students leaving their classes at Preparatory School #3 with demonstrators and began stoning and beating them. The students took that as a signal to begin barricading the street; they occupied city busses and forced them to park sideways blocking off traffic on several main arteries. They burned two busses as well. The toll of the first day: 500 wounded, 4 in a state of coma, 3 or 4 dead and 300 arrested.

That night the School of Economics at the National Polytechnical Institute and the Preparatory School #3 went on strike protesting the brutality of the riot squads. It was too late for the events to have made the newspapers. The government occupied the Communist Party headquarters as well as many private homes making indiscriminate arrests. The old scapegoat, the entire central committee of the CP, was in prison. Many others militant leftists were behind bars as well.

July 27

The morning of July 27th saw the beginning of what may be among the most completely false news campaign in recent times. The newspapers — from rightest to "liberal" — chalked the violence up to a "communist plot," accused the Cuban embassy of support and of having taken part in the manifestations. It wasn't until a few days later that charges of "CIA and FBI infiltration" as well as "international student agitation" became fashionable explanations for the disturbances.

All deaths were denied. The radio gave news of the violence, but also in a biased and partial manner. The National University radio station began giving the only real news of the events; members of the University judicial department even made hourly calls to parents whose sons were missing, to help in the investigations. The university radio station then suffered a two-day ban from the air, for "unknown" reasons. When it returned to broadcasting, it had been tempered to fit in with other official media. Vocational School #5 joined the strike, a great number of students from all over the city went to the Polytechnical Institute to discuss plans, liberate busses, and so on.

July 29

On Monday, July 29th, all the vocational and prevocational (equivalent to technical high schools and technical junior highs) schools in the city joined the general strike. All the preparatory (pre-university) schools joined too, with the exception of #5 and #6. Preparatory School #7 blocked off the *Viga*, a main artery of the city, with 25 busses liberated by them. Vocational School #7 sectioned off the whole *Nonoalco* area. Preparatory School #3 was also blocked off and occupied by students. A general meeting was called at 5:00 that afternoon in the Zocalo to protest riot squad brutality. The Zocalo was occupied by police and riot squad however, and the meeting never took place.

The students, frustrated in their need to demonstrate, began taking over busses and occupying — for brief periods of time — different parts of the center of the city. Forty busses were liberated, streets were closed off, and a great deal of damage was done. It is interesting to note that, contrary to recent expressions in France and the United States, as well as other parts of Latin America, no immediate student leaders emerged during these first demonstrations. (As the strike progresses, this becomes an important aspect: the traditional Mexican student leaders who are always found on their way to national political leadership, have had no place in this strike. New spontaneous leaders, and, especially *groups* of students, are taking charge of the situation.)

At 8:00 the night of the 29th, a clash between students of Preparatory School #3 and riot squads in the Zocalo blew up into a virtual war using molotov cocktails, rocks, clubs, sticks. A bus was burned. The battle lasted four hours, and at 1:00 a.m. the army was called in. A bazooka was fired to break down the 400-year old colonial door of Preparatory School #3 — occupied at that time by the students — and it was taken over by the army. Tanks and bayonet-welding soldiers were everywhere. The firing of the bazooka took the lives of a number of students standing behind the door. By this time there were many seriously wounded among both students and authorities. Six hundred students were arrested that night alone.

The newspapers still reported "no deaths", as well as "not a shot fired by the army". But the more sensationalist press showed huge displays of photographs, including one showing the firing of the bazooka at the door of Preparatory School #3, and few could help but "read between the line". And, of course, the shattered door remained for anyone taking the trouble to pass by to see.

In the School of Humanities at the National University a general assembly was attended by almost the entire student body. A strike of classes was agreed upon with continuous debates, and the students asked the faculty to give them classes on the French uprising of May and June, the Columbia University strike, and other recent student revolts. Fighting commissions formed; brigades were assigned for propaganda, finances, political action, medical aid, and so on. Medical students at the National University who tried to aid wounded students, however, were clubbed and arrested for trying to interfere. Red Cross workers suffered the same fate, and, it is said, one of them was killed on the night of the bazooka firing. The repression made an absolute body count impossible. More than one eye-witness has demanded investigation of bodies "carried away from the city Red Cross stations and later incinerated at the Marte Military Camp". The government still admitted no deaths, intent at all costs on preserving its image of "sunny" Mexico for its Olympic visitors.

The government occupied Vocational Schools #5 and #2 on July 29th. A protest march underway at the National University left in full force to defend Preparatory School #1 and, taking advantage of the opportunity, the army roped off the entire National University.

"University autonomy" is a national banner in Mexico. The army, in the last few years, has entered a number of national universities, including those in Sonora, Morelia and Chihuahua. But the most incredible offenses to personal and collective liberty have often been overlooked in the provinces. What called for only the protest of a few intellectuals and students when it took place in the provinces, became the banner of Dr. Barros Sierra, rector of the National University, when it happened in the capital. The "protest" march he headed, following the bloody events of the 29th, had as its central theme "a flag at half mast for the infringement of university autonomy".

The National Polytechnical Institute also had its march, somewhat more militant but still headed by school authorities, who, in the last analysis, always were forced to take the side of the government. On August 2nd, however, the rebellion had gone beyond any one controlling force. A demonstration beginning in the *Casco de Santo Tomas* and going several miles to the central Zocalo, was composed of 200,000 people. The students were absolutely orderly; the dictum was "don't give them any provocation for violence". A National Strike Committee (*Consejo Nacional de Huelga*) had been formed, and the students gave the government 72 hours to answer their five central demands:

1. Immediate release of all political prisoners taken since July 28th.
2. Immediate removal of Police Chiefs Cueto, Mendoles, and Police Captain Frias.
3. Immediate abolishment of the riot squads and other repressive organs of the government, without their being replaced by other repressive organs.
4. Indemnization for the families of dead and wounded students.
5. Abolishment of Clauses #145 and #145-bis. in the Mexican Penal Code.

On August 2nd, with 200,000 voices filling the central square, the students advised the government of two additional pleas. They would no longer ask permission for any demonstration, realizing the right to demonstrate as one safeguarded by the national constitution. And they would demand "freedom of the press" in reality instead of simply in name.

Two hundred thousand orderly students and citizens shouted insults at Mayor Corona de Rosal and President Diaz Ordaz. Neither the mayor nor the president showed his face. The public dispersed and went home. But the barrier of control had been broken; the strike was now nation-wide; every public institution of higher education in the country was officially closed.

The government began making all sorts of false moves to "come to terms" with the students. Through the usual emissaries, the bargaining began to take place. But, much to the surprise of a government whose people are used to bribes and easily fall into the temptation of the "highest offers", the students wouldn't budge. The National Strike Committee announced it would be glad to speak with the government, but on two conditions: 1) that either point 1 or point 2 of the petition be honored before any talks took place and 2) that all talks take place in public, without intermediaries, to the satisfaction of the public at large. Assemblies held daily in all the schools at the University as well as the Polytechnical Institute have repeatedly offered dialogue with senators, political leaders and other government officials; with a roundabout vocabulary — often seeming like consent to the uninformed public — all these offers have been turned down.

Government terrorism continued; leading student agitators' houses were entered daily, their families were beaten up, mothers of dead or missing sons were denied the opportunity to make public notice of their losses in the city newspapers. Only one Mexican publication, a magazine called POR QUE? (edited by a group of radicals) published the truth in word and photograph. The press machinery where the first issue of POR QUE? dealing with the strike was printed was burned to the ground, and an attempt was made on the editor's life. The magazine circulated widely in Mexico, however, in spite of the repression, and several weekly issues were devoted to the progression of events surrounding the conflict.

And so, the students, afraid of remaining in their homes or simply too involved in their new work to leave campus, set up giant living quarters on the national university campus and in the buildings of other schools. They took over cafes and cafeterias (forcing the concession managers to provide them with food, and offering a 10% increase in salaries to the workers to show they were serious!). They set up their own loudspeaker "radio stations". They renamed university buildings after Che Guevara, Demetrio Vallejo, Nugen Van Troi. Daily mimeographed bulletins gave information regarding the progress of the strike.

The work of the brigades

The brigades went out among the people. Daily hundreds of groups of two to four students visited markets, factories, parks. A fellow with a guitar, accompanied by two friends — one with leaflets and the other to collect money — would board a city bus, sing a revolutionary song, explain briefly the aims of the strikers, make a collection and climb down. The brigades talked to the people and explained the students' position. Slowly, the public opinion began to swing to the students' side.

On campus, press committees tried to get the truth of the strike to foreign news services without the interference of national media. At Chapingo, the National Agricultural School, the government supplied food to the students who lived on campus. When the army cut off the food supply in an attempt to get the students to capitulate the people from the surrounding areas began bringing supplies, and soon the Chapingo students began trading the milk of the school's prize cows for their daily bread.

Brigades began working in the hospitals too, trying to involve the underpaid doctors and nurses in the strike. Several different groups of workers are now at the point of joining the strike, but government pressure was strong. At one point a rumour that automobile gasoline in Mexico City was running out, mobilized the entire population in endless lines before every one of the city's gas stations. One didn't know if the government had cut off the gas supply to pressure the strikers — and the public at large —, or what had happened. It might have been a rumour, but no one was willing to chance that. Several hours after thousands of worried citizens had filled their tanks, the radio began repeating "there is no shortage of gas, there will be no shortage of gas, all rumours to the contrary are completely false". It was later discovered, however, that the rumour reflected threat of two sections of the Petroleum industry to join the strike. The army stepped in and prevented the strike being carried out, but the intention, at least, had been there.

At all costs, the Olympics were to be saved — the coming Olympics, as well as the President's state of the union message due September 1st, seemed responsible for at least a temporary sense of truce.

One of the most exciting incidents related to the strike was the incident of *Topilejo*. *Topilejo* is a town of some 15,000 inhabitants, approximately 20 kilometers outside Mexico City. The population is largely rural, peasants in majority. They are serviced by a line of run-down second rate busses, and towards the end of August two of these busses crashed into one another, causing an accident in which ten people died. The simple towns-people mourned their dead without realizing they were in a position to ask indemnity, nor, of course, did the government advise them of that right. But the striking students heard about the accident; the young lawyers from the school of law at the university went out and told the victims' families how to go about asking for aid from the bus companies themselves. Medical students went out to attend the wounded and they ended up setting up free consultation for the villagers themselves. Other brigades began to work in the town: they educated the people regarding the strike, they set up hygiene centers and reading and writing classes. In a matter of a week, the entire town "belonged" to the students. On that day several neighboring villages sent representatives to find out "what it was all about", the government had the riot squad and army surrounding the area and that put an end to this small-scale but unusual social reorganization program.

Lesser, but also interesting sidelights to the central events was a message of solidarity from Genaro Vasquez (guerrilla leader in the mountains of south Guerrero) which had been received and distributed by the students; for many this was the first proof of a guerrilla nucleus in the country (though others are aware of the fact that there are guerrillas operating in at least three states: Guerrero, Sonora and Chihuahua). The FNET has been completely discredited by the bulk of the Polytechnical students. A group representing at least a considerable part of Mexico City's police has released a statement of solidarity with the students (against their superiors). A committee set up by the National Strike Committee, reports 2,700 hotel accommodations cancelled so far in connection with the Olympic games.

Some of Mexico's leading painters (Jose Luis Cuevas, Manuel Felguerez, Felipe Ehrenberg, Jose Icaza,) painted a collective mural of protest on the wide column of metal covering the extinct statue of Miguel Aleman on the esplanade of the University. (The statue itself, long a sore point with the students, was blown up during a demonstration last year). Mexican poets and theatre people held several Sunday festivals on campus, during which the strike was explained to the public by members of the Strike Committee and donations were collected.

What will the outcome of the strike be? It would be naive, at this point, to assume this is the beginning of the real Mexican Revolution, but it is the beginning of something. If nothing else, the students and public are developing their political consciousness. The government still has many repressive cards in its hand, but it seems probable that at least one or two of the student demands will have

to be met. Nothing will be the same in Mexico after this. The students have taught the nation never again to accept things as they are.

II—(Written October, 1968)

A tremendous demonstration on August 27th saw half a million citizens marching down Reforma from the Anthropology Museum in Chapultepec Park to the Zocalo. Even the local newspapers admitted 400,000 participants. The marchers were by no means all students: by this time there were also housewives, workers, peasants, professional people and intellectuals. Complete order was maintained throughout the march and during the speeches in the Zocalo. Insults to the president came from anonymous — but loud and consistent — sources in the huge crowd. A few individual provocations, such as the raising of the black and red flag on the Zocalo pole and the ringing of the cathedrals bells, didn't seem to be sufficient for any sizeable response from the ever present army and police forces.

After the demonstration of the 27th of August, the National Strike Committee had decided to leave a permanent vigil group at the Zocalo. The vigil consisted of representatives of all the schools and other units. Some 3,500 who remained there at eleven that night were dispersed by the army in the early morning hours. Students were forced down the narrow streets leading from the Zocalo to *San Juan de Letran*. Light tanks ran over more than a few. The fighting lasted till the next day, and by noon reports were that approximately 30 had been killed. There were rumours that one of the dead was not a student: the first non-movement death to date. Other rumours placed the bodies inside the National Palace courtyard. (It should be noted that these "rumours" usually turned out to contain more truth than any published or "official" report. Newspapers at this point — and only in the more liberal ones — allowed the indignation of individual reporters to be read between the lines. But the official line was still cautious liberalism. And the extent of the repression made accurate investigation all but impossible.) Any public reaction that had simmered down by this time, flared up now in the face of these new atrocities.

On the first September, the president makes his yearly State of the Union speech which is televised to the nation. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was stiff and serious at the rostrum. His appearance in every way confirmed widespread rumours that he had been shot and missed a month before while on tour in Guadalajara, and then machine-gunned while driving along one of Mexico City's freeways several weeks later. From this last incident, it was said the president had received a wound in his left arm. Those who had heard the rumour were interested to note he never moved that arm during the televised message.

After several hours of "economic" and "social" national statistics, the president talked about the student conflict. Most listeners conscious of the significance his verbal reaction could have (he had been notably silent during the entire conflict), expected him to follow the line of least resistance: liberalism based on cooptation, some government concessions at least on paper. They were in for a surprise. Diaz Ordaz was adamant, absolute, and hard-lined all the way. He ignored or dismissed any mention of government brutality and instead dwelt for some time on "students who had knocked over the vegetable stands of miserable small businessmen, beggars who had been trampled by students during necessary police control," and so on.

He went so far as to say "there is not one political prisoner in Mexico" and challenged all with that absurd statement. (Only a few months before, the newspapers themselves had openly stated the State's reason for refusing to grant amnesty to Valentin Campa, leader in prison since the 1958 strike: "unwillingness to change political beliefs" was the written charge.) The president got around the popular question — especially among the liberal sector — of university autonomy by claiming "the University is part of the nation, and when national security is involved, protection comes first." On this point he has loudly maintained that the role of the student is to study. And Diaz Ordaz added: "The University deserves autonomy when the students and professors are engaged in the work of a University: their books". In his denunciation of the student movement, he paved the way for a complete government over-throw.

The September drama

Students and others involved in the movement expected a confrontation to happen sooner. No one believed the government would allow the 15th and 16th of September (anniversary of the initiation of the national independence) to pass with the schools still occupied by students. Although the majority of students unable to return to their homes for reasons of safety were still living on campus (as well as working on campus: turning out their daily news releases, holding press conferences, organizing brigades, printing posters, etc.) many of the more political members of the movement were making plans to go into relative hiding. Plans, at the very least, involved getting the equipment (medicines, mimeograph machines, paints, etc.) into hiding.

Just before the weekend of September 15-16, on the 13th, a dull rainy day with many of the students already in hiding, a silent march was held. It followed the same route as the first big march but dispersed completely at the Zocalo. The only incidents recorded this

time were the destruction of some 200 cars (witnesses testify to Mexican soldiers banging on fenders and hoods with rifle butts) parked by the marchers at the National Anthropology Museum. Only 100,000 students participated this time, but public support was obviously still very much with them.

The night of September 15th is a national fiesta in Mexico. Thousands fill the central square year after year to hear the president repeat Hidalgo's shout of "Viva Mexico". This year few were present, these were government employees forced to attend, and even among them the silence and hissing and whistling far outweighed any spontaneous enthusiasm. (Witnesses testify to this; on the televised versions, tapes of dubbed cheering replaced reality.) Elsewhere in the city, however, the people took their national celebration into their own hands (and out of the president's). On the campus of the University, at the National Polytechnical Institute, in the neighborhood plaza of Coyoacan and elsewhere people gathered to hear companions pronounce the shout of "Viva Mexico" and they responded as they couldn't to their president. People brought *tamales* and home-made sweets, and the fiesta became truly popular.

On the morning of the 16th, the traditional military parade, augmented for the first time this year with the presence of the greatly feared mounted guard of the provinces, brought obvious adverse reaction from the sidelines. Otherwise, there were no incidents. (Here it should be brought out that the provincial mounted police is that group most feared by the peasantry. They are the ones who have slaughtered countless peasant leaders, razing their homes and leaving behind the smoldering bodies as a warning to others).

The National Strike Committee continued to meet and publish reiterations of its demands in the daily newspapers. The tremendous splits already developing within the Committee were not yet public domain (revolutionaries and those with more conservative short-range views were splitting along several lines). The government continued to ignore all demands, while cloaking its attitude in the language of condescension, well-meaning phrases and other forms of cooptation. (The president, in his speech, had said "To our knowledge, no formal demand has been presented in writing by these students; we have had to intuit their desires...") There was only partial coverage in the foreign press (all part of the same international vow of silence when it comes to damaging tourist trade, economic stability in the "free world", the XIX Olympics). Unofficial communications nationally had been more effective, than anyone realized. At a meeting of the Strike Committee on the University campus, two Taharamaura Indians appeared. They had come from their home in Sonora, several thousand kilometers to the north. The representatives from this rapidly diminishing and anguished tribe knew all about the strike. In their broken Spanish they told the students: "... we can't understand it. We can't understand how they treat you like this. We understand it when they treat us bad, when they kill us. But you are their sons! What evil must be in them, to treat their own sons like this...".

From time to time news leaked out of army personnel trying to sneak arms to the students. All arms stores were closed by the government. Hooded figures machine-gunned several schools, passing for rightist terrorists but using arms typical of the Mexican army. Anonymous letters from a few men trapped in the armed services were made public, blowing holes in the "terrorist" stories.

On Wednesday night, the 18th of September, around ten p.m. heavy artillery started rolling along the *Avenida Universidad*, headed towards the National University. Many students were on campus, as well as several hundred parents attending a parents' meeting, professors, janitors, workers of various kinds. Some parents who got word of the approaching tanks and knew their sons or daughters were on campus, rushed to the University (several of these were arrested later, while their more agile offspring managed to escape). By eleven o'clock the university buildings were surrounded and everyone there picked up. Some students managed to escape between one tank and another, but hundreds were taken to various prisons. The president had made good the promise of his September 1st address.

Immediate public reaction was intense but an atmosphere of legality continued with daily debates in the Senate regarding university autonomy, the pros and cons of the laws #145 and #145-bis. One young PRI senator had the audacity to join members of lesser parties in their verbal outspokenness, but was silenced quickly and came back the following day to eat his previous words. While these "men of state" held their discussions in a "democratic" atmosphere, young boys were being beaten up in prison and members of the Mexican armed forces were taking their booty from the National University campus (typewriters, projectors, laboratory equipment including Mexico's only electron microscope, etc., — property evaluated at 25,000,000 pesos was missing when the army finally retreated almost two weeks later).

The rector of the University, Dr. Javier Barros Sierra, made his public resignation several days later. This was not accepted by the government university board, however, and he was forced to stay: face-saving devices and demagogery on all sides.

The army was finally called out of the University on September 30th, the same day a group of some 500 mothers (including mothers of dead and wounded students) marched in black down the Reforma and cried their protest before the Senate. Members of the Senate who appeared on the steps to receive them, had the audacity to "add a few words".

Three Cultures

On October 2nd the National Strike Committee called a public meeting at the *Plaza de las Tres Culturas* (Square of the three cultures: Indian, Colonial and Modern) at the housing project of Tlatelolco. The residential area had already been radicalized to a

large extent by having been made witness to the destruction of a nearby school, as well as by the liberal quantities of tear gas filling the housing project itself at a previous meeting some weeks before. The October 2nd meeting was called to debate or reaffirm the opinion of the student base, as regarding the return to classes (pleaded for by the directors of the various educational centers) or the continuance of the strike until the six points on the list of demands were met.

This was later termed *El segundo noche triste de Mexico* (making reference to the first tragic night on which, 500 years ago on this same spot, the Spaniards betrayed and assassinated Cuauhtemoc, the Aztec king.) On this twentieth-century parallel, the massacre was much greater: the official figures were 27 dead and 150 wounded. All witnesses, including impartial foreign correspondents (there were 35 of these present in Mexico for the Olympics) put the death toll at between 200 and 400, the wounded uncountable.

The meeting was comprised of some 10 000 citizens. The plaza was filled and the speakers' rostrum occupied a balcony on the 3rd floor of the "Chihuahua", one of the apartment buildings. The original plans had been to hold a brief meeting and then march, en masse, to the *Casco de Santo Tomas*, one section of the Polytechnical Institute still held by the army. Due to word that the repressive forces were expected at any moment, however, the Committee speakers suddenly announced a change in plan: the meeting would break up and avoid confrontation with the police.

At the moment of that announcement, with people still wondering whether to stay or leave, a helicopter overhead dropped two flares, one green and one red, into the midst of the crowd. At the same time, the shooting began. The public, hysterical after the first shots, quickly saw that the plaza was completely surrounded: the army had blocked off every possible exit. Tanks and light artillery were everywhere; 9 mm. weaponry was used (in other words, war materiel). The only escape seemed towards the insides of the buildings themselves. People began running, in any and every direction. The army followed orders to shoot "anything that moves". Men, women, children, pregnant women and old people fell right and left.

The battle lasted six hours. Many of those killed were hit on the stairs and in the halls of the buildings where they had tried to take refuge. Agents later identified as plainclothesmen with white handkerchiefs tied around their right hands operated at close range throughout the crowd. Even if the official explanation of "sniper fire" had any truth to it at all, the extent of the shooting went far beyond any kind of retaliatory measure. It was a mass assassination. There is no other word for it.

Inside the buildings, the occupants — already in full sentiment with the movement in spite of their natural fear — hustled students and public alike into apartments. The army, searching all these build-

ings throughout that long night, picked up those who tried to protect as well as those hiding. An anthropological "cave" in the ruins of the plaza became a hasty dungeon where many sources later testified to the on-the-spot shooting of several of the Strike Committee members.

Ambulances were not let into the plaza for five hours. For ~~the~~ reason alone, many of the wounded simply died on the stones of the square. Others, who were somehow brought to Red Cross stations and public hospitals (already manned by army personnel in addition to their regular staffs) died while bookings took precedence over medical attention. Some doctors who tried to intervene and attend the casualties, disappeared temporarily.

Some people managed to escape that *Noche Triste*. One student tells how he hid in an apartment the police didn't get to till the following day. In the early morning hours he "...went out with the lady of the house, milk pails over both our arms, we were mother and son". But several thousand were not that lucky. Those who escaped death were taken to the Military Camp #1, or the *Campo Marte* as it is sometimes called. There were thousands of prisoners there. While the slow process of investigation began, prisoners told stories of 200 in cells built for 20. Not being able to sit or lie down was a common complaint. But not being able to unbend was ~~not~~ always due to lack of room. The beatings and tortures which began to leak out from the morning of the 3rd on, left no doubt in anyone's mind as to what Mexico was up against.

The standard World-Wide Catch-All

Following the catch-all of "foreign agitators", used by the authorities extensively up to this point in the strike, various foreigners who happened to be in the meeting at Tlatelolco were treated exceptionally badly. They were given parafin tests and it was claimed their "finger prints" were on all manner of "weaponry" found in the buildings. It was immediately deduced that they must be the master-minds of the "anti-Mexican plot", and several of them were immediately given long sentences which they only managed to get out of after weeks of torture or mistreatment and the intervention of U.S. authorities willing to act in their behalf.

The foreign press was incredulous. A German journalist, in Mexico to cover the Olympics for a major German magazine, spent a day and a half at the Military Camp. All his possessions were taken from him, including travellers' checks, cameras, etc. He said "My father was a Nazi. I'm not proud of my country. But I've never seen anything to equal what happened at Tlatelolco". Two BBC newsmen suffered the same loss of property, the same imprisonment. They

spoke of the students' heads being shaved en masse in the courtyards of the compound; once they were released they'd be marked for further action. Oriana Fallaci, Italian writer and journalist, was wounded twice. In the *Hospital Vicente Lenero*, she returned the flowers sent by the president, with a few well-chosen words on the events of the past days. Then she left the hospital, recovered in a private sanitarium, and returned to Italy.

The dead: dozens of them (?), hundreds of them (?) were incinerated as the previous martyrs of the movement had been. The few indispensable funerals were allowed to be held. Inside the prisons: the convicts were questioned and tortured until the necessary "organizers" were uncovered. The daily papers held to their story of "snipers", "foreign snipers," and then began focusing attention on the "sensational revelations made by members of the Strike Committee who had been arrested".

At Tlalotelolco, the army patrolled the buildings and grounds. Bayonets drawn, the soldiers walked back and forth on the tops of buildings as well as down below. Tanks remained, circling the premises. A large army truck, filled with men, was parked before the passport offices in the State Department Building (on one side of the plaza). One of the soldiers was singing and plucking a guitar. Another was reading a copy of *POR QUE?* (still the only publication in the country to have published the facts throughout the events of these three months). Lines of "refugees", families leaving their apartments in the huge projects, could be seen walking away with their belongings and children.

The International Olympic Committee had an emergency meeting the following morning, but nothing was changed. The Mexican government had repressed the movement with brute force, and the Olympic preparations went on as if nothing had happened. Slogans and exhortations painted all over the city were methodically painted out and over them the Olympic Committee stenciled the words "BIENVENIDOS — WELCOME — BIENVENUS". Tourist trade was reduced by approximately half, many of the great sporting events were half empty, but the Olympics opened as scheduled with ostentatious fanfare on October 12th.

The beginning of the end

Thousands in prisons. Hundreds dead. Hundreds more missing. Hundreds wounded. The city painted exuberent colours. White doves of peace the repeated motif. Balloons and flags everywhere. The sense of unreality was hard to cope with, even for those least involved.

The Mexican government systematically used the army in the last two months of the strike, in order to repress what had obviously

become a popular movement for a more democratic system (despite no real effective worker's support, and in spite of the fact that the movement itself was engaged in various levels of radicalization). This consistent intervention by the army led many people to speculate on the possibility that the government had in fact been taken over by the Army (the "military coup" hypothesis.) It was rumoured that Marcial Farragan, the general who is the army's chief of staff, flew to Washington two days after the massacre at Tlatelolca. Rumours as to President Diaz Ordaz's silence, awkwardness and general inability to cope, also seemed to point to this possibility.

It was also considered that the government might have been taken over by the CIA (the "imperialist coup" hypothesis). The government itself had spread rumours, more than once featured in the press, as to "CIA infiltration", and it was also known (and will seem probably) that there are great schisms within the government itself.

But it seems evident that the CIA has no need to "rescue" the Mexican government in order to protect American interests. American interests are already well-administered in Mexico in the preferable manner: through the facade of Mexico as an independent sovereign and democratic nation. Mexico is actually owned by U.S. capital, any "51% theory" to the contrary.

The military coup theory also seems baseless at this point, though there is no doubt about the fact that the army is being intentionally strengthened. The Mexican army has no *tradicion de casta* (as, for example, the Argentine army has), it is small in size, and even in the unlikely possibility it could take over the government at this time, it is clear that it could not rule successfully.

It is not enough to seize power: the most difficult problem for any class is to conserve power, to *stay in power*. This requires not only the force of weapons but also the organization — the Party organization or any of its equivalents — capable of re-aligning those sectors of the ruling class which will form the basis of the new society, the new state. And real discontent with the status quo must be replaced by an alternative program, no matter how moderate that program is to begin with. The Mexican army is filled with discontented individuals, but there are few signs of any real organized move towards revolt.

If one looks back on the recent history of Mexico, it seems evident that the latest events represent a continuation of the ascendancy of force and violence in the strategy of a government which has found other methods less effective to maintain its power. The difference is that now coercion, cooptation, bribes and systematic lying are insufficient — more and more force is needed to keep the people in line. From Miguel Aleman to Ruiz Cortines to Lopez Mateos and now to Diaz Ordaz, the curve of official violence is steep. What has been for years taken for granted in the provinces

(the open killing of union and peasant leaders, obvious pillage and graft on every level) has now arrived in the capital and is spilling over the rim of the glass.

(Mid-December 1968): Troops surrounded the University in Mexico City on December 14 and armed patrols rolled through the street, after a clash yesterday between 6000 students and paratroops. The Attorney General's department said 500 people, mostly students, were arrested. The march was organized to protest against the continued detention of students and teachers jailed during the actions this summer before the Olympic Games.

THE EDITORS.

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MEXICO 1969

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AND REPRESSION

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INTERVIEW

Jim Harding, an associate editor of *OUR GENERATION*, spent a month in Europe this summer sponsored by the secretariat of the Canadian Union of Students. He attended the ninth World Youth Festival in Sophia, Bulgaria, as one of four CUS delegates. He also visited West Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, and England.

His main concern was to study the role of students in the French and West German crisis this past year, and to learn about the evolution of radical student politics in Eastern and Western Europe.

Harding reported his findings to Bill Fletcher, who interviewed him for *The Peak*.

The Peak : What did the Youth Festival show about students and youth internationally?

Jim Harding : There were 20,000 delegates from 120 countries. Some international generalizations are thus possible. First, I would say university issues now have a worldwide significance. In all industrial societies (capitalist and socialist) the issue of student participation exists. You, however, see different demands around this theme in different countries. In Canada radical students want to make the university independent of corporate interests and to replace training with critical education. This is true for radical students in all capitalist societies.

Growing demand

In Yugoslavia, in contrast, students who demonstrated in June were demanding that university education more fully prepare them to participate skillfully in the economy and society. This seems to be a growing demand in socialist societies. My conclusion is that radical students in capitalist societies are critical of corporate society and see no possibility of democratic participation in it; while in socialist societies they are opposed to bureaucratic elites who keep from building participatory democracy upon socialism.

Secondly, universities in the Third World are creating issues for students. Research and training go hand in hand with economic development or exploitation in these countries. If the "development" is based on capitalism, the universities are linked to the interests of the national bourgeoisie, and foreign investors. Hence there is a brain-drain on the country (professionals travelling to the U.S.) and the skills needed to bring the country out of poverty aren't produced. Universities in neo-colonial countries are themselves institutions of exploitation, and this is an issue for revolutionary students.

The Peak : How representative was the Youth Festival?

Jim Harding : World Youth Festivals were begun by youth groups of the "Allies" after WW II. The Cold War split youth organizations into communist and anti-communist and World Festivals became organized by Eastern European groups. This summer's festival reflected the end of Cold War politics among students. CUS and UGEQ were officially represented. The vast majority of non-communist student groups were there. So the delegation was broad. The actual organization of the Festival was a different thing, however. It was highly centralized, pre-planned and bureaucratic. It was like a multiversity, with lectures, huge meetings, etc. The Festival didn't allow participatory democracy in any way.

Neo-Stalinist

The Peak : Why do you think this was the case?

Jim Harding : Bulgaria is still a neo-Stalinist country. There are few signs of a radical youth movement with an international perspective. Thus student radicals from West Europe and North America and some long-haired Czechoslovakians weren't tolerated. Our leaflets calling for teach-ins were often taken away, and we had a tough time raising questions critical of the USSR in forums. There is no doubt that an authoritarianism still exists in Eastern Europe.

They just don't understand the new radicalism developing in Europe and America. When we (about 800 new leftists) demonstrated at the U.S. Embassy the Bulgarian police stopped us with horses and trucks as a barricade. Then Communist Youth had a counter-demonstration. It boggles your mind and makes you think Eastern European Socialism is as conservative as Mao argues.

The Peak : What about Czechoslovakia?

Jim Harding : I've done an extensive analysis of the Czech reforms and the Soviet-led occupation for a new Canadian student journal "Marxist Perspectives". It really takes a long analysis to understand what's happening there. The North American press doesn't give many clues either.

1) The Czech movement has broad support;

2) there are 3 main reforms: a) "special status" for the Slovak people, b) abolition of the centralized power of the Communist Party to be replaced by a socialist pluralism allowing many interests and groups to participate in government; and c) the adoption of a Yugoslav-type economy.

I strongly favour the first two, but the latter has too many overtones of a managerial-efficiency socialism. There is no doubt this is better than an authoritarian socialism, but I prefer a socialist humanism where status groups do not exist.

Exploitation

The Peak : Is there a real difference between these two types of socialism?

Jim Harding : It depends on how the economy is organized, and how wealth is distributed. Eastern European socialism is tied to the exchange-currency system of the world market. Nations compete

in this world market. Thus the person who produces is often exploited since the ends of production are not human liberation from labour and destitution, but building up a hard international currency. It's because of this that management in a Bulgaria furniture factory I visited stressed growing export production over lowering hours of work.

This managerial-socialism is of course inevitable as long as the U.S. dominates the world market. People in national socialist economies are being conditioned to labour, wages and consumption (though not debt as in capitalism), and real communist values ("from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs") are not being actualized. Instead you get status groups (though not exploitative classes) which get some vested interests over others.

The Peak : Is this what is happening in Czechoslovakia? Is this why USSR leadership considers the reforms "counter-revolutionary?"

Jim Harding : This is what seems to be happening all over Eastern Europe, whether their economies are centralized (planned) or decentralized (with a market place). The charge that Czech reforms are "counter-revolutionary" is rhetorical. The fact that the USSR is an industrial empire and Czechoslovakia is a part of it, and the added fact that a USSR-type Communist party is needed to integrate it into the empire, is the real basis of the Soviet-led occupation.

The Peak : Let's move on to the French and West German students. Dutschke and Cohn-Bendit have become well known in North America. What are the roots of these student movements?

Jim Harding : Authoritarian universities, the integration of West Europe economies into the U.S. Empire, growing neo-fascism, and the Vietnam war — all these have led to the revolutionary tactics of students in these countries. These students are firstly internationalists: they understand the political and social conflicts in their countries in relationship to U.S. imperialism, Third World liberation movements, and the significance of youth in the struggle for self-determination. I would now say that a new "Internationale" of revolutionary students is evolving in the world.

Slow to develop

The Peak : Are Canadian students part of this movement?

Jim Harding : We are slower to develop this consciousness because our society is so totally integrated into the continental capitalism of the U.S. Objectively, we are an industrial satellite with a colonial mentality. And Trudeau's branch-plant liberalism which focuses on legalism when economic realities are undermining our independence, further hampers us.

Still our condition is making us radical. The CUS conference took a significant turn to the left, though many liberal-reformers have just adopted a radical jargon without political experience to give it personal meaning. As the myths of the "great society" are exposed by the Vietnam War, the ghetto and the repression of

blacks and youth (e.g. Chicago), Canadians are turning inwards. It's hard to identify with a crumbling empire. This is the basis of a growing nationalism in this country. Whether this nationalism becomes a chauvinism that cloaks a liberal corporate society, or develops into a national liberation movement, depends greatly on the leadership of radical youth and students. In the last year radicals have begun to debate the relationship between the multiversity and Canada's satellite economy. If and when we demand university reform to gain control over our education to redirect it away from a branch-plant function, for our own national liberation, we will begin to give this leadership.

Still niggers

The Peak : Does our struggle at SFU for reform relate to this growing international movement for national liberation?

Jim Harding : It does, if we learn from our mistakes. In the last year, we have seen this campus go through a Weberian-like cycle: from traditional authority, (e.g. McFog), through charismatic authority (e.g. Loney) to legal-rational authority (e.g. Strand). Radicals, mainly the SDU, helped expose and challenge the undemocratic structure here, but "Faculty Power" has (for the time being) stabilized the campus around Strand. The students have won nothing.

We remain niggers in the classroom, and the university remains an appendage of the continental market-place. I think that many students have learned something basic about institutions in a corporate system, and there are now more radicals and more strategic radicals here. Also, students now have a base in some departments to work for meaningful reforms (abolition of grades, free education, etc.) Now that Canadian students have joined together with the radical policies in CUS we can expect a higher level of activity for educational and national freedom.

Fantasy world

The Peak : How did the trip affect you personally? How did you change?

Jim Harding : I was in eastern and western Europe in 1962. Patty and I attended the last World Youth Festival in Helsinki that summer. Immense changes have occurred since then. Radical students have become a significant political force in many societies. A movement opposing authoritarian socialism is growing in eastern Europe. In western Europe students are beginning to make alliances with workers, and in the U.S. students are helping to expose the imperialist nature of American capitalism.

In Canada we are moving into the critical period for student radicalism. Will "student power" lead to the co-management by students in a corporate training? Or will it lead to a social movement for Canadian self-determination? The danger that it will become the former is clear to me. But the commitment to make it the latter is now greater.

Middle class Canadian students can live in a fantasy world and not face the violence and exploitation of the 20th century because their individualism keeps them ignorant of the world around them. But this can only last so long. We are being affected by the continentalism and violence that comes with U.S. dollars. I realize now that we have to make important choices, each of us, if we are to avoid the turmoil across the border.

More than anything, meeting with the NLF people at Sophia, a gracious group of people, established my existential commitment to work for our own liberation. This is a central part of my life now. One girl from the NLF put it this way: "We'd appreciate it if you'd stop arms shipments to the U.S., but never separate such actions from your own national freedom."

One world

I saw and heard too much about the world to repress it on returning home. We are living in one world, with a set of fundamental problems. My hope is that more students will commit their lives to their solution — and that means a world-wide revolution in all societies — and not hiding in status, beer and jargon. The more we postpone the needed changes in Canada the more difficult it will be to avoid what is happening across the border.

WHAT'S HAPPENING AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY?

by Jim Harding

Students occupied the SFU Administration Building Wednesday night, Nov. 20, after three years of negotiations through "legitimate" channels had failed utterly. That evening the SFU Senate had refused even to debate student demands for an end to secret discriminatory admissions policies, and for free transfer to SFU from other schools. The students were getting nowhere.

SDU (Students Democratic University) students had been picketing the Simon Fraser Administration Building since the previous Thursday, when 500 students sat-in there to dramatize their demands, only to be turned down by the Senate Undergraduate Admissions Committee. Their four demands, evolved in the previous 3 months, were for:

- 1) Free transfer and automatic acceptance of credits within the BC public education system;*
- 2) An elected parity student faculty Admissions Board;*
- 3) Opening of all administration files;*
- 4) More money for education as a whole and equitable financing within post-secondary education.*

Elsewhere in this section, readers will see the report "S.F.U. Bust". Jim Harding, an activist at Simon Fraser wrote the following article before the dramatic events of late November and December.

A few years ago the new left talked of "The System." Whether it was our growing awareness that the military technology of the Cold War threatened us — and was out of our control — or our growing awareness that the market place and its bureaucracies oppressed us, we referred to The System as the other side of our felt powerlessness.

Our awareness is beginning to change. We now know that the "status quo" of The System was greatly our own fixation. We no longer see this society one-dimensionally. We recognize areas of conflict, and that diverse groups are starting to recognize their actual and potential power. Fantasy about activism is being replaced with organized radicalism.

Now that a sort of "cultural revolution" and our political skills have been nurtured, we have begun to threaten our corporate and imperialistic society¹; we need to face a whole new set of questions. Perhaps, individually, we are doing this. Our local struggles may be leading us to the same questions; some self-critical and organizational and others analytical, but this cannot be assumed automatically. So allow me to project my own concerns onto you to test then out.

We can learn nothing about how to integrate theory and practice unless we learn to understand our local situation (institutions), and to see the intricate relationships between our base of organized radicalism and wider social forces. At Simon Fraser University (SFU) we have had enough specific experiences to see this dialectic operating. If we can engender sufficient degrees of awareness we can see how various forces are beginning to consolidate and react to our organized radicalism, and how this "gestalt" will affect short-term, and long-term outcomes. In doing this we can begin to evaluate the nature of our organized radicalism so as to affect society in the way we desire.

I consider our organized radicalism at present to have one major strategy: to dislocate people ideologically, which (as SFU shows) affects the workings of an institution so as to expose the realities that complement the rhetoric (whether conservative or liberal) of the university. This strategy is fundamental to more political ones (let us distinguish the two for our own clarity) because without ideological dislocation among people in an institution there is no way that participatory democracy (by which I mean *control over*,

not participation in, i.e. not co-management of the corporate university) and revolutionary movement (people re-building their social environment themselves) can begin to occur. This distinction help break "radicals" from their "metaphysics" and force us analyse, specifically, the social psychology of the institution we within and wider forces that shape the behavior and experiences those we wish to organize. We too often confuse our ideology identity — with the institutional realities within which we are organizing.

Perhaps ironically, we have found that as we have become relatively effective within the situation at SFU (and I use the term "we" advisably since there is no static "WE"), ideological individualism (doing your own thing ideologically, in abstract from the realities around you) has decreased; though not disappeared. It is harder to put a label on SFU radicals, whereas, for the past year we saw a variety of radical vocabularies in conflict, devoid of actual campus action. We are beginning to debate campus strategy in terms of shared, institutional experience. In this sense, it is an "end of ideology."

Seeing this transition from ideological individualism to a more pragmatic use of ideas leads me to warn others that it is a destructive waste of time to debate ideology unless points are specifically relevant to a practical setting within which you are organizing. (Radical theory is often "specifically relevant" to a practical setting — so don't think I am coming on anti-intellectually.) Is this warning obvious? I think not. Few people are *actually* organizing at this stage in the Canadian student movement. If we had an organizer for every radical ideologue, we'd be a powerful movement.

To see beyond "The System" and to break out of ideological individualism certain forces have to affect your institution. SFU is a good case study. It is a relatively isolated campus (on Burnaby mountain) and thus exaggerates the dialectics that have to operate to expose "The System". So let me trace, briefly, the chronology of events that led to a growing awareness. Most of my chronology will be in terms of the painful growth of the STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC UNIVERSITY (SDU).

Formation of the SDU

The SFU-SDU was formed in January 1968. It was *not* any specific understanding of the workings and contradictions of the campus that led to the formation of the group. It was rather the radical ideology of many youth that is growing in this culture. That is not to say that radicals with past on and off campus experience (CUS, SUPA, NDY, etc.) did not play important roles.

Now (12 months later) we have a more specific and shared understanding, which allows us to think in terms of strategies and tactics. This transition has changed the nature of the SDU — made it one of many institutional forces, rather than an isolated radical sub-culture, on campus. The SDU has a political relevance because of what *we have gone through*, not because of our radical ideology per se.

This transition will probably occur in every situation where effective radicalism evolves. And if sectarian and isolationist approaches are to be avoided (a precondition for effectiveness) or outgrown, it is useful to consciously work for the transition. We did *not*, and can only use retrospect on our errors.

The SDU began as an organization with decentralized groups, and larger projects that were to develop into a participatory process rather than into an elitist leadership. This didn't work.

Our very formulation of the role of organized radicalism on campus proved to be incorrect. This probably relates to the generalized level of criticism (rather than criticism from experience) of the university by SDU members. Our "thinking" was deductive and mechanical, and we existed as one of many sub cultures of students on campus. And the rationalism (rather than activism) of our approach would never have, in itself, broken us into the lives of most students.

This happened through unfolding, circumstances, not through our own strategy. We didn't even relate to the circumstances tactically. Issues did exist on campus (as they do everywhere) and we got drawn into the debate and action over them. But, they were not issues, stemming from a radical strategy. We were reacting to faculty issues (e.g. hiring, firing and tenure), and we are still dealing with the results of this reaction. It is possible that others can avoid the traps we are in at SFU by deliberately acting differently than we have in conflict situations.

Linking to faculty issues served to expose the institutional rhetoric existing *at that time* (institutions can change their rhetoric quickly when they have to). The *demystification* of authority that occurred (for some students) allowed students to then act, i.e. to confront that very authority. Mass meetings (called after the left-liberal student council was impeached) heard debate about Board interference into academic matters and, at the same time SDU people were trying to mobilize students to confront the Board (on the issue of openness), and, later in the semester, the Senate, over its complicity in smears against "radical" professors in one department.

Because a professor's contract was not being renewed by the Board we were able to discuss the authority system at SFU, and through direct action (about 200 at each of 2 sit-ins in the spring '68 semester) many students saw and heard in person the people in authority. This linked an issue to theory and to first-hand experience. All three are needed to expose (demystify) institutional rhetoric. Direct action is not only needed to add a political process to an institution, it is necessary for practical education, especially in universities — where people are trained in verbal masturbation.

The impeachment of the student council left a void on campus that the SDU partly filled with its growing analysis of the university and society. Mass student meetings attempted to develop an alternative to the traditional elitist student government. The impeachment indicated that the students were alienated from such elitism. SDU people advocated a "direct democracy" where students would debate policies and direct a "union executive" to initiate certain strategies. Thus the term "participatory democracy" (implying a generalized critique of representative-liberal democracy) grew into a more concrete idea, "participatory unionism."

This proposal failed to engender enough support, and SFU went without a student government for the rest of the spring semester. The proposal was in fact utopian since it failed to take into account the "student as nigger" analysis. At that time the SDU was not thinking much about how to act to confront students, and to move campus issues from liberal to radical ones. Our new leftism was still formalistic, not strategic.

Once we actually tested our support. A referendum (initiated by an SDU member) called for the resignation of the Board and President for interfering in academic matters was lost 700 to 500. This disillusioned some, but in retrospect, polarization on this issue, at that particular time, was vital. I argued then that getting 1,200 to declare themselves on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the administration was more significant than the vote per se; and when the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) censured this same administration 2 months later (for maladministration). Our early polarization clearly was educational.

Still, we were unable to organize so as to further mobilize the 500 who supported the radical position. This inability to mobilize support that we know exists is still our basic weakness. Both the President and Chancellor (also British Columbia Hydro Chairman — remember the Columbia River Treaty?) spoke to student rallies before this vote, and their rhetoric succeeded in confusing most present. After the CAUT censure, however, many learned — because of these earlier "performances" — about the function of rhetoric in maintaining authoritarian-corporate institutions.

Other issues continued to build SDU support and demystify SFU authority. Gunther Frank's hiring was impeded and finally turned down, with the conservative ideology of Senate being exposed in the process. Again large rallies served to relegitimize campus authority. Later that semester a wall was built in the "Faculty Lounge" (to keep hippy-type undergrads out) and again the rhetoric about an "academic community" was exposed. Opposition to this wall grew, with the help of Provo-type tactics, and with it radicalism in and around the SDU grew.

The SDU was poorly organized through this whole semester. We were carried along by events rather than deciding how to affect them. But the momentum was there, issues were there, and our response did serve to build a more conscious radical community on campus.

The next semester the SDU shifted from this rather disorganized approach to a more conscious one. What did we learn from our flirtation with electoral politics over the summer months?

Into Student Government

During the semester break the SDU decided to enter student elections. The impeachment of student council necessitated a special council for the Summer semester. This decision had ramifications none of us saw at the time.

We ran a slate on a radical on and off campus programme. Events in France had helped break many of us out of the bind of reform versus revolution. Though some on the slate proved unable to apply the approaches of revolutionary reformism to the crisis over the summer (beware of abstract "liberal-radical" categorizing of people) giving further indication of our immaturity, this was nevertheless the perspective of these instrumental in organizing the slate.

The "plan" was to run a campaign outlining our programme for action and, win or lose, go on building the support of people willing to act.

The fact that the "student power" — SDU slate won 10/13 council seats with the largest (to that date) percentage vote in campus history (we received about 550/900 votes) deserves analysis. Clearly the SDU leadership had become "authoritative" on campus issues after the impeachment; and due to our role in earlier issues a large enough constituency of support had developed to allow electoral victory, at that stage in SFU history. Perhaps it will be the last time electoral politics will be possible. As you push radical issues on campus, rather than micky-mouse "student government" focused (read "administration front") you are bound to get a reaction and

draw more people into debate. There is no doubt most SFU ~~students~~ are conservative, have individualistic motives and thus you ~~can't~~ on elections except as an initial tactic.

If we are to glean any lessons from our experience in ~~State~~ Council we need to look back critically, to see the effects of ~~its~~ ~~of a~~ proaches, and to imagine alternative ones.

The censure was declared on a Thursday. Part of our ~~state~~ ~~is~~ already been elected (or acclaimed). Most of the rest of ~~our~~ ~~the~~ won the following day. Demands for restructuring the campus (~~the~~ eight minimum demands") were passed overwhelmingly by ~~about~~ 1,000 students the first day of the censure. ~~No~~ strategy underlying ~~it~~ "tactic", so it ~~wasn't~~ a tactic. Then the following day, two referenda were presented: one calling for the resignation of the ~~Board~~ and the other for a boycott of classes if our demands ~~were~~ met by a stated deadline. Already the "utopian radicalism" — ~~a~~ false consensus of the earlier day — was breaking down, and ~~the~~ traditional liberal argument that "we agree with your ends, but ~~on~~ your means" was being stated. Many faculty and students ~~spoke~~ against a strike, and confusion set in.

The weekend followed. Over the two days the Council ~~and~~ about 200 students (many not of the SDU "core", but attracted to the activity) established three projects (off-campus work, free ~~university~~ ~~university~~ preparation, and political strategy) to prepare for the ~~outcome~~ of the referendum.

Spontaneous activity grew over the weekend. A social movement, contrasting sharply with what I call the "collective individualism" of the corporate-like university, was underway. But, blinded by ~~the~~ roles and political rationalism, many on Council didn't ~~see~~ ~~and~~ work with, this potential. Strategizing was being done in a ~~vacuum~~. It was based on speculation rather than the process already ~~underway~~. Theory and practice were blatantly separated. I saw a transition from "ultra-leftism" to parliamentary socialism in some people in ~~and~~ around the student power Council. This suggests that the ideological individualism I referred to may lead to a split between political identity and actual leadership abilities in conflict situations.

Some on Council were thinking in terms of "democratic centralism" around the Council, while others (with various orientations) were thinking about mobilizing more people to act, building on ~~those~~ already mobilized. These two trends were in conflict, not due to theory, but due to differing ways of operating in conflict situations. And we could never get to the point of evaluating our ways of operation. There was little real communication among radicals during the crisis.

A hang-up with representative democracy also developed. Some took their Council roles seriously per se, rather than putting "their" election in the context of past and present events. When you begin to think of yourself as "Representatives", rather than as initiators, you will ultimately get stopped by "the tyranny of the majority." And that's what happened.

Legal-political criteria rather than activist criteria dominated the Council as we prepared for the referendum. There was even conflict over the Council issuing a pamphlet in support of the boycott on the last morning of voting. Some thought this was unwise since it would alienate some students. We were supposed to sit back and wait for the results, not affect them. The habits of liberal democracy were deeply ingrained in people.

This divergence among the Council itself and among others centrally involved during the "crisis" led to "tactical" differences over how to treat the referendum results. And, because legal-political thought dominated, it was pushed to a council vote of whether 50% or 66% was needed to have the boycott (we passed 50%). We should have debated what *we would do* whatever the vote was, but the consciousness of many was now a majoritarian-consensus type and so that debate was impossible.

The boycott vote received 58% support (900 of 1300), but put to a vote as to whether 50% or 66% was needed, the vast majority at the mass meeting said 66% (with the help of the then Ombudsman, now reactionary student president, who used his position and legalisms to stop the boycott), the action was stopped. The fact that 83% voted for the resignation of the Board, but only 58% for the boycott showed the dangers of this kind of thinking and the need to organize a link between theory and practice.

When you have 900 out of 2,400 students ready to act, and there is no action, disillusionment sets in. And it did. There was no leadership independent of the Council able to establish mass action when the Council failed. Instead we were left with minority action by the SDU core off Council.

A SDU sit-in⁴ began in the Administration building. It had an effect on Joint Faculty since, until it began, they refused to include student participation in their list of reforms. But the main "reason" for the sit-in was the belief that without direct action the crisis would turn into a legalistic game.

We "escalated" the sit-in from the lower hall to the President's floor, and ultimately into the Board room. During this period the SDU core (aided by a few faculty) dismantled the wall in the Faculty Lounge.

Then, finally getting into the Board room, we declared the newly "liberated zone" a children's nursery. We knew by this time that there was no way to use the sit-in to refocus the confrontation onto the Board, so we felt we'd better establish the precedent of using university space for the needs of students.

The "confrontation-liberation" model seemed to evolve naturally from the SDU core. I have since thought critically about it since many North American radicals seem to have identifications with third world revolutionaries that may not be relevant to our own context.

Holding the Board room we "bargained" for space for a permanent nursery, and it was later obtained. For three years student councils and others had asked for such space, without success. The nursery, now called the "Co-op Family" remains the only liberated (non-incorporated) zone on the campus.

After the boycott failed most students looked to Joint Faculty. Pressure was off the Board and the crisis turned institutional, rather than political in the broad sense. This was the beginning of student-faculty confrontations that were to continue until the end of the summer.

Joint Faculty meetings (Arts, Science, and Education) had themselves been opened through an earlier confrontation. Several students sat in their first crisis meeting, forcing a vote on openness. That one was lost, but at the next meeting the same motion carried. This is just one of many examples of how important reforms came from minor confrontations. It also shows how attitudes can change when people are faced with a human reality, not just a resolution or a committee.

The presence of large numbers of students in tense meetings certainly affected the faculty decisions. Whereas most faculty wanted to lift the censure, through minor reforms within the same university structures, they ended up passing principled statements that had a similarity with the students demands (limiting Board power, all academic senate, democratization of departments, students participation). Though it took many hours of petty debate to do it, the faculty ended up granting student parity on the presidential search committee (with veto) and on the Implementation Committee. The establishment of these procedures initiated a period of bargaining which has since served to expose (to SDUers) the inability of most faculty to replace traditional approaches with inquiry into and change toward an autonomous, self-governing university. The nature of "faculty power" also became clear through this bargaining, and they were added to the list of authorities demystified on campus.

The presidential search committee exposed the deceitfulness of many faculty. The student committee (initially split between militant and compromise positions) finally presented John Seeley as their presidential choice, but, the majority of that committee agreed to compromise on the faculty choice if certain procedures could be criticized before Joint Faculty. The "compromise" was undermined by faculty themselves, (they pushed their man through without student criticism) once again showing that compromising without power is cutting your own throat.

The same dynamics existed on the implementation committee. The faculty ended up undermining their *own* principles with pseudo-arguments that cloaked their timidity in the face of the power of the Board or the Social Credit government. They showed they prefer a saw-off with these groups, to basic reform. They ended up rejecting any form of student participation in the university that would allow us to have real *controls* over our education.

The summer activities themselves became mystified across English Canada. I am still amazed how the capitalist media creates myths that many *radicals* believe. The affect of SFU delegates on the Canadian Union of Students Congress may have partially been a result of this mystification.

This year, CUS went "radical" in policy, partly because the summer at SFU — linked to impressions of Paris and Columbia in this country — gave student radicalism a certain status to liberals and activist students. It remains to be seen whether radicalism is sufficiently organized in the country to put some power in CUS policies, before "student power" is itself turned into rhetoric. The reaction to CUS by conservative student forces is a challenge to radicals to organize for an independent (ultimately voluntary) national student union to give a political base for the Canadian student movement.

National Liberation and University Reform

The Fall '68 semester began with the new President (Strand) giving his "address to the union" to students. The media had continually projected an image of chaos and anarchy at SFU, and the cry "the taxpayers can't tolerate student anarchy" was heard over and over. Most students "wanted" to have institutional stability more than institutional reforms, and it became clear that a reaction to student power was developing. This culminated in the election of a reactionary (they call themselves "moderates") Student Council.

A comment on the Fall elections is needed. The first vote (the election of SFU's Council is done in two, week-apart votes) gave the so-called "moderates" 1800 of 2,700 votes. Half the student body voted. The second vote gave the "moderates" 800 of 1,400 votes. The vote dropped from 50% to 30% in one week.

Many radicals were further disillusioned by the loss of the election, showing they had not understood the revolutionary reformist perspective underlying our entrance into student government in the summer. The ideology of representative, liberal democracy again showed its power to cloak facts. The fact is the moderates received fewer votes in the second vote than the radicals did on the first.

Many radicals confused votes for conservatives with support for the status quo. In reality the vote was a reaction to the mystique surrounding radicals from the summer. Though we "lost" (by liberal

criteria) we clearly have a committed constituency and succeeded in moving issues to a new level. The moderates will increasingly be schizophrenic since they had to "agree" with our programme though attacking us and our means, as a means of legitimizing themselves.

Abstract ideology still keeps many radicals from critically evaluating campus dynamics — to enable us to persistently organize an autonomous base of student power. When we entered electoral politics in the summer we were ignorant of our naivete about the workings of liberal democracy. We were trapped, and failed to do the self-criticism necessary to learn from our errors. This still characterizes the SFU-SDU.

The SDU is now clearly in a minority position and all liberal majoritarian tactics (for now at least) have to be rejected. Those who believed that revolutionary reforms — reforms that enhance consciousness and build strength for more fundamental reforms — could be had without a struggle, are again cynical. But we have a solid base of support to build from on campus. We are in a better position than at any previous time to organize for basic reform, if we can learn from our twelve months experience.

The revolutionary reformist perspective is the only one that allows us to build support around issues arising out of liberal capitalist ideology and, through praxis, push for more basic changes. Radicalism that is sectarian or academic is simply irrelevant to the task of mobilizing people for social change. But, to ensure that university reforms are building radical consciousness (and not leading to the co-management by students of branch-plant universities) we now need to concentrate on building an effective organization. We have arrived at the point where an organization has an objectivity in the situation.

It will be an extra-parliamentary opposition on and off campus which raises issues of control and utilizes confrontations to further strategies aimed at gaining real victories for students.

The Fall election itself shows the potential for education through confrontations. Our militant programme clearly provoked verbal confrontations throughout the campus. We succeeded in breaking large numbers on campus out of their narrow existence to begin to ask critical questions about the environment.

The pattern seems clear. There has been a reaction to militant student power, but on *our* terms. This is reason for confidence, not disillusionment. The reaction occurred around issues *we* have pushed: thus the level of awareness has been raised. The fact that 50% of the students voted has brought 3,000 students into the continuing debate. This shows that confrontations can undermine apathy, even if conservatism replaced much of the apathy for now. We can expect, as in the past, that many who reacted to us will learn, through ongoing events, that our analysis simply is more accurate even for short term reforms. Already the rhetorical and irrational nature of the

so-called moderates' appeal to the fears of the unorganized students is being exposed.

So the SDU must now operate on a higher political level. We can no longer wait for liberal issues to build from. We must initiate debate and push reforms through strategically based confrontations.

An organization form is required to do this. At present the SDU operates with a steering committee, membership meetings, and committees. But radical forces on campus are broader than this. There is the Women's Caucus which grew out of the summer crisis, which raises political issues relevant to the experience of females in this society; but more importantly, helps liberate females from their inferior status and roles in our culture.

Then there are all those doing explicit campus organizing. Organizing in departments is increasing. The Student Implementation Report (from the summer crisis) has published a radical set of demands for democratizing all aspects of the university — not just formal decision-making. This again pushes issues to a more radical level. There is, as one example, a major push for abolition of grades, as one way to democratize controls in the university increases.

Then there are those who are injecting debate and activity around a strategy for the national liberation of Canada. This is, after all, the revolutionary issue underlying all our action for reform. We need to mobilize students around issues that will expose continentalism and imperialism. And the university issues do just that.

We obviously must think tactically about both the media and the police. Expectations grow for a major confrontation, with the vicious circle following. And there is no doubt that this is feasible within the present dynamics. We must ensure that the struggle is on *our* terms and not the result of romantic actions and stereotyped reactions to them. Strategic thinking is a priority now since spontaneous activism is on the increase. This is why the research and strategic debate within the SDU must now be solidly organized.

In twelve months we have pushed the debate of issues from narrow, vested interests to the structure and function of the university. We have largely reacted, even when the SDU slate was on Student Council. Now the lines are drawn and out of confrontations between students and the faculty and administration, we may be able to evolve an organization which can work strategically for reforms, both to free students to learn critically and to build a revolutionary movement in Canada.

Once institutional reforms are won around the issue of control, on and off campus issues begin to complement each other. It is now our task to push the struggle to the stage where educational and broader political issues become the same.

Since the SDU formed, the SFU administration has changed from a conservative to an explicitly corporate form. We had a

British, civil servant type President before the censure. Now we have a "Yankee", with all the liberal management skills "sent out" to U.S. colonies. Our work for campus reform and the more fundamental issue of national liberation are therefore linked, and because of this our continuing struggle which now involves the demystification of branch-plant corporate liberalism may yet help evolve a student liberation front in this country.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Canada can be considered a satellite colonizer. Though a U.S. economic satellite, our own national bourgeoisie are imperialists in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Guyana, etc.) Our political economy clearly functions as part of the world imperialist system. Our complicity in Vietnam is symptomatic of this more basic reality.
2. See J. Harding, "The Function of University Rhetoric" CUS pamphlet #233.
3. See J. Harding, "Students and Revolutionary Reformism in English Canada." CUS pamphlet #339.
4. For a detailed analysis of direct action and issues at SFU this summer, see J. Harding, "From the Midst of a Crisis: Student Power in English Canada", Student Protest, G. McQuiggon (ed.) in paperback, Methuen, 1968.

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a world survey

*edited by Devi Prasad
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S. F. U. BUST:

"...WE SPENT MOST OF OUR TIME FREAKING OUT
THE COPS..."

The bust at Simon Fraser last Saturday night is now a matter of history, but strange things happened (and are still happening) to people's heads as a result of this affair. I was arrested along with 113 others on charges of mischief through obstruction. I want to let you know what happened during the actual bust and in jail waiting to be bailed out.

Just before the bust I was at a meeting downstairs with about seventy-five others discussing how community seemed to be breaking down, and talking about how maybe we should think about pulling out before the whole thing fucked up. It wasn't really that bad, but people were tired after three days without sleep and the strain was terrific. Upstairs others were singing, sleeping, talking politics etc. and generally preparing for the bust that most people figured would come the next night. Some kids were watching a film of *Alice in Wonderland*.

I remembered that the doors upstairs were unguarded, rushed up and sure enough some asshole had got scared, split, and left the door unbarricaded. This was about one minute before the cops got there. I got some help and quickly replaced the barricade. I sat on it while the meeting was going on. Through the cracks in the papered windows I could see the yellow stripes on the Mounties' lens, and every once in a while an eyeball when they got curious. To keep them happy I loudly mumbled about orders from Peking, and how Mao told us to keep the faith.

When the cops finally made it in, they spread like flies to search every corner of the place. The cop read S'rand's eviction notice, gave people another chance to leave, and then started arresting us. We were singing "Gimme That Old Time Religion" when they came in, and we continued to sing everything from Roaring Twenties numbers to IWW labour ballads. The cops were clearly freaked, they were expecting a group of wild-eyed serious revolutionaries: instead they found a group of calm, happy revolutionaries.

O-O-O-O-M-M-M-M-M-...

A cat was playing the guitar, and they took a special interest in photographing him. The singing and music was something they could not compute. It made them deal with us as people rather than objects. It kept our morale up. The actual naked fact of Establishment power in the person of the police was a real mindfuck.

The cat who was playing the guitar fainted. He had not slept for five days or eaten very well, and the cops were hassling him because of the beautiful effect the music was having. The cops left him lying there, taking pictures of him. When a couple of his brothers tried to get him to a drinking fountain, the cops were sure it was a rusk to escape. They hassled them all of 50 feet (in plain sight) to the fountain.

Arresting 114 people took a helluva long time. The cops took photos for busywork. The flashes came so often that it was a'most like a strobe. Outside the building, as people were removed through a basement door, a crowd of 300 people was freaking the cops and making the V sign to the prisoners. Finally they got us all loaded into paddy wagons, and took us down to the Burnaby jail.

Strangely enough, the Burnaby Public Safety Building has the same style architecture as the University. It was built soon afterward. We were all deposited in a concrete bay like a place where garbage is loaded. There we were guarded by six fuzz, all armed with Smith & Wesson 38's, as one curious person took pains to ascertain.

Next the chicks were segregated out. They gave the guys goodbye kisses, to the vocal disgust of the cops, who loudly professed their inability to tell the "girls from the boys." I replied that if he didn't know the difference by now he really had problems. He became quite indignant and stated that he was married, to which I replied that he really had problems. He choked and we all had a good laugh. It is indicative of the poor exploited Establishment cop ideologue that he cannot prove his existence or notecy other than by attacking dissent on sexual grounds. You can only project a sad image of how sterile their lives must be.

Then we had to go through booking and the Alice's Restaurant process of having our belts, wallets and possessions taken away from us. ("Officer Obie, do you think I'm going to hang myse'f for occupying?") They even took our buttons away, as they figured we were going to slash our wrists or commit murder with the pins. Cleaning out my pockets I found a piece of garbage about a square inch large which I just threw on the floor. The con jumped over the counter, carefully unfurled the thing, and still not convinced that it was just garbage, carefully listed it as a

possession. The cops started to become laughable in their confusion. Actually, I don't envy anyone charged with having to hassle 114 aware radicals.

Nevertheless, I became aware of a lot of legends in my head that were being quickly blown up. When we insisted on our rights to see a lawyer, to make a phone call, and not to give information without the advice and aid of legal counsel, we were hassled to the point where people had their arms twisted behind their backs by the cops who were trying hard to nail us in any way they could.

From then on we spent most of our time freaking out the cops, who just couldn't cope with people who were as close-knit as we had become. We pulled off a lot of Marat/Sade games. By the time we were getting bailed out the cops were obviously up against the wall. We told them so often that WE were on the outside, and they were the real prisoners, that they were almost beginning to act like they believed it.

At first they had refused to feed us. Now they were constantly bringing in food and coffee. When we had something to decide we became quiet and orderly and held cell votes as to what we would do as a collective group. The next minute we would be climbing on the bars gibbering like monkeys and arguing as to whether we should let them in.

All laughing aside though, there is a deadly serious side to the whole thing. The charges preferred against us could put us away for a long time, and definitely will fuck us up for a while. After 3 days of occupation, our brains were pretty tired in jail, and stoned from the high of being together with a purpose and the stuff that overworked brains produce. It wasn't till we had been bailed out and we thought about it for a while that the reality hit us. That they were out to destroy us because we pose a definite threat to their fucked-up system. not just because we happened to be occupying a building. They have chosen the weapons and forced us to respond. It may look like they have the upper hand right now but then can't keep down the legitimate voice of a whole generation. It's just starting here in Canada but it's starting off with a big one and it's their turn to watch out. **KEEP THE FAITH, BABY...**

Ed. Note : Lawyer Bill Deverall has stated that the felony charge in this case—"mischief: the unlawful and willful obstruction of the lawful use of private property"—as opposed to a misdemeanor charge of trespass, represents the beginning of an attempt by the Social Credit government to crush the student movement in British Columbia. He is counsel for the accused.

Don't universities belong to the students who go to them, rather than a clique of bureaucrats? Should the students do five years for sitting-in THEIR university for 3 days?

from the Georgia Straight — Dec. 5, 1968

THE TWO SOULS OF SOCIALISM

by Hal Draper

Hal Draper is author of "BERKELEY: THE NEW STUDENT REVOLUTION" (Evergreen Black Cat Book), and is an editor of New Politics. Mr. Draper is on the staff of the University of California Library since 1960.

SOCIALISM'S crisis today is a crisis in the meaning of socialism. For the first time in the history of the world, very likely a majority of its people label themselves "socialist" in one sense or another; but there has never been a time when the label was less informative. The nearest thing to a common content of the various "socialisms" is a negative: anticapitalism. On the positive side, the range of conflicting and incompatible ideas that call themselves socialist is wider than the spread of ideas within the bourgeois world.

Even anti-capitalism holds less and less as a common factor. In one part of the spectrum, a number of social-democratic parties have virtually eliminated any specifically socialist demands from their programs, promising to maintain private enterprise wherever possible. The most prominent example is the German social-democracy. ("As an idea, a philosophy, and a social movement, socialism in Germany is no longer represented by a political party," sums up D. A. Chalmers' recent book *The Social Democratic Party of Germany*.) These parties have defined socialism out of existence, but the tendency which they have formalized is that of the entire reformist social-democracy. In what sense are these parties still "socialist"?

In another part of the world picture, there are the Communist states, whose claim to being "socialist" is based on a negative: the abolition of the capitalist private-profit system, and the fact that the class which rules does not consist of private owners of property. On the positive side, however, the socio-economic system which has replaced capitalism there would not be recognizable to Karl Marx. The state owns the means of production—but who "owns" the state? Certainly not the mass of workers, who are exploited, unfree, and alienated from all levers of social and political control. A new class rules, the bureaucratic bosses; it rules over a collectivist system—a bureaucratic collectivism. Unless stratification is mechanically equated with "socialism," in what sense are these societies "socialist"?

These two self-styled socialisms are very different, but they have more in common than they think. The social-democracy has typically dreamed of "socializing" capitalism from above. Its principle has always been that increased state intervention in society and economy is *per se* socialist. It bears a fatal family resemblance to the Stalinist conception of imposing something called socialism from the top down, and of equating statification with socialism. Both have their roots in the ambiguous history of the socialist idea.

Back to the roots: the following pages propose to investigate the meaning of socialism historically, in a new way. There have always been different "kinds of socialism," and they have customarily been divided into reformist or revolutionary, peaceful or violent, democratic or authoritarian, etc. These divisions exist, but the underlying division is something else. Throughout the history of socialist movements and ideas, the fundamental divide is between *Socialism-From-Above* and *Socialism-From-Below*.

What unites the many different forms of Socialism-from-Above is the conception that socialism (or a reasonable facsimile thereof) must be *handed down* to the grateful masses in one form or another, by a ruling elite which is not subject to their control in fact. The heart of Socialism-from-Below is its view that socialism can be realized only through the self-emancipation of activized masses in motion, reaching out for freedom with their own hands, mobilized "from below" in a struggle to take charge of their own destiny, as actors (not merely subjects) on the stage of history. "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves": this is the first sentence in the Rules written for the First International by Marx, and this is the First Principle of his life-work.

It is the conception of Socialism-from-Above which accounts for the acceptance of Communist dictatorship as a form of "socialism." It is the conception of Socialism-from-Above which concentrates social-democratic attention on the parliamentary superstructure of society and on the manipulation of the "commanding heights" of the economy, and which makes them hostile to mass action from below. It is Socialism-from-Above which is the dominant tradition in the development of socialism.

Please note that it is not peculiar to socialism. On the contrary, the yearning for emancipation-from-above is the all-pervading principle through centuries of class society and political oppression. It is the permanent promise held out by every ruling power to keep the people looking upward for protection, instead of to themselves for liberation from the need for protection. The people looked to kings to right the injustices done by lords, to messiahs to overthrow the tyranny of kings. Instead of the bold way of mass action from below, it is always safer and more prudent to find the "good" ruler who will Do the People Good. The pattern of emancipation-from-above goes all the way back in the history of civilization, and had

to show up in socialism too. But it is only in the framework of the modern socialist movement that liberation from below could become even a realistic aspiration; within socialism it has come to the fore but only by fits and starts. The history of socialism can be read as a continual but largely unsuccessful effort to free itself from the old tradition, the tradition of emancipation-from-above.

In the conviction that the current crisis of socialism is intelligible only in terms of this Great Divide in the socialist tradition, we turn to a few examples of the two souls of socialism.

1. Some Socialist "Ancestors"

Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretician of the Second International, began his book on Thomas More with the observation that the two great figures inaugurating the history of socialism are More and Münzer, and that both of them "follow the long line of Socialists, from Lycurgus and Pythagoras to Plato, the Gracchi, Catalina, Christ..."

This is a very impressive list of early "socialists," and considering his position Kautsky should certainly have been able to recognize a socialist when he saw one. What is most fascinating about this list is the way it falls apart under examination into two quite different groups.

Plutarch's life of Lycurgus led the early socialists to adopt him as the founder of Spartan "communism"—this is why Kautsky lists him. But as described by Plutarch, the Spartan system was based on equal division of land under private ownership; it was in no way socialistic. The "collectivist" feeling one may get from a description of the Spartan regime comes from a different direction: the way of life of the Spartan ruling class itself, which was organized as a permanent disciplined garrison in a state of siege; and to this add the terroristic regime imposed over the helots (slaves). I do not see how a modern socialist can read of the Lycurgan regime without feeling that he is meeting not an ancestor of socialism but a forerunner of fascism. There is quite a difference! but how is it that it did not impress itself on the leading theoretician of social-democracy?

Pythagoras founded an elite order which acted as the political arm of the landed aristocracy against the plebeian-democratic movement; he and his party were finally overthrown and expelled by a popular revolutionary rising. Kautsky seems to be on the wrong side of the barricades! But besides, inside the Pythagorean order a regime of total authoritarianism and regimentation prevailed. In spite of this, Kautsky chose to regard Pythagoras as a socialist ancestor because of the belief that the organized Pythagoreans practised communal consumption. Even if this were true (and Kautsky found out later it was not) this would have made the Pythagorean order exactly as communistic as any monastery. Chalk up a second ancestor of totalitarianism on Kautsky's list.

The case of Plato's *Republic* is well-enough known. The sole element of "communism" in his ideal state is the prescription of monastic-communal consumption for the small elite of "Guardians" who constitute the bureaucracy and army; but the surrounding social system is assumed to be private-property-holding, not socialistic. And—here it is again—Plato's state model is government by an aristocratic elite, and his argument stresses that democracy inevitably means the deterioration and ruin of society. Plato's political aim, in fact, was the rehabilitation and purification of the ruling aristocracy in order to *fight* the tide of democracy. To call him a socialist ancestor is to imply a conception of socialism which makes any kind of democratic control irrelevant.

On the other hand, Catiline and the Gracchi had *no* collectivist side. Their names are associated with mass movements of popular-democratic revolt against the Establishment. They were not socialists, to be sure, but they were on the popular side of the class struggle in the ancient world, the side of the people's movement from below. It seems it was all the same to the theoretician of social-democracy.

Here, in the pre-history of our subject, are two kinds of figures ready-made for adoption into the pantheon of the socialist movement. There were the figures with a tinge of (alleged) collectivism, who were yet thorough elitists, authoritarians and anti-democrats; and there were the figures *without* anything collectivistic about them, who were associated with democratic class struggles. There is a collectivist tendency without democracy, and there is a democratic tendency without collectivism *but nothing yet which merges these two currents.*

Not until Thomas Münzer, the leader of the revolutionary left wing of the German Reformation, do we find a suggestion of such a merger; a social movement with communistic ideas (Münzer's) which was also engaged in a deep-going popular-democratic struggle from below. In contrast is precisely Sir Thomas More: the gulf between these two contemporaries goes to the heart of our subject. More's *Utopia* pictures a thoroughly regimented society, more reminiscent of 1984 than of socialist democracy, elitist through and through, even slaveholding, a typical Socialism-from-Above. It is not surprising that, of these two "socialist ancestors" who stand at the threshold of the modern world, one (More) execrated the other and supported the hangmen who did him and his movement to death.

What then is the meaning of socialism when it first came into the world? From the very beginning, it was divided between the two souls of socialism, and there was war between them.

2. The First Modern Socialists

Modern socialism was born in the course of the half century or so that lies between the Great French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848. So was modern democracy. But they were *not* born linked

like Siamese twins. They traveled at first along separate lines. **When** did the two lines first intersect?

Out of the wreckage of the French Revolution rose different kinds of socialism. We will consider three of the most important in the light of our question.

I. *Babeuf*. — The first modern socialist movement was that led in the last phase of the French Revolution by Babeuf ("the Conspiracy of the Equals"), conceived as a continuation of revolutionary Jacobinism plus a more consistent social goal: a society of communist equality. This represents the first time in the modern era that the idea of socialism is wedded to the idea of a popular movement—a momentous combination.*

This combination immediately raises a critical question: What exactly in each case is the relationship that is seen between this socialist idea and that popular movement? *This is the key question for socialism for the next 200 years.*

As the Babouvists saw it: The mass movement of the people has failed; the people seem to have turned their backs on the Revolution. But still they suffer, still they need communism: *we* know that. The revolutionary will of the people has been defeated by a conspiracy of the right; what we need is a cabal of the left to recreate the people's movement, to effectuate the revolutionary will. We must therefore seize power. But the people are no longer ready to seize power. Therefore it is necessary for *us* to seize power in their name, in order to raise the people up to that point. This means a temporary dictatorship, admittedly by a minority; but it will be an Educational Dictatorship, aiming at creating the conditions which will make possible democratic control in the future. (In that sense we are democrats.) This will not be a dictatorship of the people, as was the Commune, let alone of the proletariat; it is frankly a dictatorship *over* the people—with very good intentions.

For most of the next fifty years, the conception of the Educational Dictatorship over the people remains the program of the revolutionary left—through the three B's (Babeuf to Buonarroti to Blanqui) and, with anarchist verbiage added, also Bakunin. The new order will be handed down to the suffering people by the revolutionary band. This typical Socialism-from-Above is the first and most primitive form of revolutionary socialism, but there are still today admirers of Castro and Mao who think it is the last word in revolutionism.

II. *Saint-Simon*. — Emerging from the revolutionary period, a brilliant mind took an entirely different tack. Saint-Simon was impelled by a revulsion *against* revolution, disorder and disturbances. What fascinated him was the potentialities of industry and science.

* Strictly speaking, this combination had been anticipated by Gerard Winstanley and the "True Levelers," the left wing of the English Revolution; but it was forgotten and led to nothing, historically speaking.

His vision had nothing to do with anything resembling equality, justice, freedom, the rights of man or allied passions: it looked only to modernization, industrialization, planning, divorced from such considerations. Planned industrialization was the key to the new world, and obviously the people to achieve this were the oligarchies of financiers and businessmen, scientists, technologists, managers. When not appealing to these, he called on Napoleon or his successor Louis XVIII to implement schemes for a royal dictatorship. His schemes varied, but they were all completely authoritarian to the last planned ordinance. A systematic racist and a militant imperialist, he was the furious enemy of the very idea of equality and liberty, which he hated as offspring of the French Revolution.

It was only in the last phase of his life (1825) that, disappointed in the response of the natural elite to do their duty and impose the new modernizing oligarchy, he made a turn toward appealing to the workers down below. The "New Christianity" would be a popular movement, but its role would be simply to convince the powers-that-be to heed the advice of the Saint-Simonian planners. The workers should organize—to petition their capitalists and managerial bosses to take over from the "idle classes."

What then was his relationship between the idea of the Planned Society and the popular movement? The people, the movement, could be useful as a battering-ram—in someone's hands. Saint-Simon's last idea was a movement-from-below to effectuate a *Socialism-from-Above*. But power and control must remain where it has always been—above.

III. *The Utopians.* — A third type of socialism that arose in the post-revolutionary generation was that of the utopian socialists proper—Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Etienne Gabet, etc. They blueprinted an ideal communal colony, imagined fullblown from the cranium of the Leader, to be financed by the grace of the philanthropic rich under the wing of Benevolent Power.

Owen (in many ways the most sympathetic of the lot) was as categorical as any of them: "This great change . . . must and will be accomplished by the rich and powerful. There are no other parties to do it . . . it is a waste of time, talent and pecuniary means, for the poor to contend in opposition to the rich and powerful . . ." Naturally he was against "class hate," class struggle. Of the many who believe this, few have written so bluntly that the aim of this "socialism" is "to govern or treat all society as the most advanced physicians govern and treat their patients in the best arranged lunatic hospitals," with "forbearance and kindness" for the unfortunates who have "become so through the irrationality and injustice of the present most irrational system of society."

Cabet's society provided for elections, but there could be no free discussion; and a controlled press, systematic indoctrination, and completely regimented uniformity was insisted on as part of the prescription.

For these utopian socialists, what was the relationship between the socialist idea and the popular movement? The latter was the flock to be tended by the good shepherd. It must not be supposed that Socialism-from-Above necessarily implies cruelly despotic intentions.

This side of these Socialisms-from-Above is far from outlived. On the contrary, it is so modern that a modern writer like Martin Buber, in *Paths in Utopia*, can perform the remarkable feat of treating the old utopians as if they were great democrats and "libertarians"! This myth is quite widespread, and it points once again to the extraordinary insensitivity of socialist writers and historians to the deeprooted record of Socialism-from-Above as the dominant component in the two souls of socialism.

3. What Marx Did

Utopianism was elitist and anti-democratic to the core because it was utopian—that is, it looked to the prescription of a prefabricated model, the dreaming-up of a plan to be willed into existence. Above all, it was inherently hostile to the very idea of transforming society from below, by the upsetting intervention of freedom-seeking masses, even where it finally accepted recourse to the instrument of a mass movement for pressure upon the Tops. In the socialist movement as it developed before Marx, nowhere did the line of the Socialist Idea intersect line of Democracy-from-Below.

This intersection, this synthesis, was the great contribution of Marx: in comparison, the whole content of his *Capital* in secondary. What he fused was revolutionary socialism with revolutionary democracy. This is the heart of Marxism: "This is the Law; all the rest is commentary." The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 marked the self-consciousness of the first movement (in Engels' words) "whose notion was from the very beginning that the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself."

The young Marx himself went through the more primitive stage just as the human embryo goes through the gill stage; or to put it differently, one of his first immunizations was achieved by catching the most pervasive disease of all, the illusion of the Savior-Despot. When he was 22, the old kaiser died, and to the hosannahs of the liberals Friedrich Wilhelm IV acceded to the throne amidst expectations of democratic reforms from above. Nothing of the sort happened. Marx never went back to this notion, which has bedeviled all of socialism with its hopes in Savior-Dictators or Savior-Presidents.

Marx entered politics as the crusading editor of a newspaper which was the organ of the extreme left of the liberal democracy of the industrialized Rhineland, and soon became the foremost editorial voice of complete political democracy in Germany. The first article he published was a polemic in favor of the unqualified freedom of the press from all censorship by the state. By the time the imperial

government forced his dismissal, he was turning to find out more about the new socialist ideas coming from France. When this leading spokesman of liberal democracy became a socialist, he still regarded the task as the championing of democracy—except that democracy now had a deeper meaning. Marx was the first socialist thinker and leader who came to socialism *through* the struggle for liberal democracy.

In manuscript notes made in 1844, he rejected the extant "crude communism" which negates the personality of man, and looked to a communism which would be a "fully developed humanism." In 1845 he and his friend Engels worked out a line of argument against the elitism of a socialist current represented by one Bruno Bauer. In 1846 they were organizing the "German Democratic Communists" in Brussels exile, and Engels was writing: "In our time democracy and communism are one." "Only the proletarians are able to fraternize really, under the banner of communist democracy."

In working out the viewpoint which first wedded the new communist idea to the new democratic aspirations, they came into conflict with the existing communist sects such as that of Weitling, who dreamed of a messianic dictatorship. Before they joined the group which became the Communist League (for which they were to write the *Communist Manifesto*), they stipulated that the organization be changed from an elite conspiracy of the old type into an open propaganda group, that "everything conducive to superstitious authoritarianism be struck out of the rules," that the leading committee be elected by the whole membership as against the tradition of "decisions from above." They won the league over to their new approach, and in a journal issued in 1847 only a few months before the *Communist Manifesto*, the group announced:

We are not among those communists who are out to destroy personal liberty, who wish to turn the world into one huge barrack or into a gigantic workhouse. There certainly are some communists who, with an easy conscience, refuse to countenance personal liberty and would like to shuffle it out of the world because they consider that it is a hindrance to complete harmony. But we have no desire to exchange freedom for equality. We are convinced . . . that in no social order will personal freedom be so assured as in a society based upon communal ownership . . . [Let us put] our hands to work in order to establish a democratic state wherein each party would be able by word or in writing to win a majority over to its ideas . . .

The *Communist Manifesto* which issued out of these discussions proclaimed that the first objective of the revolution was "to win the battle of democracy." When, two years later and after the decline of the 1848 revolutions, the Communist League split, it was in conflict once again with the "crude communism" of putschism, which thought to substitute determined bands of revolutionaries for the real mass movement of an enlightened working class. Marx told them:

The minority... makes mere will the motive force of the revolution, instead of actual relations. Whereas we say to the workers: "You will have to go through fifteen or twenty or fifty years of civil wars and international wars, not only in order to change extant conditions, but also in order to change yourselves and to render yourselves fit for political dominion," you, on the other hand, say to the workers: "We must attain to power at once, or else we may just as well go to sleep."

"In order to change yourselves and to render yourselves fit for political dominion": this is Marx's program for the working-class movement, as against both those who say the workers can take power any Sunday, and those who say never. Thus Marxism came into being, in self-conscious struggle against the advocates of the Educational Dictatorship, the Savior-Dictators, the revolutionary elitists, the communist authoritarians, as well as the philanthropic do-gooders and bourgeois liberals. This was *Marx's* Marxism, not the caricatured monstrosity which is painted up with that label by both the Establishment's professoriat, who shudder at Marx's uncompromising spirit of revolutionary opposition to the capitalist status quo, and also by the Stalinists and neo-Stalinists, who must conceal the fact that Marx cut his eyeteeth by making war on *their* type.

"It was Marx who finally fettered the two ideas of Socialism and Democracy together"* because he developed a theory which made the synthesis possible for the first time. The heart of the theory is this proposition: *that there is a social majority which has the interest and motivation to change the system*, and that the aim of socialism can be the education and mobilization of this mass-majority. This is the exploited class, the working class, from which comes the eventual motive-force of revolution. Hence a socialism-from-below is possible, on the basis of a theory which sees the revolutionary potentialities in the broad masses, even if they seem backward at a given time and place. *Capital*, after all, is nothing but the demonstration of the economic basis of this proposition.

It is only some such theory of working-class socialism which makes possible the fusion of revolutionary socialism and revolutionary democracy. We are not arguing at this point our conviction that this faith is justified, but only insisting on the alternative: all socialists or would-be reformers who repudiate it *must* go over to some Socialism-from-Above, whether of the reformist, utopian, bureaucratic, Stalinist, Maoist or Castroite variety. And they do.

Five years before the *Communist Manifesto*, a freshly converted 23-year-old socialist had still written in the old elitist tradition: "We can recruit our ranks from those classes only which have enjoyed a pretty good education; that is, from the universities and from the commercial class..." The young Engels learned better, but this obsolete wisdom is still with us as ever.

* The quotation is from H.G. Wells' autobiography. Inventor of some of the grimmest Socialism-from-Above utopias in all literature. Wells is here denouncing Marx for this historic step.

4. The Myth of Anarchist "Libertarianism"

One of the most throughgoing authoritarians in the history of radicalism is none other than the "Father of Anarchism," Proudhon, whose name is periodically revived as a great "libertarian" model, because of his industrious repetition of the word liberty and his invocations to "revolution from below."

Some may be willing to pass over his Hitlerite form of anti-Semitism ("The Jew is the enemy of humankind. It is necessary to send this race back to Asia, or exterminate it..."). Or his principled racism in general (he thought it was right for the South to keep American Negroes in slavery, since they were the lowest of inferior races). Or his glorification of war for its own sake (in the exact manner of Mussolini). Or his view that women had no rights ("I deny her every political right and every initiative. For woman liberty and well-being lie solely in marriage, in motherhood, in domestic duties...")—that is, the *Kinder-Kirche-Küche* of the Nazis.

But it is not possible to gloss over his violent opposition not only to trade-unionism and the right to strike (even supporting police strikebreaking), but to any and every idea of the right to vote, universal suffrage, popular sovereignty, and the very idea of constitutions. ("All this democracy disgusts me... What would I not give to sail into this mob with my clenched fists!") His notes for his ideal society notably include suppression of all other groups, any public meeting by more than 20, any free press, and any elections; in the same notes he looks forward to "a general inquisition" and the condemnation of "several millions people" to forced labor—"once the Revolution is made."

Behind all this was a fierce contempt for the masses of people—the necessary foundation of Socialism-from-Above, as its opposite was the groundwork of Marxism. The masses are corrupt and hopeless ("I worship humanity, but I spit on men!"). They are "only savages... whom it is our duty to civilize, and without making them our sovereign," he wrote to a friend whom he scornfully chided with: "You still believe in the people." Progress can come only from mastery by an elite who take care to give the people no sovereignty.

At one time or another he looked to some ruling despot as the one-man dictator who would bring the Revolution: Louis Bonaparte (he wrote a whole book in 1852 extolling the Emperor as the bearer of Revolution); Prince Jerome Bonaparte; finally Czar Alexander II ("Do not forget that the despotism of the czar is necessary to civilization").

There was a candidate for the dictator's job closer to home, of course: himself. He elaborated a detailed scheme for a "mutualist" business, cooperative in form, which would spread to take over all business and then the state. In his notes Proudhon put himself down as the Manager in Chief, naturally not subject to the democratic

control he so despised. He took care of details in advance: "Draw up a secret program, for all the managers: irrevocable elimination of royalty, democracy, proprietors, religion [and so on]."—"The Managers are the natural representatives of the country. Ministers are only superior Managers or General Directors: as I will be one day . . . When we are masters, Religion will be what we want it to be; ditto Education, philosophy, justice, administration and government."

The reader, who may be full of the usual illusions about anarchist "libertarianism," may ask: Was he then insincere about his great love for liberty?

Not at all: it is only necessary to understand what anarchist "liberty" means. Proudhon wrote: "The principle of liberty is that of the Abbey of Thélème [in Rabelais]: do what you want!" and the principle meant: "any man who cannot do what he wants and anything he wants has the right to revolt, even alone, against the government, even if the government were everybody else." *The only man who can enjoy this liberty is a despot*; this is the sense of the brilliant insight by Dostoyevsky's Shigalev: "Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrive at unlimited despotism."

The story is similar with the second "Father of Anarchism," Bakunin, whose schemes for dictatorship and suppression of democratic control are better known than Proudhon's.

The basic reason is the same: Anarchism is not concerned with the creation of democratic control from below, but only with the destruction of "authority" over the individual, including the authority of the most extremely democratic regulation of society that it is possible to imagine. This has been made clear by authoritative anarchist expositors time and again; for example, by George Woodcock: "even were democracy possible, the anarchist would still not support it . . . Anarchists do not advocate political freedom. What they advocate is freedom from politics . . ." Anarchism is on principle fiercely anti-democratic, since an ideally democratic authority is still authority. But since, rejecting democracy, it has no other way of resolving the inevitable disagreements and differences among the inhabitants of Thélème, its unlimited freedom for each uncontrolled individual is indistinguishable from unlimited despotism by such an individual, both in theory and practice.

The great problem of our age is the achievement of *democratic control from below over the vast powers of modern social authority*. Anarchism, which is freest of all verbiage about something-from-below, rejects this goal. It is the other side of the coin of bureaucratic despotism, with all its values turned inside-out, not the cure or the alternative.

5. Lassalle and State Socialism

That very model of a modern social-democracy, the German

Social-Democratic Party, is often represented as having arisen on a Marxist basis. This is a myth, like so much else in extant histories of socialism. The impact of Marx was strong, including on some of the top leaders for a while, but the politics which permeated and finally pervaded the party came mainly from two other sources. One was Lassalle, who founded German socialism as an organized movement (1863); and the other was the British Fabians, who inspired Eduard Bernstein's "revisionism."

Ferdinand Lassalle is the prototype of the *state-socialist*—which means, one who aims to get socialism handed down by the existing state. He was not the first prominent example (that was Louis Blanc), but for him the existing state was the Kaiser's state under Bismarck.

The state, Lassalle told the workers, is something "that will achieve for each one of us what none of us could achieve for himself." Marx taught the exact opposite: that the working class had to achieve its emancipation itself, and abolish the existing state in the course. E. Bernstein was quite right in saying that Lassalle "made a veritable cult" of the state. "The immemorial vestal fire of all civilization, the State, I defend with you against those modern barbarians [the liberal bourgeoisie]," Lassalle told a Prussian court. This is what made Marx and Lassalle "fundamentally opposed," points out Lassalle's biographer Footman, who lays bare his pro-Prussianism, pro-Prussian nationalism, pro-Prussian imperialism.

Lassalle organized this first German socialist movement as his personal dictatorship. Quite consciously he set about building it as *a mass movement from below to achieve a Socialism-from-Above* (remember Saint-Simon's battering-ram). The aim was to convince Bismarck to hand down concessions—particularly universal suffrage, on which basis a parliamentary movement under Lassalle could become a mass ally of the Bismarckian state in a coalition against the liberal bourgeoisie. To this end Lassalle actually tried to negotiate with the Iron Chancellor. Sending him the dictatorial statutes of his organization as "the constitution of my kingdom which perhaps you will envy me," Lassalle went on:

But this miniature will be enough to show how true it is that the working class feels an instinctive inclination towards a dictatorship, if it can first be rightly persuaded that the dictatorship will be exercised in its interests; and how much, despite all republican views—or rather precisely because of them—it would therefore be inclined, as I told you only recently, to look upon the Crown, in opposition to the egoism of bourgeois society, as the natural representative of the social dictatorship, if the Crown for its part could ever make up its mind to the—certainly very improbable—step of striking out a really revolutionary line and transforming itself from the monarchy of the privileged orders into a social and revolutionary people's monarchy.

Although this secret letter was not known at the time, Marx grasped the nature of Lassalleanism perfectly. He told Lassalle to his face that he was a "Bonapartist," and wrote presciently that "His

attitude is that of the future workers' dictator." Lassalle's tendency he called "Royal Prussian Government socialism," denouncing his "alliance with absolutist and feudal opponents against the bourgeoisie."

"Instead of the revolutionary process of transformation of society," wrote Marx, Lassalle sees socialism arising "from the state and" that the state gives to the producers' cooperative societies and which the state, not the worker, 'calls into being.'" Marx derides this. "But as far as the present cooperative societies are concerned, they are of value only insofar as they are the independent creations of the workers and not protégés either of the government or of the bourgeoisie." Here is a classic statement of the meaning of the word independent as the keystone of Socialism-from-Below versus state-socialism.

There is an instructive instance of what happens when an American-type academic anti-Marxist runs into this aspect of Marx. Mayo's *Democracy and Marxism* (later revised as *Introduction to Marxist Theory*) handily proves that Marxism is anti-democratic mainly by the simple expedient of defining Marxism as "the Moscow orthodoxy." But at least he seems to have read Marx, and realized that nowhere, in acres of writing and a long life, did Marx evince concern about more power for the state but rather the reverse. Marx, it dawned on him, was not a "statist":

The popular criticism leveled against Marxism is that it tends to degenerate into a form of 'statism'. At first sight (i.e., reading) the criticism appears wide of the mark, for the virtue of Marx's political theory... is the entire absence from it of any glorification of the state.

This discovery offers a notable challenge to Marx-critics, who of course know in advance that Marxism must glorify the state. Mayo solves the difficulty in two statements: (1) "the statism is implicit in the requirements of total planning..." (2) Look at Russia. But Marx made no fetish of "total planning." He has so often been denounced (by other Marx-critics) for failing to draw up a blueprint of socialism precisely because he reacted so violently against his predecessors' utopian "plannism" or planning-from-above. "Plannism" is precisely the conception of socialism that Marxism wished to destroy. Socialism must involve planning, but "total planning" does not equal socialism—just as any fool can be a professor but not every professor need be a fool.

6. The Fabian Model

In Germany, behind the figure of Lassalle there shades off a series of "socialisms" moving in an interesting direction.

The so-called Academic Socialists ("Socialists of the Chair," *Kathedersozialisten*—a current of Establishment academics) looked to Bismarck more openly than Lassalle, but their conception of state-socialism was not in principle alien to his. Only, Lassalle embarked

on the risky expedient of calling into being a mass movement from below for the purpose—risky because once in motion it might get out of hand, as indeed it did more than once. Bismarck himself did not hesitate to represent his paternalistic economic policies as a kind of socialism, and books got written about "monarchical socialism," "Bismarckian state-socialism," etc. Following further to the right, one comes to the "socialism" of Friedrich List, a proto-Nazi, and to those circles where an anti-capitalist form of anti-Semitism (Dühring, A. Wagner, etc.) lays part of the basis for the movement that called itself socialist under Adolf Hitler.

The thread that unites this whole spectrum, through all the differences, is the conception of *socialism as equivalent merely to state intervention in economic and social life*. "Staat, greif zu!" Lasalle called. "State, take hold of things!"—this is the socialism of the whole lot.

This is why Schumpeter is correct in observing that the British equivalent of German state-socialism is—Fabianism, the socialism of Sidney Webb.

The Fabians (more accurately, the Webbbians) are in the history of the socialist idea, that modern socialist current which developed in most complete divorcement from Marxism, the one most alien to Marxism. It was almost chemically-pure social-democratic reformism unalloyed, particularly before the rise of the mass Labour and socialist movement in Britain, which it did not want and did not help to build (despite a common myth to the contrary). It is therefore a very important test, unlike most other reformist currents which paid their tribute to Marxism by adopting some of its language and distorting its substance.

The Fabians, deliberately middle-class in composition and appeal, were not for building any mass movement at all, least of all a Fabian one. They thought of themselves as a small elite of brain-trusters who would permeate the existing institutions of society, influence the real leaders in all spheres Tory or Liberal, and guide social development toward its collectivist goal with the "inevitability of gradualness." Since their conception of socialism was purely in terms of state intervention (national or municipal), and their theory told them that capitalism itself was being collectivized apace every day and had to move in this direction, their function was simply to hasten the process. The Fabian Society was designed in 1884 to be pilot-fish to a shark: at first the shark was the Liberal Party; but when the permeation of Liberalism failed miserably, and labour finally organized its own class party despite the Fabians, the pilot-fish simply reattached itself.

There is perhaps no other socialist tendency which so systematically and even consciously worked out its theory as a Socialism-from-Above. The nature of this movement was early recognized, though it was later obscured by the merging of Fabianism into the body of Labour reformism. The leading Christian Socialist inside the

Fabian Society once attacked Webb as "a bureaucratic Collectivist" (perhaps the first use of that term.) Hilaire Belloc's once-famous book of 1912 on *The Servile State* was largely triggered by the Webb type whose "collectivist ideal" was basically bureaucratic. G. D. H. Cole reminisced: "The Webbs, in those days, used to be fond of saying that everyone who was active in politics was either an 'A' or a 'B'—an anarchist or a bureaucrat—and that they were 'B's...'"

These characterizations scarcely convey the full flavour of the Webbian collectivism that was Fabianism. It was through-and-through managerial, technocratic, elitist, authoritarian, "plannist." Webb was fond of the term wire-pulling almost as a synonym for politics. A Fabian publication wrote that they wished to be "the Jesuits of Socialism." The gospel was Order and Efficiency. The people, who should be treated kindly, were fit to be run only by competent experts. Class struggle, revolution and popular turbulence were inanity. In *Fabianism and the Empire* imperialism was praised and embraced. If ever the socialist movement developed its own bureaucratic collectivism, this was it.

"It may be thought that Socialism is essentially a movement from below, a class movement," wrote a Fabian spokesman, Sidney Ball, to disabuse the reader of this idea; but now socialists "approach the problem from the scientific rather than the popular view; they are middle-class theorists," he boasted, going on to explain that there is "a distinct rupture between the Socialism of the street and the Socialism of the chair."

The sequel is also known, though often glossed over. While Fabianism as a special tendency petered out into the larger stream of Labour Party reformism by 1918, the leading Fabians themselves went in another direction. Both Sidney and Beatrice Webb as well as Bernard Shaw—the top trio—became principled supporters of Stalinist totalitarianism in the 1930s. Even earlier, Shaw, who thought socialism needed a Superman, had found more than one. In turn he embraced Mussolini and Hitler as benevolent despots to hand "socialism" down to the Yahoos, and he was disappointed only that they did not actually abolish capitalism. In 1931 Shaw disclosed, after a visit to Russia, that the Stalin regime was really Fabianism in practice. The Webbs followed to Moscow, and found God. In their *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*, they proved (right out of Moscow's own documents and Stalin's own claims, industriously researched) that Russia is the greatest democracy in the world; Stalin is no dictator; equality reigns for all; the one-party dictatorship is needed; the Communist Party is a thoroughly democratic elite bringing civilization to the Slavs and Mongols (but not Englishmen); political democracy has failed in the West anyway, and there is no reason why political parties should survive in our age...

They staunchly supported Stalin through the Moscow purge trials and the Hitler-Stalin Pact without a visible qualm, and died more uncritical pro-Stalinists than can now be found on the Polit-

buro. As Shaw has explained, the Webbs had nothing but scorn for the Russian Revolution itself, but "The Webbs waited until the wreckage and ruin of the change was ended, its mistakes remedied, and the Communist State fairly launched." That is, they waited until the revolutionary masses had been straitjacketed, the leaders of the revolution cashiered, the efficient tranquillity of dictatorship had settled on the scene, the counter-revolution firmly established; and then they came along to pronounce it the Ideal.

Was this really a gigantic misunderstanding, some incomprehensible blunder? Or were they not right in thinking that this indeed was the "socialism" that matched their ideology, give or take a little blood? The swing of Fabianism from middle-class permeation to Stalinism was the swing of a door that was hinged on Socialism-from-Above.

If we look back at the decades just before the turn of the century that launched Fabianism on the world, another figure looms, the antithesis of Webb: the leading personality of revolutionary socialism in that period, the poet and artist William Morris, who became a socialist and a Marxist in his late forties. Morris's writings on socialism breathe from every pore the spirit of Socialism-from-Below, just as every line of Webb's is the opposite. This is perhaps clearest in his sweeping attacks on Fabianism (for the right reasons); his dislike of the "Marxism" of that British edition of Laxalle, the dictatorial H. M. Hyndman; his denunciations of state-socialism; and his repugnance at the bureaucratic-collectivist utopia of Bellamy's *Looking Backward*. (The latter moved him to remark: "If they brigaded *me* into a regiment of workers, I'd just lie on my back and kick.")

Morris' socialist writings are pervaded with his emphasis from every side on class struggle from below, in the present; and as for the socialist future, his *News from Nowhere* was written as the direct antithesis of Bellamy's book. He warned

that individual men cannot shuffle off the business of life on to the shoulders of an abstraction called the State, but must deal with it in conscious association with each other... Variety of life is as much an aim of true Communism as equality of condition, and... nothing but a union of these two will bring about real freedom.

"Even some Socialists," he wrote, "are apt to confuse the cooperative machinery towards which modern life is tending with the essence of Socialism itself." This meant "the danger of the community falling into bureaucracy." Therefore he expressed fear of a "collectivist bureaucracy" lying ahead. Reacting violently against state-socialism and reformism, he fell backwards into anti-parliamentarism but he did not fall into the anarchist trap:

... people will have to associate in administration, and sometimes there will be differences of opinion... What is to be done? Which party is to give way? Our Anarchist friends say that it must not be carried by a majority; in that case, then, it must be carried by a minority. And why? Is there any divine right in a minority?

This goes to the heart of anarchism far more deeply than the common opinion that the trouble with anarchism is that it is ~~one~~ idealistic.

William Morris versus Sidney Webb: this is one way of ~~summing~~ up the story.

7. The "Revisionist" Facade

Eduard Bernstein, the theoretician of social-democratic "revisionism," took his impulsion from Fabianism, by which he was heavily influenced in his London exile. He did not invent the reformist policy in 1896: he merely became its theoretical spokesman. (The head of the party bureaucracy preferred less theory: "One doesn't say it, one *does* it," he told Bernstein, meaning that the politics of German social-democracy had been gutted of Marxism long before its theoreticians reflected the change.)

But Bernstein did not "revise" Marxism. His role was to uproot it while pretending to prune away withered limbs. The Fabians had not needed to bother with pretense, but in Germany it was not possible to destroy Marxism by a frontal attack. The reversion to Socialism-from-Above ("die alte Scheisse") had to be presented as a "modernization," a "revision."

Essentially, like the Fabians, "revisionism" found its socialism in the inevitable collectivization of capitalism itself; it saw the movement toward socialism as the sum of the collectivist tendencies immanent in capitalism itself; it looked to the "self-socialization" of capitalism from above, through the institutions of the existing state. The equation of *Statification*=*Socialism* is not the invention of Stalinism; it was systematized by the Fabian-Revisionist-State-socialist current of social-democratic reformism.

Most of the contemporary discoveries which announce that socialism is obsolete, because capitalism no longer really exists, can already be found in Bernstein. It was "absurd" to call Weimar Germany capitalist, he declared, because of the controls exercised over the capitalists; it follows from Bernsteinism that the Nazi state was even more anti-capitalist, as advertised...

The transformation of socialism into a bureaucratic collectivism is already implicit in Bernstein's attack on workers' democracy. Denouncing the idea of workers' control of industry, he proceeds to redefine democracy. Is it "government by the people"? He rejects this, in favour of the negative definition "absence of class government." Thus the very notion of workers' democracy as a *sine qua non* of socialism is junked, as effectively as by the clever redefinitions of democracy current in the Communist academies. Even political freedom and representative institutions have been defined out: a theoretical result all the more impressive since Bernstein himself was not personally anti-democratic like Lassalle or Shaw. It is the theory of Socialism-from-Above which requires these formulations. Bernstein

is the leading social-democratic theoretician not only of the equation Statification—Socialism, but also of the disjunction of socialism from workers' democracy.

It was fitting, therefore, that Bernstein should come to the conclusion that Marx's hostility to the state was "anarchistic," and that Lassalle was right in looking to the state for the initiation of socialism. "The administrative body of the visible future can be different from the present-day state only in degree," wrote Bernstein; the "withering away of the state" is nothing but utopianism even under socialism. He, on the contrary, was very practical; for example, as the Kaiser's non-withering state launched itself into the imperialist scramble for colonies, Bernstein promptly came out for colonialism and the White Man's Burden: "only a conditional right of savages to the land occupied by them can be recognized; the higher civilization ultimately can claim a higher right."

Bernstein contrasted his own vision of the road to socialism with that of Marx: Marx's "is the picture of an army. It presses forward, through detours, over sticks and stones... Finally it arrives at a great abyss. Beyond it there stands beckoning the desired goal—the state of the future, which can be reached only through a sea, a red sea as some have said." In contrast, Bernstein's vision was not red but roseate: the class struggle softens into harmony as a beneficent state gently changes the bourgeoisie into good bureaucrats. *It didn't happen that way*—when the Bernsteinized social-democracy first shot down the revolutionary left in 1919, and then, reinstating the unregenerate bourgeoisie and the military in power, helped to yield Germany into the hands of the fascists.

If Bernstein was the theoretician of the identification of bureaucratic collectivism with socialism, then it was his left-wing opponent in the German movement who became the leading spokesman in the Second International of a revolutionary-democratic Socialism-from-Below. This was Rosa Luxemburg, who so emphatically put her faith and hope in the spontaneous struggle of a free working class that the myth-makers invented for her a "theory of spontaneity" which she never held, a theory in which "spontaneity" is counterposed to "leadership."

In her own movement she fought hard against the "revolutionary" elitists who rediscovered the theory of the Educational Dictatorship over the workers (it is rediscovered in every generation as The Very Latest Thing), and had to write: "Without the conscious will and the conscious action of the majority of the proletariat there can be no socialism..."—" [We] will never assume governmental authority except through the clear unambiguous will of the vast majority of the German working class..." And her famous aphorism: "Mistakes committed by a genuinely revolutionary labour movement are much more fruitful and worthwhile historically than the infallibility of the very best Central Committee."

Rosa Luxemburg versus Eduard Bernstein: this is the German chapter of the story.

8. The 100% American Scene

At the wellsprings of American "native socialism," the picture is the same, only more so. If we overlook the imported "German socialism" (Lassalleian with Marxist trimmings) of the early Socialist Labor Party, then the leading figure here is, far and away, Edward Bellamy and his *Looking Backward* (1887). Just before him came the now-forgotten Laurence Gronlund, whose *Cooperative Commonwealth* (1884) was extremely influential in its day, selling 100,000 copies.

Gronlund is so up-to-date that he does not say he rejects democracy—he merely "redefines" it; as "Administration by the Competent," as against "government by majorities," together with a modest proposal to wipe out representative government as such as well as all parties. All the "people" want, he teaches, is "administration—good administration." They should find "the right leaders," and then be "willing to thrust their whole collective power into their hands." Representative government will be replaced by the plebiscite. He is sure that his scheme will work, he explains, because it works so well for the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Naturally he rejects the horrible idea of class struggle. The workers are incapable of self-emancipation, and he specifically denounces Marx's famous expression of this First Principle. The Yahoos will be emancipated by an elite of the "competent," drawn from the intelligentsia; and at one point he set out to organize a secret conspiratorial American Socialist Fraternity for students.

Bellamy's socialist utopia in *Looking Backward* is expressly modeled on the army as the ideal pattern of society—regimented hierarchically ruled by an elite, organized from the top down, with the cozy communion of the beehive as the great end. The story itself pictures the transition as coming through the concentration of society into one big business corporation, a single capitalist: the state. Universal suffrage is abolished; all organizations from below eliminated; decisions are made by administrative technocrats from above. As one of his followers defined this "American socialism": "Its social idea is a perfectly organized industrial system which, by reason of the close interlocking of its wheels, shall work at a minimum of friction with a maximum of wealth and leisure to all."

As in the case of the anarchists, Bellamy's fanciful solution to the basic problem of social organization—how to resolve differences of ideas and interests among men—is the *assumption* that the elite will be superhumanly wise and incapable of injustice (essentially the same as the Stalinist-totalitarian myth of the infallibility of the Party), the point of the assumption being that it makes unnecessary any concern about democratic control from below. The latter is unthinkable for Bellamy because the masses, the workers, are simply a dangerous monster, the barbarian horde. The Bellamyite movement—which called itself "Nationalism" and originally set out to be both

anti-socialist and anti-capitalist was systematically organized on a middle-class appeal, like the Fabians.

Here were the overwhelmingly popular educators of the "native" wing of American socialism, whose conceptions echoed through the non-Marxist and anti-Marxist sectors of the socialist movement well into the 20th century, with a resurgence of "Bellamy Clubs" even in the 1930s, when John Dewey eulogized *Looking Backward* as expounding "the American ideal of democracy." Technocracy, which already reveals fascist features openly, was a lineal descendant of this tradition on one side. If one wants to see how thin the line can be between something called socialism and something like fascism, it is instructive to read the monstrous exposition of "socialism" written by the once-famous inventor-scientist and Socialist Party luminary Charles P. Steinmetz. His *America and the New Epoch* (1916) sets down in deadly seriousness exactly the anti-utopia once satirized in a science-fiction novel, in which Congress has been replaced by direct senators from DuPont, General Motors and the other great corporations. Steinmetz, presenting the giant monopolistic corporations (like his own employer, General Electric) as the ultimate in industrial efficiency, proposes to disband the political government in favour of direct rule by the associated corporate monopolists.

Bellamyism started many on the road to socialism, but the road forked. By the turn of the century, American socialism developed the world's most vibrant antithesis to Socialism-from-Above in all its forms: Eugene Debs. In 1897 Debs was still at the point of asking none other than John D. Rockefeller to finance the establishment of a socialist utopian colony in a western state; but Debs, whose socialism was forged in the class struggle of a militant labour movement, soon found his true voice.

The heart of "Debsian socialism" was its appeal to, and faith in, the self-activity of the masses from below. Debs' writings and speeches are impregnated with this theme. He often quoted or paraphrased Marx's 'First Principle' in his own words: "The great discovery the modern slaves have made is that they themselves their freedom must achieve. This is the secret of their solidarity; the heart of their hope..." His classic statement is this:

Too long have the workers of the world waited for some Moses to lead them out of bondage. He has not come; he never will come. I would not lead you out if I could; for if you could be led out, you could be led back again. I would have you make up your minds that there is nothing you cannot do for yourselves.

He echoed Marx's words of 1850:

In the struggle of the working class to free itself from wage slavery it cannot be repeated too often that everything depends on the working class itself. The simple question is, can the workers fit themselves, by education, organization, cooperation and self-imposed discipline, to take control of the productive forces and manage industry in the interest of the people and for the benefit of society? That is all there is to it.

Can the workers fit themselves... He was under no starry-eyed illusions about the working class as it was (or is). But he proposed a different goal than the elitists whose sole wisdom consists in pointing a finger at the backwardness of the people now, and in teaching that this must always be so. As against the faith in elite rule from above, Debs counterposed the directly contrary notion of the revolutionary *vanguard* (also a minority) whose faith impels them to advocate a harder road for the majority:

It is the minorities who have made the history of this world [he said in the 1917 anti-war speech for which Wilson's government jailed him]. It is the few who have had the courage to take their places at the front; who have been true enough to themselves to speak the truth that was in them; who have dared oppose the established order of things; who have espoused the cause of the suffering, struggling poor; who have upheld without regard to personal consequences the cause of freedom and righteousness.

This "Debsian socialism" evoked a tremendous response from the heart of the people, but Debs had no successor as a tribune of revolutionary-democratic socialism. After the postwar period of radicalization, the Socialist Party became pinkly respectable on the one hand, and the Communist Party became Stalinized on the other. On its side, American liberalism itself had long been under-going a process of "statification," culminating in the great New Deal illusion of the '30s. The elite vision of a dispensation-from-above under the aegis of the Savior-President attracted a whole strain of liberals to whom the country gentleman in the White House was as Bismarck to Lassalle.

The type had been heralded by Lincoln Steffens, the collectivist liberal who (like Shaw and Georges Sorel) was as attracted to Moscow as to Moscow, and for the same reasons. Upton Sinclair, quitting the Socialist Party as too "sectarian," launched his "broad" movement to "End Poverty in California," with a manifesto appropriately called *I, Governor of California, and How I Ended Poverty* (probably the only radical manifesto with two I's in the title) on the theme of "Socialism-from-Up-in-Sacramento." One of the typical figures of the time was Stuart Chase, who wove a zigzag course from the reformism of the League for Industrial Democracy to the semi-fascism of Technocracy. There were the Stalinoid intellectuals who managed to sublimate their joint admiration for Roosevelt and Russia by hailing both the NRA and the Moscow Trials. There were signs of the times like Paul Blanshard, who defected from the Socialist Party to Roosevelt on the ground that the New Deal program of "managed capitalism" had taken the initiative in economic change away from the socialists.

The New Deal, often rightly called America's "social-democratic period," was also the liberals' and social-democrats' big fling at Socialism-from-Above, the utopia of Roosevelt's "people's monarchy." The illusion of the Rooseveltian "revolution from above" united creeping-socialism, bureaucratic liberalism, Stalinoid elitism, and

illusions about both Russian collectivism and collectivized capitalism, in one package.

9. Six Strains of Socialism-from-Above

We have seen that there are several different strains or currents running through Socialism-from-Above. They are usually intertwined, but let us separate out some of the more important aspects for a closer look.

(1) *Philanthropism*.—Socialism (or "freedom," or what-have-you) is to be handed down, in order to Do the People Good, by the rich and powerful out of the kindness of their hearts. As the *Communist Manifesto* put it, with the early utopians like Robert Owen in mind, "Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them." In gratitude, the down-trodden poor must above all avoid getting rambunctious, and no nonsense about class struggle or self-emancipation. This aspect may be considered a special case of—

(2) *Elitism*.—We have mentioned several cases of this conviction that socialism is the business of a new ruling minority, non-capitalist in nature and therefore guaranteed pure, imposing its own domination either temporarily (for a mere historical era) or even permanently. In either case, this new ruling class is likely to see its goal as an Educational Dictatorship over the masses—to Do Them Good, of course—the dictatorship being exercised by an elite party which suppresses all control from below, or by benevolent despots or Savior-Leaders of some kind, or by Shaw's "Supermen," by eugenic manipulators, by Proudhon's "anarchist" managers or Saint-Simon's technocrats or their more modern equivalents—with up-to-date terms and new verbal screens which can be hailed as fresh social theory as against "nineteenth-century Marxism."

On the other hand, the revolutionary-democratic advocates of Socialism-from-Below have also always been a minority, but the chasm between the elitist approach and the *vanguard* approach is crucial, as we have seen in the case of Debs. For him as for Marx and Luxemburg, the function of the revolutionary vanguard is to impel the mass-majority *to fit themselves to take power in their own name, through their own struggles*. The point is not to deny the critical importance of minorities, but to establish a different relationship between the advanced minority and the more backward mass.

(3) *Plannism*.—The key words are Efficiency, Order, Planning, System—and Regimentation. Socialism is reduced to social-engineering, by a Power above society. Here again, the point is not to deny that effective socialism requires over-all planning (and also that efficiency and order are good things); but the *reduction* of socialism to planned production is an entirely different matter; just as effective democracy requires the right to vote, but the *reduction* of democracy merely to the right to vote once in a while makes it a fraud.

As a matter of fact, it would be important to demonstrate that the separation of planning from democratic control-from-below makes a mockery of planning itself; for the immensely complicated industrial societies of today cannot be effectively planned by an all-powerful central committee's ukases, which inhibit and terrorize the free play of initiative and correction from below. This is indeed the basic contradiction of the new type of exploiting social system represented by Soviet bureaucratic collectivism. But we cannot pursue this subject further here.

The substitution of Plannism for socialism has a long history, quite apart from its embodiment in the Soviet myth that *Statification=Socialism*, a tenet which we have already seen to have been first systematized by social-democratic reformism (Bernstein and the Fabians particularly). During the 1930's, the mystique of the "Plan," taken over in part from Soviet propaganda, became prominent in the right wing of the social-democracy, with Henri de Man hailed as its prophet and as successor to Marx. De Man faded from view and is now forgotten because he had the bad judgment to push his Revisionist theories first into corporatism and then into collaboration with the Nazis.

Aside from theoretical constructions, Plannism appears in the socialist movement most frequently embodied in a certain psychological type of radical. To give credit due, one of the first sketches of this type came in Belloc's *The Servile State*, with the Fabians in mind. This type, writes Belloc,

loves the collectivist ideal in itself . . . because it is an ordered and regular form of society. He loves to consider the ideal of a State in which land and capital shall be held by public officials who shall order other men about and so preserve them from the consequences of their vice, ignorance and folly. [Belloc writes further:] In him the exploitation of man excites no indignation. Indeed, he is not a type to which indignation or any other lively passion is familiar . . . [Belloc's eye is on Sidney Webb here.] . . . the prospect of a vast bureaucracy wherein the whole of life shall be scheduled and appointed to certain simple schemes . . . gives his small stomach a final satisfaction.

As far as concerns contemporary examples with a pro-Stalinist colouration, examples-a-go-go can be found in the pages of Paul Sweezy's magazine *Monthly Review*.

In a 1930 article on the "motive patterns of socialism," written when he still thought he was a Leninist, Max Eastman distinguished this type as centered on "efficiency and intelligent organization . . . a veritable passion for a plan . . . businesslike organization." For such, he commented, Stalin's Russia has a fascination:

It is a region at least to be apologized for in other lands—certainly not denounced from the standpoint of a mad dream like emancipation of the workers and therewith all mankind. In those who built the Marxian movement and those who organized its victory in Russia, that mad dream was the central motive. They were, as some are prone now to forget,

extreme rebels against oppression. Lenin will perhaps stand out, when the commotion about his ideas subsides, as the greatest rebel in history. His major passion was to set men free . . . If a single concept must be chosen to summarize the goal of the class struggle as defined in Marxian writings, and especially the writings of Lenin, human freedom is the name for it . . .

It might be added that more than once Lenin decried the push for total-planning as a "bureaucratic utopia."

There is a subdivision under Plannism which deserves a name too: let us call it Productionism. Of course, everyone is "for" production just as everyone is for Virtue and the Good Life; but for this type, production is the decisive test and end of a society. Russian bureaucratic collectivism is "progressive" because of the statistics of pig-iron production (the same type usually ignores the impressive statistics of increased production under Nazi or Japanese capitalism). It is all right to smash or prevent free trade-unions under Nasser, Castro, Sukarno or Nkrumah because something known as "economic development" is paramount over human rights. This hardboiled viewpoint was, of course, not invented by these "radicals," but by the callous exploiters of labour in the capitalist Industrial Revolution; and the socialist movement came into existence fighting tooth-and-nail against these theoreticians of "progressive" exploitation. On this score too, apologists for modern "leftist" authoritarian regimes tend to consider this hoary doctrine as the newest revelation of sociology.

(4) "*Communismism*."—In his 1930 article Max Eastman called this "the united-brotherhood pattern," of "the gregarious or human-solidarity socialists"—"those yearning with a mixture of religious mysticism and animal gregariousness for human solidarity." It should not be confused with the notion of solidarity in strikes, etc., and not necessarily identified with what is commonly called comradeship in the socialist movement or a "sense of community" elsewhere. Its specific content, as Eastman says, is a "seeking for submersion in a Totality, seeking to lose himself in the bosom of a substitute for God."

Eastman is here pointing to the Communist Party writer Mike Gold; another excellent case is Harry F. Ward, the CP's hardy clerical fellow-traveler, whose books theorize this kind of "oceanic" yearning for the shucking-off of one's individuality. Bellamy's notebooks reveal him as a classic case: he writes about the longing "for absorption into the grand omnipotency of the universe," his "Religion of Solidarity" reflects his mistrust of the individualism of the personality, his craving to dissolve the Self into communion with Something Greater.

This strain is very prominent in some of the most authoritarian of the Socialisms-from-Above and is not seldom met in milder cases like the philanthropic elitists with Christian Socialist views. Naturally, this kind of "communismism" socialism is always hailed as an "ethical

socialism" and praised for holding class struggle in horror; for there must be no conflict inside a beehive. It tends to flatly counterpose "collectivism" to "individualism" (a false opposition from a humanist standpoint), but what it really impugns is *individuality*.

(5) *Permeationism*.—Socialism-from-Above appears in many varieties for the simple reason that there are always many alternatives to the self-mobilization of masses from below; but the cases discussed tend to divide into two families.

One has the perspective of *overthrowing* the present, capitalist hierarchical society in order to replace it with a new, non-capitalist type of hierarchical society based on a new kind of elite ruling class. (These varieties are usually ticketed "revolutionary" in histories of socialism.) The other has the perspective of *permeating* the centers of power in the existing society in order to metamorphose—it gradually, inevitably—into a starified collectivism, perhaps molecule by molecule the way wood petrifies into agate. This is the characteristic stigmata of the reformist, social-democratic varieties of Socialism-from-Above.

The very term permeationism was invented for self-description by what we have already called the "purest" variety of reformism ever seen, Sidney Webb's Fabianism. All social-democratic permeationism is based on a theory of mechanical *inevitability*: the inevitable self-collectivization of capitalism from above, which is equated with socialism. Pressure from below (where considered permissible) can hasten and straighten the process, provided it is kept under control to avoid frightening the self-collectivizers. Hence the social-democratic permeationists are not only willing but anxious to "join the Establishment" rather than to fight it, in whatever capacity they are allowed to join it, whether as cabin boys or cabinet ministers. Typically the function of their movement-from-below is primarily to blackmail the ruling powers into buying them off with such opportunities for permeation.

The tendency toward the collectivization of capitalism is indeed a reality: as we have seen, it means the bureaucratic collectivization of capitalism. As this process has advanced, the contemporary social-democracy has itself gone through a metamorphosis. Today, the leading theoretician of this neo-reformism, G. A. R. Crossland, denounces as "extremist" the mild statement favoring nationalization which was originally written for the British Labor program by none other than Sidney Webb (with Arthur Henderson)! The number of continental social-democracies that have now purged their programs of all specifically anti-capitalist content—a brand new phenomenon in socialist history—reflects the degree to which the ongoing process of bureaucratic collectivization is accepted as an installment of petrified "socialism."

This is permeationism as grand strategy. It leads, of course, to permeationism as political tactic, a subject we cannot here pursue

beyond mentioning its presently most prominent U.S. form: the policy of supporting the Democratic Party and the lib-lab coalition around the "Johnson Consensus," its predecessors and successors.

The distinction between these two "families" of Socialism-from-Above holds for *home grown* socialisms, from Babeuf to Harold Wilson; that is, cases where the social base of the given socialist current is *inside* the national system, be it the labor aristocracy or déclassé elements or any other. The case is somewhat different for those "socialisms-from-outside" represented by the contemporary Communist Parties, whose strategy and tactics depend in the last analysis on a power base *outside* any of the domestic social strata; that is, on the bureaucratic-collectivist ruling classes in the East.

The Communist Parties have shown themselves uniquely different from any kind of home-grown movement in their capacity to *alternate or combine both* the "revolutionary"-oppositionist and the permeationist tactics to suit their convenience. Thus the American Communist Party could swing from its ultra-left-adventurist "Third Period" of 1928-34 into the ultra-permeationist tactic of the Popular Front period, then back into fire-breathing "revolutionism" during the Hitler-Stalin Pact period, and again, during the ups-and-downs of the Cold War, into various degrees of combination of the two. With the current Communist split along Moscow-Peking lines, the "Khrushchevites" and the Maoists tend each to embody one of the two tactics which formerly alternated.

Frequently, therefore, in domestic policy the official Communist Party and the social-democrats tend to converge on the policy of permeationism, though from the angle of a different Socialism-from-Above.

(6) *Socialism-from-Outside*.—The preceding varieties of Socialism-from-Above look to power at the tops of society: now we come to the expectation of succor from the outside.

The flying-saucer cult is a pathological form, messianism a more traditional form, when "outside" means out of this world; but for present purposes "outside" means *outside the social struggle at home*. For the Communists of East Europe after World War II, the New Order had to be imported on Russian bayonets; for the German Social-Democrats in exile, liberation of their own people could finally be imagined only by grace of foreign military victory.

The peacetime variety is socialism-by-model-example. This, of course, was the method of the old utopians, who built their model colonies in the American backwoods in order to demonstrate the superiority of their system and convert the unbelievers. Today, it is this substitute for social struggle at home which is increasingly the essential hope of the Communist movement in the West.

The model-example is provided by Russia (or China, for the Maoists); and while it is difficult to make the lot of the Russian proletarians half-attractive to Western workers even with a generous

dose of lies, there is more success to be expected from two other approaches:

(a) The relatively privileged position of managerial, bureaucratic and intellectual-flunky elements in the Russian collectivist system can be pointedly contrasted with the situation in the West, where the same elements are subordinated to the owners of capital and manipulators of wealth. At this point the appeal of the Soviet system or statified economy coincides with the historic appeal of middle-class socialisms, to disgruntled class-elements of intellectuals, technologists, scientists and scientific employes, administrative bureaucrats and organization men of various types, who can most easily identify themselves with a new ruling class based on state power rather than on money power and ownership, and therefore visualize themselves as the new men of power in a non-capitalist but elitist setup.

(b) While the official Communist Parties are required to maintain the façade of orthodoxy in something called "Marxism-Leninism," it is more common that serious theoreticians of neo-Stalinism who are not tied to the party do free themselves from the pretense. One development is the open abandonment of any perspective of victory through social struggle inside the capitalist countries. The "world revolution" is equated simply with the demonstration by the Communist states that their system is superior. This has now been put into thesis-form by the two leading theoreticians of neo-Stalinism, Paul Sweezy and Isaac Deutscher.

Baran and Sweezy's *Monopoly Capitalism* (1966) flatly rejects "the answer of traditional Marxist orthodoxy—that the industrial proletariat must eventually rise in revolution against its capitalist oppressors." Same for all the other "outsider" groups of society—unemployed, farm workers, ghetto masses, etc.; they cannot "constitute a coherent force in society." This leaves no one; capitalism cannot be effectively challenged from within. What then? Some day, the authors explain on their last page, "perhaps not in the present century," the people will be disillusioned with capitalism "as the world revolution spreads and as the socialist countries show by their example that it is possible" to build a rational society. [Emphasis added.] That is all. Thus the Marxist phrases filling the other 366 pages of this essay become simply an incantation like the reading of the Sermon on the Mount at St. Patrick's Cathedral.

The same perspective is presented less bluntly by a more circumlocutious writer in Deutscher's *The Great Contest*. Deutscher transmits the new Soviet theory "that Western capitalism will succumb not so much—or not directly—because of its own crises and inherent contradictions as because of its inability to match the achievements of socialism [i.e. the Communist states]"; and later on: "It may be said that this has to some extent replaced the Marxist prospect of a permanent social revolution." Here we have a theoretic-

al rationale for what has long been the function of the Communist movement in the West: to act as border guard and shill for the competing, rival establishment in the East. Above all, the perspective of Socialism-from-Below becomes as alien to these professors of bureaucratic collectivism as to the apologists for capitalism in the American academies.

This type of neo-Stalinist ideologist is often critical of the actual Soviet regime—a good example is Deutscher, who remains as far as possible from being an uncritical apologist for Moscow like the official Communists. They must be understood as being *permeation-ists with respect to bureaucratic-collectivism*. What appears as a "socialism-from-outside" when seen from the capitalist world, becomes a sort of Fabianism when viewed from within the framework of the Communist system. Within this context, change-from-above-only is as firm a principle for these theoreticians as it was for Sidney Webb. This was demonstrated *inter alia* by Deutscher's hostile reaction to the East German revolt of 1953 and to the Hungarian revolution of 1956, on the classical ground that such upheavals from below would scare the Soviet establishment away from its course of "liberalization" by the Inevitability of Gradualness.

10. Which Side Are You On ?

From the point of view of intellectuals who have a choice of roles to play in the social struggle, the perspective of Socialism-from-Below has historically had little appeal. Even within the framework of the socialist movement it has had few consistent exponents and not many inconsistent ones. Outside the socialist movement, naturally, the standard line is that such ideas are visionary, impractical, unrealistic, "utopian"; idealistic perhaps but quixotic. The mass of people are congenitally stupid, corrupt, apathetic and generally hopeless; and progressive change must come from Superior People rather like (as it happens) the intellectual expressing these sentiments. This is translated theoretically into an Iron Law of Oligarchy or a tinny law of elitism, in one way or another involving a crude theory of inevitability—the inevitability of change-from-above-only.

Without presuming to review in a few words the arguments pro and con for this pervasive view, we can note the social role it plays, as the self-justificatory rite of the elitist. In "normal" times when the masses *are* not moving, the theory simply requires pointing with scorn, while the whole history of revolution and social upheaval is simply dismissed as obsolete. But the recurrence of revolutionary upheavals and social disturbances, defined precisely by the intrusion onto the historical stage of previous inactive masses and characteristic of periods when basic social change is on the agenda, is just as "normal" in history as the intervening periods of conservation. When the elitist theorist therefore has to abandon the posture of the scientific observer who is merely *predicting* that the mass of people will always continue quiescent, when he is faced with the opposite reality of a revolutionary mass threatening to subvert the structure of

power, he is typically not behindhanded in switching over to an entirely different track: denouncing mass intervention from below as evil in itself.

The fact is that the choice between Socialism-from-Above and Socialism-from-Below is, for the intellectual, basically a *moral* choice, whereas for the working masses who have no social alternative it is a matter of necessity. The intellectual may have the option of "joining the Establishment" where the worker does not; the same option holds also for labor leaders, who, as they rise out of their class, likewise confront a choice that did not exist before. The pressure of conformity to the mores of the ruling class, the pressure for bourgeoisification, is stronger in proportion as personal and organizational ties with the ranks below become weak. It is not hard for an intellectual or bureaucratized official to convince himself that permeation of and adaptation to the existing power is the smart way to do it, when (as it happens) it also permits sharing in the perquisites of influence and affluence.

It is an ironic fact, therefore, that the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" is ironclad mainly for the intellectual elements from whom it arises. As a social stratum (i.e., apart from exceptional individuals) intellectuals have never been known to rise against established power in anything like the way that the modern working class has done time and again through its relatively brief history. Functioning typically as the ideological flunkies of the established rulers of society, the brain-worker sector of the non-propertied middle classes is yet, at the same time, moved to discontent and disgruntlement by the relationship. Like many another servant, this Admirable Crichton thinks, "I am a better man than my master, and if things were different we would see who should bend the knee." More than ever in our day, when the credit of the capitalist system is disintegrating throughout the world, he easily dreams of a form of society in which he can come into his own, in which the Brain and not Hands or Moneybags would dictate; in which he and his similars would be released from the pressure of Property through the elimination of capitalism, and released from the pressure of the more numerous masses through the elimination of democracy.

Nor does he have to dream very far, for existing versions of such a society seem to be before his eyes, in the Eastern collectivisms. Even if he rejects these versions, for various reasons including the Cold War, he can theorize his own version of a "good" kind of bureaucratic collectivism, to be called "Meritocracy" or "managerialism" or "Industrialism" or what-have-you, in the U.S.; or "African Socialism" in Ghana and "Arab Socialism" in Cairo; or various other kinds of socialism in other parts of the world.

The nature of the choice between Socialism-from-Above and Socialism-from-Below stands out most starkly in connection with a question on which there is a considerable measure of agreement among liberal, social-democratic and Stalinoid intellectuals today.

This is the alleged inevitability of authoritarian dictatorships (benevolent despotisms) in the newly developing states of Africa and Asia particularly—e.g. Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno, et al.—dictatorships which crush independent trade unions as well as all political opposition and organize to maximize the exploitation of labor, in order to extract from the hides of the working masses sufficient capital to hasten industrialization at the tempo which the new rulers desire. Thus to an unprecedented degree, "progressive" circles which once would have protested injustice anywhere have become automatic apologists for any authoritarianism which is considered non-capitalist.

Apart from the economic-determinist rationale usually given for this position, there are two aspects of the question which illuminate what is broadly at stake:

(a) The economic argument for dictatorship, purporting to prove the necessity of breakneck industrialization, is undoubtedly very weighty for the new bureaucratic rulers—who meanwhile do not stint their own revenue and aggrandizement—but it is incapable of persuading the worker at the bottom of the heap that he and his family must bow to super-exploitation and super-weating for some generations ahead, for the sake of a quick accumulation of capital. (In fact, this is why breakneck industrialization requires dictatorial controls.)

The economic-determinist argument is the rationalization of a ruling-class viewpoint; it makes human sense *only* from a ruling-class viewpoint, which of course is always identified with the needs of "society." It makes equally good sense that the workers at the bottom of the heap *must* move to fight this super-exploitation to defend their elementary human dignity and wellbeing. So was it also during the capitalist Industrial Revolution, when the "newly developing states" were in Europe.

It is not a question simply of some technical-economic argument but of sides in a class struggle. The question is: Which side are you on?

(b) It is argued that the mass of people in these countries are too backward to control the society and its government; and this is no doubt true, not only there. But what follows? How does a people or a class become fit to rule in their own name?

Only by fighting to do so. Only by waging their struggle against oppression—oppression by those who tell them they are unfit to govern. Only by fighting for democratic power do they educate themselves and raise themselves up to the level of being able to wield that power. There has never been any other way for any class.

Although we have been considering a particular line of apologia, the two points which emerged do in fact apply all over the world, in every country, advanced or developing, capitalist or Stalinist. When the demonstrations and boycotts of the Southern Negroes threatened to embarrass President Johnson as he faced an election,

the question was: *Which side are you on?* When the Hungarian people erupted in revolt against the Russian occupier, the question was: *Which side are you on?* When the Algerian people fought for liberation against the "socialist" government of Guy Mollet, the question was: *Which side are you on?* When Cuba was invaded by Washington's puppets, the question was: *Which side are you on?* and when the Cuban trade unions are taken over by the commissars of the dictatorship, the question is also: *Which side are you on?*

Since the beginning of society, there has been no end of theories "proving" that tyranny is inevitable and that freedom-in-democracy is impossible; there is no more convenient ideology for a ruling class and its intellectual flunkies. The e are self-fulfilling predictions, since they remain true only as long as they are taken to be true. In the last analysis, the only way of proving them false is in the struggle itself. That struggle from below has never been stopped by the theories from above, and it has changed the world time and again. To choose any of the forms of Socialism-from-Above is to look back to the old world, to the "old crap." To choose the road of Socialism-from-Below is to affirm the beginning of a new world.

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NOTE

This is a completely rewritten and expanded version of a study which originally appeared in the socialist student magazine "Anvil" (Winter 1960) and was subsequently reprinted two or three times elsewhere. The framework, the general content, and some passages remain, but I have taken advantage of this new edition to make a thorough revision of what was a hasty first draft.

The aim is not to give a history of socialist thought in a nutshell, but simply to illustrate a thesis—the thesis basing a historical interpretation of the meaning of socialism and of how socialism came to mean what it does today. To this end I have selected for discussion a few of the most important socialist currents up to the early 20th century, since the object of the inquiry is the wellsprings of the modern socialist movement. There are a number of tendencies which would have been difficult to treat briefly, and are therefore not discussed here at all, such as syndicalism, DeLeonism, Bolshevism, the IWW, the collectivist liberals, etc.; but I believe that their study leads to the same conclusions.

The chief difficulty in treating the subject briefly is the heavy encrustation of myth over the written history of socialism. At the end I have listed a very few works which are especially useful for some of the figures discussed here; for others the interested reader simply has to go back to the sources. There is no half-decent history of socialist thought extant today; and there probably will not be one until more socialist scholars do the kind of job that E. P. Thompson did for William Morris, whose image had been almost obliterated by the myths.

Speaking of William Morris, I re-read "A Dream of John Ball," and came once again across the oft-quoted passage about— Well, let us quote it again, as motto for the following pages:

"... I pondered all these things, and how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they means under another name..."

H. D.

A Few References

As mentioned in the Note, following are a few useful titles, but for most of the question dealt with, one must go back to the sources.

For Section 1, one book worth reading is A.D. Winspear's *The Genesis of Plato's Thought*, which discusses Pythagoras somewhat too. For Proudhon, see the chapter in J.S. Schapiro's *Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism*, and Proudhon's *Carnets*. For Bakunin, see E. Pyziur's *The Doctrine of Anarchism of M. A. Bakunin*, with E. H. Carr's biography for background. For Lassalle, see E. Bernstein's *F. Lassalle as a Social Reformer*, and D. Footman's biography. For Fabianism, there is only one half-decent published study, A. M. McBriar's *Fabian Socialism and English Politics*, and E. J. Hobsbawm's unpublished thesis, *Fabianism and the Fabians*, neither adequate for our purpose. For Rosa Luxemburg, see Paul Frolich's biography, and Tony Cliff's thin book, both titled with her name. For Bellamy and Gronlund, see Arthur Lipow's unpublished thesis, *Edward Bellamy and the Nationalist Movement* (Berkeley, Univ. of Calif., 1965).

Two articles by me in *New Politics* bear on some aspects of the subject: "Neo-Corporatists and Neo-Reformists" (I, 1, Winter 1962) and "The New Social-Democratic Reformism" (II, 2, Winter 1963). Also relevant are parts of the following two publications of the Independent Socialist Committee: *Independent Socialism: A Perspective for the Left* (pamphlet), and *Introduction to Independent Socialism* (a "clippingbook").



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PARTICIPATIVE TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

by Martin Oppenheimer

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"NEOCAPITALISM," said Lelio Basso recently, "has set in motion a whole series of mechanisms of integration at the shop level... It has even succeeded in creating between the managerial staffs and the workers a community of interests... which corresponds, on the shop level, to the alliance which is being shaped on the state level between monopoly capitalism and the working-class movement." Basso, a well-known European left-socialist, is not the only radical to have examined the startling flexibility of Western capitalism in terms of this national-level adaptability in recent years. But shop-level integration has been neglected of late by radical writers: the objective of this essay is to examine the *micro*-structure of integration as put forward by current American management theory, and to assess its perspectives.

The beginnings of the "human relations" approach, as distinct from classical management theory, came with some experiments conducted at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Co. in Chicago between 1924 and 1932. The experiments, conducted by Elton Mayo of Harvard School of Business Administration and other industrial psychologists, seemed to show that production output was *not* related to material incentives such as wages, physical working conditions, and hours; rather, the fact that workers were receiving *attention* in and of itself appeared to cause high morale and high output almost regardless of other aspects of the job. The experiments initiated "sophisticated" management theory — that the need for recognition, security, status, and a sense of belonging were at least as important in determining workers' morale, hence in affecting output, as material incentives such as wages and hours.

Origins of Approach

This particular "human relations" approach did not make a real impact on management during the 1930's depression; nobody cared, in a time of business crisis and labour surplus, how workers felt. But during World War II with its labour shortages, management became more concerned with worker-behavior as it might be related to *general* morale (including extra-plant, home life, etc.) and it began in many concerns to move seriously into industrial psychology in order to get a "better-adjusted," happier, more productive worker. Management, in short, began to move beyond an interest in the "point of production," and came to understand in a special sort of way that workers were indeed class-conscious — although of course, that term was never used. By the 1950's, a specific human relations approach was clearly identifiable in management thinking. This approach became a sort of high-level rationale for Dale Carnegie's popular efforts to teach people how to *manipulate* other people by *being nice to them*. The changes to be made in people through human relations (rather than by fiat) were always predetermined by management, and the only issue was how to persuade workers that these decisions were genuinely theirs when in fact they weren't. It was this manipulative human relations approach which Whyte exposed and demolished in *The Organization Man* (Whyte, 1956).

McGregor approach

Then, with the publication of *The Human Side of Enterprise* by McGregor of M.I.T.'s School of Industrial Management in 1960, the manipulative approach in human relations came under attack from within management's own camp. For several years some theorists had been arguing that good human relations would pay off, and that in the long run manipulative approaches would be self-defeating. These particular writers had begun to converge both theoretically and in experimentation in the plant with group dynamics pioneers such as Lewin and Moreno, counseling therapists such as Carl Rogers, and even humanistically and radically-oriented psychologists such as Fromm and Abraham Maslow. These writers together with Freud (and augmented later on by Norman Brown and Marcuse) began to be standard references in human relations work and remain so today; their terminology (e.g. repression, defenses, ego, self-actualizing, etc.) soon became standard vocabulary in human relations in management. Their concepts, particularly those of Rogerian therapy (non-directive counseling), were carried over into individual and group training for the organizational setting, involving people who were not judged to be in any way mentally ill, but who were judged to require better human relations skills, particularly in companies that understood that rapid, ongoing change was to be a permanent part of mid-century enterprise, and that adaptability to changing conditions required such skills.

"Theory Y"

It was McGregor who coined the expression "theory Y" to identify a concept of management which he saw as a revolutionary departure from classical and manipulative human relations approaches termed "theory X."

Where classical theory "X" is based on coercion and compromise, modern theory "Y" is based on collaboration leading to consensus. Putting it another way, theory "X" assumptions are shared by both classical bosses and Marxists; both look at the labour management bifurcation as a "zero-sum game" in which whatever one party wins, the other loses. Theory "Y" on the other hand is a *class-collaborationist view*; it sees the disappearance of a labour-management division, and looks at decisions as "non-zero-sum games" in which all parties can win proportionally.

So far, this is but a new name for an old game. *How real is the difference between theory "Y" and manipulative human relations?* There are two devices which are different from earlier approaches: the structure of the firm, and the specific technique of human relations used to change people in the firm. Not much has so far been written on the new structures — the picture has to be gathered second-hand from descriptions of particular firms using "Y" theory: Ansul Chemical Co. (manufacturer of Cacodylic Acid and 2, 4-D, "herbicides" used by the U.S. in Vietnam), various firms using the "Scanlon Plan"* and R & D outfits which have in different ways forsaken traditional business structure. The key element in "Y" structure seems to be the "team" approach. Staff and line are recognized as being interdependent, and lose their specialized functions. Division of labour begins to break down as teams collaborate in working out an entire product (or idea) from start to finish. Authority lines become less important as discussion groups include many levels of the hierarchy. As McGregor puts it, "The modern industrial organization is a vast complex of interdependent relations, up, down, across, and even 'diagonally'... only collaborative team efforts can make the system work effectively... a series of linked groups rather than... a hierarchical structure..." (McGregor, 1960, 175). Implied are such tactics as the abolition of the "job description," which limits the function of the individual to a rational, pre-determined area regardless of his interests or talents. In a "Y" organization, positions change as conditions and people change; no longer is the job defined and the individual fitted into it. The individual participates in decisions affecting his career (including his

* The "Scanlon Plan" (after Joseph Scanlon of M.I.T.) was a "Y" approach devised for regular industrial production — a kind of American Titolem involving money bonuses in proportion to base salary for all improvements in overall company efficiency, plus a factory-wide system of work-improvement committees that crossed hierarchical levels. In effect, this was a modified workers' control plan with management as part of the control force; workers were involved in consultation on job assignments, production rates, and wages (Lecieur, 1958).

saying no to promotions without prejudice to his later advancement if he so pleases).

In terms of management recruiting, "Y" theory emphasizes a heterogeneous supply of human resources rather than carefully structured training to develop specialists. The unpredictable needs of tomorrow require broad education — those who conform to today's management types (Whyte's organization men) may be all wrong in tomorrow's organization. Thus "Y" theory fits into educationalist theory which is nowadays moving once again toward the liberal, humanistic college degree rather than technical specialization. Nor is this a moralistic view alone. In the respected *Harvard Business Review*, leading exponents of "Y" theory recently pointed out that "several of the newest and most rapidly blooming companies in the United States boast unusually democratic organizations... Executives and even entire management staffs have been sent to participate in human relations and organizational laboratories to learn skills and attitudes which ten years ago would have been denounced as anarchic and revolutionary" (Slater, 1964). The reason, as one of the authors told the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management at M.I.T., is that "the bureaucratic form of organization is out of joint with contemporary realities... new shapes, patterns and models are emerging which promise drastic changes in the conduct of the corporation and of management practices in general. In the next 25 to 50 years we should witness, and participate in, the end of bureaucracy as we know it and the rise of a new social system better suited to 20th Century demands..." (Bennis, 1966).

All of this related, in the view of "Y" theorists, to the knowledge explosion; those who are sufficiently flexible to handle that will survive. Future organizations must therefore be "rapidly changing temporary systems," with the "task force" as typical, set up in response to a problem rather than by a table of organization. In short, the characteristic "Y" organizations will be "adaptive, problem-solving, temporary systems of diverse specialists, linked together by coordinating and task-evaluating specialists in an organic flux." Necessarily, then, the job will involve more, not less, of a person's personality. Profound implications are raised concerning the problem of occupational alienation, which conceivably could be alleviated or even eliminated in the "Y" organization of the future.

Based on two assumptions

Apart from the new structures, theory "Y" also approaches human relations from a new angle. At the heart of human relations training for use in "Y" enterprises are *two* assumptions: one is that people will not accept the new structure unless they are involved in its planning. That is, real change can only take place if those affected take part. The other is that the new structure requires continuing sensitivity to oneself, to others, and to the group process because close collaboration and mutual understanding and trust are required

if traditional hierarchical authority is to be dispensed with; authority must be within the self and within the team, since traditional authority is limited to less visible areas of the organization's life (less visible does not mean less important, however, as we shall see). The basic tool for this kind of human relations training is a technique called the "T-Group" (T for training), developed over some twenty National Training Laboratories. "T-Grouping" is done not only at the N.T.L.'s center in Bethel, Me., but also at a variety of other centers, and at organizational sites.

"T-Group"

In management training programs using T-Groups (e.g. at M.I.T., Pitt, U.C.L.A., Harvard) the emphasis is away from concern with acquiring skills directly related to production problems, and toward the development of skills of "social interaction" closely related to psychotherapy, because of the two assumptions just mentioned above. Anybody with talent can pick up technical know-how; but that changes so quickly today that it is almost wasted effort for long-term management training. It's the man who can adapt easily to changing conditions and get along with others in a term *without giving up his creativity* to some sterile conformity who will still be around in years to come. Or so goes the theory. Empirically, advanced management circles back this up with cash. One week of higher executive T-Group training costs \$1000 plus expenses; two weeks of junior executive training runs from \$450 to \$650, and the companies foot the bills.

A T-Group is a "relatively unstructured group in which individuals participate as learners. The data for learning... are the transactions among the members, their own behavior in the group, as they struggle to create a productive and viable organization, a miniature society;" it is education through experience (Bradford, 1964).

At Bethel, Me. in the U.S.A., the major T-Group center in this country, groups run in shifts all summer long. There are perhaps twenty groups of twelve to fifteen persons going at any one time, with some eight of these being basic human relations training groups for the junior executive set, and perhaps eight more for mixed groups of students, teachers and administrators from universities. The basic course runs over a two-week shift, and the typical T-Group will consist of a "trainer," usually a social-psychologist or someone from a closely-related field with some years of experience in group dynamics, a couple of ministers, a social worker or two, three or four people from various government agencies, and four or five younger executives from the business world. (A rough projection would make that about 100 executives per summer.) Notably under-represented at Bethel are Negroes and working-class people (by definition, since they don't make it up to these ranks in equitable proportions), and, oddly, trade union officials, who perhaps haven't figured out what's going on as yet. No two groups, no two executives, are alike. What

is apparent, however, is that no participant goes away unaffected. Everyone learns something about himself, about others, about how others look at him, and about how groups work. There is probably not one participant in ten who does not question whether he is in the right job back home; true, probably not one in ten changes jobs.

Skin deep change

Far from creating an atmosphere of conformity, as Whyte charged in his sketchy description of T-Groups in *The Organization Man*, Bethel seems to promote self-confidence, self-esteem, and motivation to engage in "experimental behavior" including talking frankly and openly to superiors (as well as subordinates). In fact, Bethel is openly committed to the idea of breaking down the "other-directed personality," exposing the "games people play," and demolishing "fronts." Numerous follow-up studies have been made to determine the effectiveness of "laboratory training," though few of them go beyond a year after the "T-Group" experience. Most of this research is in agreement that real shifts in such behavior as listening to others, sensitivity to others' needs, flexibility, work relations, and decision-making takes place in a positive direction (Bunker, 1965; Durham, 1960).

T-Group kinds of techniques have consciously or unknowingly been adopted in a series of contexts outside the business world; mothers receiving welfare, hard-core unemployed, juvenile delinquents, neighbors in poor communities. The concept of participatory democracy as well as the Rogerian notions of group-centered leadership and student-centered teaching are now part of the armory not only of the student New Left, but also of anti-poverty workers of a more conventional stripe, and of some more innovatively-inclined educators in such anti-poverty program settings in the U.S. as Upward Bound and Headstart.

The limitations of "Y" Theory

The problems associated with "Y" theory come down to three: (1) obstacles to introducing "Y" methods; (2) inconsistency between its assumptions about human nature and its practice; and (3) inconsistency in trying to operate a human enterprise in an inhuman society.

Obviously, as many as 90 per cent of North American businessmen and other organizational leaders have never heard of "Y" theory and care less. The typical organization is still run on classical lines, with perhaps a token gesture in the direction of industrial psychology, testing, and "personnel relations," a mixed system sometimes called "neo-classical." The obstacles to introducing "Y" methods are considerable. First of all, most higher management regards any real challenge to its prerogatives as high treason, and even to consider widening real decision-making power to include lower-echelon management, much less workers, continues in the realm of the unthinkable. Furthermore, people raised and trained to think of organization

in hierarchical and linear terms find it hard to engage in "Y" kinds of thinking. It would require a willingness to abandon conventional organizational forms in the face of no clear guarantee in order that the present (generally good) state of things be improved. Management must perceive a problem in order to accept the need for change; yet if it is threatened by a problem (say, competition), this threat is probably more likely to result in authoritarian behavior than in moves toward democracy, reversion to more classical methods of operation (which are security-inspiring) rather than innovations, which are even more anxiety-producing. By and large, organizations are structured to resist attempts at innovation, and decision-makers do get to the top because they are "organization men," conformists who have learned to respond to what they think their superiors want rather than to think imaginatively and innovatively. For "Y" theory advocates, then, it is largely a question of whether or not management will respond sufficiently quickly to rapid change by introducing flexible, human-relations-oriented structures; if not, "Y" enterprises will continue to exist in an ocean of authoritarian organizations, and the long-term social changes hoped for by some "Y" enthusiasts will remain illusory.

Apart from the problem of resistance to change, which remains unsolved, there is the issue of "Y" theory's assumptions about "human nature," which it shares with many thinkers including the Freudians, existential psychologists, and others. Maslow, a long-term observer and student of T-Groups and "Y" management, can be viewed as a spokesman for this view. The job of the T-Group from a psychological point of view is to enable the individual to come closer to his "real" self — the assumption is that man is more than the sum of his social settings — and thereby to fulfill his true nature and develop his potential more fully. The goal is to have the individual actualize his "self", or be a "self-actualizing" person. Maslow, like others before him, sees the work situation as an important part of what is ruining man, and what man is ruining for himself. He believes that intelligent management of organizational life can help to develop healthier, happier people, and that self-actualizing people can create better, more productive, more fulfilling job situations (Maslow, 1962 and 1965).

But who is to carry out such changes? Paradoxically, Maslow seems to believe that it is only when enlightened management moves that progress can be made, and that the first step in this is to locate or develop healthy managers. How are these benevolent elites to appear? This is not clear; apparently some of them are born and not ruined by organizational life. Others must come to Bethel for T-Grouping. A certain colonialist flavour creeps into "Y" theory despite the protestations of genuine participation, for enlightened management cannot spread, according to Maslow, until people are "ready for it." People who are not used to democratic living are not ready for "Y" theory, and "X" is what they will require for some time to come. It is social scientists, of course, who must decide when and how (gradually) to introduce democracy to others.

The vehicle for change, then, is the elite, for only it can know whether the others are ready for benevolence. Only it (after consultation with social scientists) can decide whether people are self-actualizing. This view is contradictory to the other assumption of the theory, that change is no good unless people are involved in making it, and that people therefore have the right to be wrong, and to reject what is good for them. In effect this is a replication of the old "socialism from above" versus "socialism from below" argument. Maslow is arguing an elitist line; he puts all his hope in the wisdom of the elite to decide when the masses are ready for change, whereas by his own theory his view should be that the masses are ready when and as they proceed to accomplish change. The implications of Rogerian therapy, for example, and of student-centered teaching (e.g. *Summerhill*) are that people do not become self-actualizing except in the process of becoming self-actualizing — the dialectics of psychology, shall we say. This is an anti-elitist view and an issue which Maslow and his "Y" theory colleagues will have to cope with if they are to be truly in favor of a non-manipulative, participative work situation. If they do not cope with it, if they maintain that the path to progress lies through elite decisions when and if elites are healthy, then the distinction between their theories and those of the neo-classical manipulators (as exposed by Whyte, for instance) will always remain hazy. Self-actualization and elite-actualization are inherently contradictory, and cannot be made synonymous.

Human relations-related changes made in "Y" companies, then, are introduced by higher management. By implication, this raises a *third* issue: the nature of the product. Basic decision-making power, including the critical power to introduce structural change and participative processes, remains in the hands of those who control the enterprise, as does the power to decide the nature of the product, whether it be an idea, a design, a piece of research, a commodity, or a social service. While the product can be *modified* by participative processes within the organization (chiefly so that it can be more effective from management's viewpoint), neither the assumption that the product should be produced nor (therefore) that the product should be efficiently produced, however management defines efficiency, is challengeable. Human relations, in other words, work just as well for missile and napalm-makers as for more "human" products. The limits of participation exclude the most important segment of the job, namely the content of product, while attempting to create a de-alienating situation by democratizing the form or process.

Furthermore, even the most benign product is still produced under classical economic laws (for profit, in the case of a commodity) within a total system which is far from human. The very fact that the profit system remains intact creates some of that overall inhumanity. *In short, the democratic enterprise has to exist within an imperialist system, and in fact helps to maintain that system.* The question raised by critics of manipulative human relations approaches is thus still valid: how "human" can an organization be if either the

product and/or the system in which it exists are inhuman? Even more to the point, how human can relations be if an inhuman product (say, a missile system) helps make the world even less human than it was before "human relations" were invented?

While "Y" theory raises some interesting issues for those of us interested in the perspectives and prospects of modern management, it is of interest for another reason as well. Radicals have been traditionally concerned with the conditions of work, and have argued since the time of Marx that the alienation related to modern mass production techniques (especially within a profit-oriented economy) can be overcome only through democratic planning and control of the workplace by the producers, the workmen themselves. Historically this idea has been associated with the slogan of "workers' control." The Paris Commune, the soviets of 1905, 1917 and 1936 in Hungary, and more recently the whole "participatory democracy" concept, have served as possible models. This particular stream of thought has been especially significant since radicalism's disillusionment with both social democracy and bureaucratic collectivism, in part at least because both systems have left *essentially unchanged the relationship of man to his work*. In some important ways, "Y" theory contributes to various Goodmanesque decentralization models of society, and to anarchist theory as well, because it provides specific pictures of organizational structure, not just slogans. What "Y" theory, despite its capitalistic context, *is really providing is some clues as to how organizations could be set up to maximize human potential and de-alienate the workplace*. Even now, it is possible to introduce "Y" concepts into some of our own organizations — in fact, this has already been done, though not consciously or systematically, in genuine "participatory democracy" groups.

New efficiency

"Y" organizations are apparently very efficient. The reason in part seems to be that the organizational method has been accepted by its members; the "T-Group" exists to work out personal and communications hang-ups — and the organizers-trainers have had a chance to work out their own hang-ups elsewhere, so they don't need to do it inside the organization. Participatory democracy groups, on the other hand, seem to be inefficient; too many people are in it to work out their personal problems, and this overloads the system. This means that if the movement is serious about "participatory democracy" and the introduction of "Y" techniques, it ought perhaps to consider having its own "Bethel" to begin to overcome those problems.

Summary

In summary, "Y" theory is advanced management's technique for structuring itself to adapt to an organizational world of rapid change.

As "Y" organizations show themselves to be more viable, the method will spread. Yet the basic production goals of these organizations have *not* changed; they continue to produce in accordance with classical economic laws, although with innovative means. So that despite organizational innovations, *the macro system* remains unchanged.

On two critical issues "Y" theory has not yet successfully differentiated itself from manipulative human relations approaches: it is inconsistent because it claims to believe that change cannot be successful unless those affected participate, yet the change agent is the managerial elite. It is further inconsistent because it claims to be human on the individual organizational level, yet it leaves unchallenged the anti-human assumptions of the product and of the total system within which the "democratic" organization functions.

Because of these basic theoretical shortcomings, "Y" theory is seductive and dangerous. At the micro-level, it is a more viable method for dealing with rapidly changing conditions. Because of its more real concern for participation, it seduces management and workers into a greater loyalty to the company and the work process, from which they become less alienated. The danger is that harmony, creativity, and self-actualization can co-exist with the production of missiles and napalm.

That's the problem for us as we look at the system's own perspective. At the same time, "Y" theory provides us with valuable insights as to how anti-establishment organizations can work better and be more faithful to the goals of a human society, both at once. So we had better learn about the danger, and seize the opportunity.

* An extended version of this article appeared in the winter, 1967 New Politics.

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NOTE : This is the concluding portion of the discussion of C. George Benello's WASTELAND CULTURE published in Vol. 5, No. 2 of OUR GENERATION and available in pamphlet form at 75¢ from the Literature Department of this journal.

This discussion was initiated in Vol. 5, No. 4 with participants Todd Gitlin, Rich Rotstein, John Conway, Brian Carpendale and Joan Renold, George Woodcock with C. George Benello responding.

The Editors.

FUNCTION AND OBJECTIVE

by Watson Thompson

ON first reading I found myself in substantial agreement with "Wasteland Culture" and admired it greatly for its comprehensiveness and sweep of knowledge. (This was greatly facilitated by his frequent references to people I have read approvingly for years — Lewis Mumford, Erich Fromm, Paul Goodman, Kenneth Keniston etc.)

On further reflection, however, I could see a difference of emphasis which may be important. Benello does not seem to me to

be fully or constantly aware of the extent and profundity of the evil of the present order of society. To change from a power-oriented society to one which is people-oriented is not merely to change from vertical modes of organization to horizontal, but it is also to get rid of war and liquidate our immense store of 'nuclear devices', disband the CIA and so on.

Likewise on the personal scale I think he is somewhat optimistic. Sure, there are pockets of good cooperative people who are entirely ready for Benello's "openness, psychological freedom and participation" but one must also remember that the vast majority are hollow, alienated conformists. This means, I think, that on the interpersonal level (which I agree is fundamental) we must probe deeper and take more risks. It is to this matter, on which I have

had some experience, that I shall mainly address myself.

The material at hand

First of all, let us look at the general North American scene. There is the Establishment, with its "military-industrial complex" more concentrated than ever. But there are also such diverse anti-Establishment groups as the Black Power advocates and such mainly non-violent groups as the 'Hippies', the 'Diggers' the drop-outs and the pacifists.

In this extraordinary ferment, which goes deep enough to affect religions and philosophies with strong elements of Zen and other Oriental modes, there are of course some groups which point in the same general direction which Benello would approve. Group dynamics, sensitivity - training groups and therapy groups, would all tend to agree with Benello's objective of the "primacy of persons".

But the question is, Around what nucleus might a whole new society be created which would have that "personalist goal" instead of the present goal of power?

I think that this nucleus group must have an intrinsic commitment and its own kind of discipline of a far greater intensity than is even hinted at in "Wasteland Culture".

What is the dynamic?

Benello says "primacy of persons," and I heartily agree. But this only makes sense if you mean the primacy of all persons. If you start, as you must, with a hand-

ful of people, how do you create interpersonally with them a relationship which becomes infinitely extendable outwards? The answer is that if you go deep enough in yourself, you find the most different other person there also. And if you really mean primacy of all persons you must mean those you naturally like and those you naturally dislike.

This begins to look like a tall order but whoever said that toppling the immense power structure of this society was going to be simple or easy? Yet I believe that, begun on the right principles and with the right orientation, such a group has infinite potentiality for rich and rapid growth.

Where to begin

You must begin with only as many people as can sit around and look each other in the face. Ideally the group should contain as great a diversity as possible regarding age, sex, ethnic origin. In practice, however, it will almost certainly have to begin with more or less compatible people who are at ease with each other and sympathetic to the objectives of the process. These objectives, according to Mowrer as quoted by Benello, are "openness and self-disclosure". I would prefer to call it "self-discovery," because the idea is to discover from other people more about yourself than you have allowed yourself to see. The process in fact proceeds along two rather opposite paths. One is increasing understanding, the other is an increasing capacity for the severest truth-speaking and the utmost self-affirmation. When there is enough of the warm kind of loving throughout the group

then you can risk the harshest truth-speaking with nothing but creative results. Through this process one learns to see the usefulness of those defence mechanisms which keep us all apart.

This preliminary inward-facing process is a necessity but is by its very nature never-ending. As soon as it has gone all a certain way there is need to turn outwards. There is after all a whole society to be transformed and there is after all a certain desperate urgency about tackling that job as soon as possible. Where does one begin?

Turning outwards, the first thing to do is to connect up with those groups, to be found in every urban centre, which are ready made for this new orientation. Benello lists them as follows: co-operative schools (I would prefer to say, the new free schools which are springing up all across Canada), day-care centres, community unions, newspapers, radio, and, later, producer enterprises. He goes on to say: "As the projects grow, the organization will gain associational density: association of schools, mass media, community projects and so forth."

The penetration of the field of production and industry is of course a vital step. To be sure, there are successful models to be imitated — Standard Autos, the workers'-controlled factory in Israel, quoted by Mellman, and the French communities of work. So long as that is so, the revolution, one may suppose, will be non-violent.

At this point it is useful, I think to associate all that we have said with Harrell's* concept of the counter society. The counter societies — free schools, free universities, community clinics as

in Saskatchewan are examples — do old things in a new way, that is, in the context of human and personal values restored to their appropriate centrality. Because they respect the primacy of persons they tend to be small and therefore to be free of bureaucratic machinery. The "Poor Peoples" Co-operatives and the Freedom Labour Unions, mentioned by Benello as off-shoots of the Civil Rights Movement can surely be added to our list of embryonic counter societies.

As you pass from the purely personal nuclear group to the co-the-job relationships of production and occupation we still have the same goal of openness, frankness and mutuality, but a supplementary principle has to be added. I first met it in slogan form: equality in essence, hierarchy in function. But this requires a little explanation. The word "equality" can be used to mean several different things but here it refers to the non-measurable spring of potentiality and creative energy which is at the centre of the being of each of us. If we mutually grant each other equality in that sense then there is no difficulty about our grading each other according to our degree of skill in some field or another. If you convince the other of your recognition of him as a human equal first, then he will readily grant you your place of superiority or inferiority in regard to the functional matter. This applies to a teacher in relation to his students at an academic level as it does to an engineer in relation to the

* William Harrell's "Anti-totalism and the Counter Society" LIBERATION, Summer 1966.

native workers on some technical assistance project. If this principle is kept always in mind, then all kinds of technical skills can be retained without doing violence to the central objective of "the primacy of persons".

It is useless to speculate in any detail about the process of change from a power-oriented society to one that is people-oriented. Suffice it to say that there is an amazing ferment going on at this very time. All the protesters, or rebels, or dropouts have this in common — that they want to get away from the mechanization and bureaucratization of life and have nothing but disgust for the kind of society which seems to reach its culmination in the H-bomb and the Vietnam war. But I think it is somewhat facile, not to say evasive, to say as Benello does in his penultimate paragraph:

As it develops a critical mass allowing it autonomy in major ways it can renounce the present system, creating its own fundamental institutions of law and government, and at this stage it will have passed from paradigms into politics.

At some point in the process of change there will be a crisis but what form the crisis will take I would not care to speculate. But there can be no assured peace in the world until the wholeness of persons (all persons) becomes the prime concern of this society and ultimately all societies.

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CLASS AND COMMUNITY IN THE DESERT

by *Evan Stark*

HISTORY, Marx tells us, "weighs like a nightmare" on the brains of the living. The analogy recalls the Manifesto's urge to awaken. The rich sleep easily. The middle-class dream of pre-Raphaelite women and then remember their accounts. But the poor lie, restless. "Nightmare" is their metaphor, the image which describes their uneasiness and compels them to fulfill their historic role. The relevance of this metaphor is its "echo," its simultaneous appeal to memory, aspiration and experience. By describing "what is" in imagery which hints at "what can be," Marx provokes the poor to move from dystopia to utopia. They are called to revolution, to counter metaphor, to awaken from their stony sleep.

Such metaphors are the core of radical theory because they ground otherwise abstract concepts in the workaday experience of groups that radicals hope to move. Like other "new" leftists, Benello argues that the imagery of contemporary Marxism is static and, therefore irrelevant. To be static is to be historically cold, to be unrelated to the common travail of those who most need liberation. Without specific echo, images compel neither the formulation nor the practice of program and tend to separate theory

from practice rather than to unite it. It is no wonder that the culture heroes of the new left grope after fresh imagery.

But if the old left is blind to the reality confronting them, many new leftists in their agonized reappraisals of the varieties of repressive experience have, like the bourgeoisie, fetishized what they see in front of them as if it were the totality against which theory, action and alternatives must be drawn. Where the old left reifies structure, the new left reifies super-structure.

It is good for the new left to remind us that the experience of struggle should be the basis of theory. But it is another thing to conclude that any conflict is struggle so long as it is experienced as such. This second conclusion replaces the Marxian emphasis on "objective conditions" with a neo-Freudian concern for the subjective experience, that is, how something is experienced becomes more important than what is experienced. The equating of strikes to protect students from the draft or from archaic restrictions with the struggles of Black and industrial workers against their oppressors — "the student as nigger" is a current new left tract — broadens beyond usefulness the conditions for change and fragments the content of radical thought. A theory which finds every experience potentially "radicalizing" leads to political opportunism because it blurs the stratification of experience which the Marxist perceives. When every disturbance is analyzed as traumatic the specific causes of social psychosis are obscured.

Correspondingly, a politics which reifies such phenomena as "psychic scarcity", "positive

thought control," "multi-versity" and "one dimensionality" and poses alternatives to them mistakes for frozen merely temporary solutions to the problems of exploitation in a period of abundance. The small progressive collegiate alternatives to mammoth culture bureaucracy, for example, merely assure ruling elites that the creatively rebellious will be permissively eased into the white-collar market. Alternatives to the super-structural designs of liberal elites do not shatter their systems, but make it more efficient. This is something which the old left is spared because of its irrelevance.

Benello's article is an advance in the search for relevant imagery. But his quest for radical identity, humanist intentions aside, tends to legitimize self-interested exploiters rather than to liberate those who are most exploited. To be radicalized, Benello's imagery must be grounded deep in the historical processes of collective struggle. Here, I argue that Benello's "wasteland" image and his "community" counter-image are not rooted metaphors and can easily be put in the service of oppression. Only when filtered through a class pyramid are the "wasteland" and the "community" crucial to the search for a theory which unites form and content, radical political economy with a theory of action.

Insofar as history is a struggle between irreconcilable forces resolved temporarily by the victory of one and the transformation of others, metaphors must themselves reflect the specific concerns of those in struggle. Since a revolutionary future is wholly or partially a negation of the present, when radical images are cor-

rectly set against one another we see the historical struggle taking place and feel its invitation to participate within ourselves.

The Wasteland

"If you insist on finding value in this world," Goethe wrote in Schopenhauer's album in 1814, "then you must first lend it some." More than a century later, come to Catholic exile in a dying empire from a Mississippi River polluted with industrial waste. Eliot spoke even more cogently about the quicksand reality of modern society. The "wasteland" begins where aristocratic "either/or" morality has given way to the "how much?" questions posed by plebian go-getters, in Yeats words, "those bankers, school masters and clergymen the martyrs call the world." The wasteland is a bourgeois desert strewn with casual photos of cultural skeletons where men speak clearly only in despair and where despair surrounds radical identity. In the desert, men lack what Benello calls "causal efficacy."

Like Goethe, Eliot or Yeats, the poet who gives us a radical image of the loss of cultural identity is often less than radical when translating his poetry into politics. The poet may sense that the democratization of everything negates cultural and civil liberty and that the equality which liberalism imposes in all spheres save economics is the nadir of personal freedom. No matter. When he is forced to face the political implications of his insight, he often turns toward sentimental rationalizations — witness Yeats' Gallicism or Eliot's

medieval nationalism — with a nostalgia that has its social counterpart in the yearnings of declining classes.

Thus, images which are initially radical — whether Nietzsche, Sombart, Michels, Sorel, Goodman, Mills or Marcuse — often produce counter-images which supply the ideological cement by which ruling elites bind themselves to declining classes against groups which threaten their power. Consider how easily historical materialism gave way to historical romance during the Depression or Communism to McCarthyism afterwards. Adapted by "publics," the image which emerges from the cauldrons of despair are often expropriated as platitudes and then democratized by those who make the production and advertisement of despair their business. It is one thing, for example, to speak of "psychic scarcity" as does Benello in order to highlight the loss of truth values in market society. But it is quite another thing for Benello to virtually universalize this image, to assume that everyone, except those on top, lives in this wasteland and to build a politics from this assumption. This exercise only fortifies the pervasive self-pity of middle-masses.

Missing : the poor

Like Eliot's plebian desert, Benello's organizational wasteland is inhabited exclusively by the middle-classes of West and East, by students, their professors, journalists, advertisers, white-collar workers and their suburban families, that is, by those working and benefiting from the hier-

archies of impersonality, those whom Weber found overwhelmed by rationality and devoid of magic. "Impersonality" and "psychic scarcity" more accurately describe the ethical and psychological dilemmas of an exploiting middle-class than they do the political dilemmas of a radical party.

The middle-class man can now have more power than ever before, the power to buy and make things, to make love without guilt, to live longer, to be rich and travel, to retire with pension and die with insurance and the power to transform himself, even in terms of information, from provincial to world citizen. To acquire this power, he must become at least partially the merchandise. The cost of deriving one's power by assisting those who exploit is paid in the inevitable barbarization that accompanies selling oneself willingly. The culture which middle-class man forges as he builds his castles in the desert of imperialism is, in Jules Henry's phrase, a culture against man, and so the wasteland is his appropriate psychological domain.

But the middle-class man does not adopt this life-line because he is the slave of bureaucracy. Quite the reverse. He commits himself to entrapment because the power he achieves in his mental wasteland is real to him, fraught with moral ambiguities though it may be for certain members of the bourgeois intelligentsia. This is why the middle-class man devise mythical and not radical consciousness when he is confronted by wasteland imagery: in order to continue to enjoy the benefits he derives from exploitation, he elevates his barbarism to first principle.

Sports events, LSD, TV, "tear jerkers" and decentralized therapeutic organizations provide outlets that would otherwise be turned into anger at the over-rationalization of workaday life and love. The more it is fed wasteland imagery, the more self-righteously the middle-class defends its power. As the cost of inane living goes up, so do other prices, including that extracted from the poor for whom illusion is an escape from life rather than life itself. The middle-class resolves but does not remove impersonality by confessing it at every opportunity publicly on the media and privately to neighbor's wives and their psychiatrists. This is done not as Benello suspects to rationalize powerlessness but rather to reconcile a desired power based on exploitation with its accompanying alienation. Benello and SDS think the problem is "organization" but sophisticated techniques for domination, some of which they propose, ameliorate the problem of organization without improving the situation of those who are exploited but cannot exploit.

Who benefits from Wasteland

Wasteland imagery, when not correctly translated into an analysis of who made and who benefits from the wasteland, of who lives there and who does not, becomes a checking device for a self-policing state trying to convince its working masses that their poverty is shared — at least in psychological terms which it pretends are the most important — by the middle-masses and even by the rich. Mills' Power Elite

was a smashing success in Scarsdale because it gave the rich a speaking part in their own daily God dramas. Within the bourgeois desert, demonstrations by segments of the middle-masses, sit-ins, marches and the like, merely provide ready validation for the superior effectiveness of public relations.

Middle-masses can take their insights only to a certain level of abstraction before having to choose between opposing their class (i.e., destroying their exploiter-servant status) and fragmenting their consciousness. So they fragment and mythify not because they are unaware — the contention of liberals — or because they are unorganized — the assumption SDS shares with Benello — but because they are both highly organized and aware of their class interests. Images of despair and cynicism serve, like the nightly TV appertif of violence, to increase the middle-classes' appetite for illusion and drugs, their tolerance for a violent status quo and their willingness to do what is "necessary" even if the results are tragic.

The bourgeoisie throws up the means and images of its own destruction, but not in final form. Radicals must add the political touch by forcing action, at all levels of society, to consciousness. When middle-class intellectuals cling to wasteland images as they have since World War I or when middle-masses cling to them as they have since Hiroshima, radicals turn first to an analysis of the abundance-poverty paradox at the basis of American society. But to confront the wasteland with its material abundance as do Marcuse, Harrington and Benello is to leave

analysis at the level of paradox. The radical theorist must convert paradox into contradiction by locating the agents which force revolutionary changes.

The Community

The image which Benello offers to counter "wasteland" is "community." Abundance breaks through the wasteland as "participatory democracy" — a non-totalitarian communism — and the arena where this occurs is "community," the organization of middle-class men actualizing themselves by working for their best interests as equals. But here again Benello confuses ethical and psychological problems, i.e., false consciousness, with basic sociological conditions.

As William Appleman Williams has shown, the community is a profound American experience both on the frontier and in the industrial wilderness. Struggling against the wasteland imagery of bourgeois materialism, American writers languish after community with a populist's "keep on marching" sentimentality.

Recently it is Allen Ginsberg who most courageously follows Satan's temptation to find real value in the bourgeois desert, to force the submerged community into the American panorama. But if "Howl" is a prime example of middle-class man's need to "initiate interaction" in Benello's terms, it is magnificent because it is frank in its failure. For while Ginsberg seeks the theophany of Moses by suffering the torments of his comrades, he cannot speak to his God. Even as he achieves his psychic goal — "with mother

finally fucked!" — he is drowned in the quicksand of fragmented experience. His public self is all that remains. Ginzberg teaches us that the middle-class man who would universalize community by asserting his identity can have a freedom only in the mind (and then, only after lobotomy). As the bourgeois anarchists who would remain pure realize, for the middle-class man to be free, he must "refuse" and not assert everything that he is. The submerged community which begins in anarchy ends not in democracy but either in a wasteland burial or in isolation. For the bourgeois man to actualize objective truth, he must negate what is best in middle-class life and destroy his identity before he has used it to destroy others. To confront this psychic dilemma is difficult but to attempt to resolve it by political projection as do SDS and Benello is irresponsible.

One need not record chapter by chapter the failures which quickly overtook the predecessors to Benello's model. Each generally followed the steps he lays down from group therapy to program to counter structure and each found its counter-structure either totally assimilated by the dominant structure or else wholly isolated. It is begging the question to argue, as does Goodman against the progressives and Benello against the organization theorists, that they do not go far enough. Ideas are always adapted by "elective affinity" and take on the limitations in practice imposed by the class and status interests of those who use them. The communities of the underground begin by identifying with the lower-class in dress, in language and in life style. But, since

the community of the proletariat ends only when mankind has been liberated, the bohemian who insists on experiencing radical catharsis in the "now" — Benello's instance — must turn toward a subjective oppression and emotional revolution to live in Utopia. The trip down from the middle-class is accompanied by a radical skepticism. But the community which is formed is a community of hippies, that is, a community of impatient slaves.

Today utopian community is a living potential and neither an artist's vision nor a bohemian's yearning and the middle-class man who would be free — that is, free from himself — must turn to direct politics for liberation. The question is no longer "what is to be done?" but "how to do it?" and so the middle-class visionary must become the working class activist. He is the counter-image which Ginzberg's failure points toward, the middle-class man not in search of his identity but in revolt against it. The post-World War II intellectuals at their best speak correctly of middle-class community either as dystopia — a horror show — or as something which, in a post-revolutionary society alone, we shouldn't somehow have to strive for. Although the model communities were composed of activists, they failed to produce a radical America because they lacked social ties to the basic historical agents of radical change.

Cell or Sell?

Benello proposes the "cell" to link "wasteland" abundance to "community" individuality. On

the one hand, he provides an incisive portrait of the moral degradation of culture and politics under market capitalism; on the other hand, there is a vision of community rising from the indifference of Puritan asceticism to assert its politics through the autonomy of its members. Benello would have us speak of our real needs now and then act, motivated not by a longing for the impossible but necessary — Goodman's alternative — but by the living reality of actualized selves. But his plan for action is as distant from historical struggle as are his images.

Benello's cell theory reflects ideas advanced by bohemian carrying the group ethics of American business in the 50's into extra-curricular communities of love. Benello conceives of a neo-Freudian proletariat organizing with Marxian tactics. Since his conception of "individual" is abstracted from bourgeois humanism it is psychological and ethical but hardly political-economic. It is natural then for Benello to define oppression as repression and to suggest cells formed outside the dominant structures but feeding on them to liberate the repressed energies. The bohemian is characterized by his departure from his class (though he usually lives off it) and by his refusal to fully identify with any other class or group.

When bohemians combine an aesthetic bolshevism with delinquency, as in the "Provos" or "diggers," radical action may momentarily emerge. I was surprised to learn that, after the police and administration at Wisconsin had brutalized about two hundred students last October, some "passive" hippies set fire to several

administrative offices. Radical action — if this is indeed what the hippies occasionally perform — does not, of course, constitute radical politics nor should we prematurely conclude that it can lead to such. The hippies may very well live in the future as Paul Goodman suggests. So do those who prophesy "managerial revolution". But until we ascertain just who's future they live in, we should hesitate to imitate their program. The over-production of genius in America — there are now more than five million Americans in college — will for a time produce a minority of disaffected youngsters who will rebel. The problem is not to stimulate rebellion among such youngsters but to insure that their rebellion will be radical.

More and more these days, the neo-Freudian proletariat to which Benello appeals (i.e., those who see repression rather than exploitation as the major mode of oppression) appear as historical opponents of the Marxian proletariat. Quite likely the sexual aggressions generated by the forced compromises of middle-class life will be resolved in new and more primitive forms of suburban barbarism and not contained and retrained for radical politics. And, as suburbia wallows in the increasing disenchantment which accompanies its maintenance of power, suburbanites will try to extend their wasteland, culturally and militarily, into underdeveloped rural and urban settings. So long as such adventures in international exploitation are successful, the middle-class' power will be secured. And, if energies are needed to sustain power, why should they be used to change its basic nature? The middle-class

will revolt when it has nothing to lose. But this time is far more distant than Benello, Marcuse and SDS suspect. Subjective barbarism may often seem like rebellion among Puritan sectors of society: the National Film Board defends hippies in Toronto and everyone laughs at Diefenbaker's hostility toward legalizing homosexuality and abortion. Recalling the scope of the "wasteland," let us not be enthusiastic when legalized abortion accompanies massive child murder in Vietnam.

Benello copies the therapeutic cells developed by the Birch society and the Japanese Soka Gakkai. Both organizations rest on highly symbolic and even chillasitic visions of society which, when frustrated by confrontations with political and economic realities, can lead only to fanatic violence. So, Benello insists form must be abstracted from content. But if this is possible — and since organizational forms are super-structural arrangements, I have no doubt that it is possible — how then can Benello conclude that "organization is the basic problem"? Either the Birchites have devised some clever means to escape from organizational determinism or else organization is no problem at all for if it were then the Birchite form which Benello suggests we copy would have already generated out of his therapeutically healthy groups. The political logic here is agonized. What Benello does is fetishize form — something he would probably accuse the Marxists of — and thus misses the crucial sociological determinants of content, that is, the political and economic base of a group regardless of its mode of organization. One needn't be a prophet to predict

that such "cells" will be adapted on a broad scale by the middle-class of the 1970's. After all, what are hippies, organization theorists and Birchites if not the social, political and economic avant garde of this middle-class? Of course, such "cells" will "not go far enough" and thus will, tragically for Benello and SDS, perpetuate the unreason which is their inheritance and livelihood.

Even if we grant Benello that there is a difference between his middle-masses and those who become hippies or Birchites, it must still be shown that any sector of the middle-class in North America expresses the needs of the majority of mankind. There is, I contend, convincing evidence that to maintain whatever freedoms they do have, the middle-masses must and will perpetuate their exploitative functions: at their most honest, they are most exploitative. Benello's cell based on "function" rather than on legal, magical or political prerogatives is reminiscent of Veblen's faith in the engineers or Marcuse's faith in the technical intellectuals. Each theorist allows anti-Marxism to produce radical illusionism for it is clear that the more oriented toward function our society becomes, the more it becomes oriented toward technical rather than human rationality and the more the middle-masses create a cooperative expertise driven by the democratization of go-getting. This, by the way, was what Weber feared would be the result of bourgeois socialism.

CONCLUSION

Benello compels us to deal with the cultural barrenness of the mid-

die-class ethos. Certainly, for example, no appeal to idealism is useful on the desert. He suggests that the old idea of a radical vanguard organized around confessional reinforcement may be relevant, particularly when tied to industrial populism, to the development of a revolutionary political movement. He properly directs us to the conservative critiques of capitalist inefficiency and barbarism. Implicitly, the "wasteland" image permits us to stand against the democratization of "truth" as "honesty" and morality as "values" and urges us not to pretend to be more democratic than the establishment (a fault of SDS) until we are certain what is being democratized.

When trying to juxtapose wasteland and community, however, we must see that they are mutually exclusive images and so refer to different historical currents and trends. The community is forged against the wasteland by those who have rejected its ideology as well as its class base, that is, the ethics and interests of the middle-class.

Benello says the middle-masses must learn "how to be politics." We have argued that they are becoming politics all too rapidly and that their so-called humanist functional organizations, e.g., the Canadian NDP, are already filled with the psychotechnocratic keepers of the bourgeois desert. What is needed are cells organized around the therapeutic renunciation of middle-class needs in the name of an objective human freedom.

The poetry of the poor in North America awaits translation into radical politics: those who are exploiters and servants at once

can make this translation as is revealed by middle-class revolutionary leadership throughout the world. Only when members of the middle-class organize as "radicals" rather than as professionals or students will they renounce rather than affirm their exploitative function. Here might arise not only a community of theory but economic and political support for workers' and peasants' movements and of disruption as well. Cooperatives, instead of serving students suffering from a poverty as temporary as their stay in college — history weighs like a lead weight on the head of college administrators — can serve those genuinely in need of economic autonomy and organization. Other professionals, sympathetic but not willing to devise such radical biographies for themselves, would sell out but at a price high enough to give the bank some trouble. The middle-masses, to become radicalized, must first be liberated from the eternal therapy of self-interest and this will happen when they look beyond the wasteland which they half-create to live in. Already, draft resistance unions of college drop-outs are beginning to realize that their true allies are not their collegiate cohorts but their working class comrades, that political resistance is conscientious but that conscientious resistance is usually politically opportunistic. Still, they depend for support upon the "liberal" community who cut cut them off when they move concertedly from the draft to more politically universal issues. And so they are learning to forge economic and political ties to the oppressed rather than the oppressors.

If the dialectic no longer has the force it once had in America — though it is doing alright in Vietnam — then let us reinforce or abandon but not mythify it. And if the dialectic has run itself out in the clean bathrooms of working class suburbia and the automated luxuries of rural isolation,

then let us turn elsewhere, to the biology of the domestically servile or to the direct service of national liberation movements. But let us not cling to a myth about ourselves which we ourselves create while history, for better or worse, speeds by.

OLD AND NEW :

Theory and

Pracice

by Jody Palmour

"THE WASTELAND CULTURE" is undoubtedly the most exciting and seminal essay to come out of the current movement in North America. It's important because it synthesizes so much contemporary criticism. It is nevertheless premature and tends to skew the immediate direction of our movement away from a resistance position. Benello fails to see today's social reality as raising in new forms problems from classical marxism. He fails then to consider the critical application of seemingly traditional solutions, derives traditionally utopian ones of his own and commits a profound mistake akin to that Marx and Engels afforded Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen.

Like the classical utopians Benello does not appear to represent specifically any particular mass following or class interest, whether that be the university community, the new working class,

the Black ghetto. His comments could be taken then in the tone of "I've never seen this work, and am not doing it myself, but I've thought a lot about it, and would be glad to teach you — How To Be Free."

And like the earlier utopias, his paradigm ["a society both densely and intensely organized in an integrative fashion wherein the basic activities of life interrelate (and do so inevitably), because the center of concern changes from the efficiency of the organization in pursuing its particular objectives (i.e. profit-making in one form or another) to the primacy of the person as the locus of the objective interrelation of human purposes"... forming an ecosystem of co-operative enterprises around independent development banks outside the capitalist political economy] claims to emancipate those who people it before expanding from this remnant to enforcing the whole of humanity. And he too fails to tell us who his group is, what makes them start working on this project with historical seriousness and how, other than the simple explanation of renouncing "the present system [and] creating its own fundamental institutions of law and government," it will concretely proceed in freeing the whole of humanity.

He has a compelling argument why this needs to happen:

Advanced capitalist production creates an economy of psychic scarcity requiring upward mobility from its barren base to the various hierarchies of psychic plenty. Only at the top do men integrate personal purpose and power — there, where men propose, plan, implement and test their hopes and desires through the profit as opposed to the profit. This integration of the person occurs to a greater degree the higher one goes within the structure. These corporate structures have swollen to such degree that they now determine the social and natural environment in which men live. The little remaining off-duty, private activity has been divested of its integrative power. The Wasteland Culture is not the natural result of advanced technology but rather of the specific social organization required by the profit-as opposed to the product-producing political economy of advanced capitalism. Only through a radically democratic and person-centered restructuring of society can mankind be freed from the cynical and obese existence he alone can know today. The reorganization of people within the Wasteland Culture is the only real solution and must then be the immediate task before us.

But his solution is not related to the present historical movement in the U.S.A., the resistance. Benello wants to get there his way :

Men grow up in the Wasteland Culture and come to think of it is the non-ideological rational expression of human nature. One's

self and social concept in this vacuum cannot be altered by agitation and lecturing. Only by experiencing the reality of a new manhood through acting out a new structuring of society can a man lay aside the old social organization. Only the functioning of a new order can spell the bankruptcy of the old.

But again, Benello does not speak specifics when it comes to who will organize and who will people this new organization. The closest historical reference he makes is to the Black movement and its Poor People's Corporation, Mississippi Freedom Labor Union and other producer and consumer co-operatives. But I fear he's out of tune with their reality. My understanding is that the MFLU is all but dissolved, that the PPC while producing excellent quality hand-crafts nonetheless survives on a sympathy market that could easily be exhausted, and that most co-ops haven't gotten off the ground before collapsing — particularly the radical, democratic ones.

A totalitarian regime excludes opposition parties by definition, while it is not able to exclude totally their objective presence as tendencies. Opposition becomes indirect in such situations and is disguised as a cultural question. The totalitarian party of an exploitative political economy represents the interests of its class as being in the interests of all — when they are not. A revolutionary socialist party, on the other hand deserves its name only to the extent that its representation is objectively in the interests of the whole society and not the special interests of any single group.

The creation of an opposition party especially in a totalitarian situation requires concrete participation in the life of the exploited class and the articulation of the real life interests of that class. Gramsci's writings on the totalitarian party have not been translated from the Italian but I think he might agree with Debray that initially a revolutionary has to show his capacity to disrupt the exploiter and survive before he has the base to begin constructive work. In an industrialized society there exists an inverse proportion between the ease of disruption and the desire to do so. We have not had to use guns to begin a white resistance movement in America. And their use will not become a political question until the movement matures to the point that it has something to defend, i.e., the beginnings of a society developed through harder work than pulling a trigger. Defiant and open disruption, when done before a constituency that has been sensitized to the operation of the structure, lays the ground for the recognition of the concrete class antagonism embodied in that structure and begins the search for alternative structures.

Traditional radical terminology is needlessly uncomfortable for us as New Leftists. It's precisely because we have failed to criticize our own tradition as radicals that we don't know the usage of these concepts. As a corollary, because we "Know that something's wrong, but don't know what it is," we don't know the forms of domination within the dominant liberal ideology. Our personal acceptance of that ideology explains, I think, why we're so uncomfortable with these terms. Their uti-

lization becomes concrete only as we involve ourselves in the praxis of lives as exploited people. We are much more comfortable with Benello's criticism, couched as it is in the language of modern manipulative social science. I think the substance of Benello's work though is simply a current expression of classical marxist theory and in fact suffers to the extent to which he does not consciously express that fact.

It is indeed a major project to extend Benello's categories into marxist ones. I will attempt merely to suggest the sort of correlation that is possible. Gramsci again is most helpful. He and Benello are committed to the necessity of revolutionizing both political and civil society — the state and the economy. Revolution is legitimized for them by the establishment of a higher and more comprehensive, democratic and people-centered culture that cannot continue to develop without taking over control of the means of production and distribution. The outline of the new society grows up within the shell of the old.

They are together so far. Benello's concern though is primarily with man's basic affectivity needs and while he goes a long way in describing, their negative satisfaction under exploitative organization, he fails to relate these needs to the concrete practice of our movement today and from that fails to project the probable form society will take as men gain the power to satisfy these needs. It is here that marxist criticism develops Benello's work beyond its utopian form by forcing it back into the realm of practice.

The Wasteland Culture is presently an abstract construct cap-

able of perception only by those with fairly advanced intellectual training. The intellectual faculties can affirm its existence without being able to successfully communicate it to those not so trained or politically inclined. This is true even though it portends to describe the structure in which we all live. For most it has no content. Gramsci can explain this difficulty, I think. Gwynn A. Williams, writing in the "Journal of the History of Ideas," XXI, 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1960), defined Gramsci's usage of "hegemony" as "an order in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its intellectual and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all tasks, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations." (quoted in Cammett). Hegemony is exercised by conceit. Hegemony is exercised in all societies, the question is by whom and to what effect is it exercised. For the American people to learn the way they are forced to live and grow would destroy capitalism in this country.

For Gramsci, the working class must have demonstrated its claim as the only class ethically, culturally, politically and economically fit to rule before it can assume the right to control the means of production and distribution and determine the future development of mankind. A premature seizure of power necessitates the brutalization consequent upon the supremacy of the dictatorship of the proletariat over proletarian hegemony.

The spirit of the chants "Burn, Baby, Burn" and "Hell No, We Won't Go" seems much the more

dominant than that of the co-operatives or even that of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization. "Black Power" is admitting developing the beginning of a democratic political economy for the ghetto, but its primary power is in beginning to get Blacks together for struggle. And I would suggest that its demonstrated power results more from its ability to get white authority uptight than from its capacity to change Black peoples' objective position within their colonized community. It's a thundering chant busting up the authority, more than the organizational power of the white built capitalist structure. Blacks get together when they see The Man can be gotten at.

Counter - structure formation will not come till it becomes culturally impossible to enter the structures of the colonizer and military repression should not be underestimated as a central means by which this cultural foreclosing will occur — as dangerous as it might be that it comes prematurely and to an overwhelming degree. Lenin said, the revolutionary should always allow the exploiter to shoot first. The exploiter legitimatizes his own destruction thereby. We have not yet made the point to our people that the government has been shooting first for a long time. The system has been murderously foolish for a long time and we have failed to capitalize upon it in building our movement. We have not developed resistance politics. Resistance precedes counter-structure formation.

Benello prescribes what will be seen to be a premature organizing pattern for our movements. I would argue that the Black and

White movements are consciously in a prerevolutionary posture of resistance. It is a transitional attitude in which all activity assumes the dual character of, on the one hand, exposing and desanctifying the domination-exploitation and/or colonization emanating from public and private corporate structures and, on the other, protecting the political and simple physical reality of the Left wing presence that has developed around the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. With the coming summer and the Presidential election campaigns, increased draft calls and domestic political and military counter-insurgency of warfare, both tasks will be re-intensified and will increasingly complement each other.

My impression is that we simply do not have the people, the organizational skills or the consequential cultural political climate to begin implementing this vision.

His work is today theoretical. Our work will make it empirical. The required cultural climate will be built concretely around the maturation of expanded and intensified popular recognition of the totalitarian structure of American society. Benello's references reveal that the objective conditions for revolution have long existed in our society. We have simply failed to develop the subjective of cultural expression that would permit the American people to control their own lives.

Antonio Gramsci's understanding of the role of the intellectual and the political party is the heart of our criticism of Benello — the question of praxis.

"The first principle is that there do exist governors and governed, rulers and ruled," Gramsci

says in *THE MODERN PRINCE: ESSAYS ON THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS IN THE MODERN AGE* (New World Paperbacks, NW-78. See also John Gammett, *ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND THE ORIGINS OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM*, Stanford University Press.) This principle is not altered within a democratic electoral process. There the rulers are those who organize the electorate most thoroughly to act at the polls in support of their continued domination. Those with the greatest power in private affairs would be expected to have the best organized structures to organize within the public arena. Benello clearly outlines the operation of domination in these structures. Society functions to the benefit of the few, the rulers, and the objective and subjective detriment of the many — i.e., all those who have both physically and ideologically organized to express their interests in the manner most profitable to the corporate structures and their heads.

In non-totalitarian societies, many political parties develop. The parties represent different groups of the same class. Gramsci calls them the nomenclature of social classes, they express themselves in both the civil of private and political or public arenas. Their class expression is often not clear because the development of a party requires the aid of allied party groups. These groups usually are of the same class and they work together moving toward the creation of a party that will reflect more totally the interests of their class. An "intellectual general staff" sometimes arises to further this process. Gramsci mentions as an example the London Times and we might add its

New York counterpart. Lenin's Iskra is the archetype for the proletariat. Our movement does not yet have such an organized focal point, just isolated intellectuals.

We see then that economic awareness of a group's plight is not enough. A revolutionary class and party grows out of a group which sees its economic and political interests as transcending itself and enfolded the interests of other groups within that class. This process represents the most political period in the development of a revolution. The revolutionary party expands itself to include the whole class it will fight for.

This is where it gets hard because making the revolution comes close to home here. So far as a white radical movement in America today is concerned, we as students and New Class professionals are it. I would suggest that we as a group have the possibility of moving this country into a revolutionary situation. The essential thing to remember though is that we are not there yet. We must key our actions and expectations to our situation. Frantic, extremist actions of despair will simply impede the development of our movement. Exaggerated expectations will simply cripple us emotionally and keep us from working. Perhaps this is a danger in Benello's work. We must intensify our campus based activity and support our brothers as they begin to work elsewhere.

I think most of the people in and around our movement are with us more for reasons of a common negation of American society than to build a new society around the recognition of human needs. Many kids I work

with talk about just wanting to blow up the damn Draft Board or maybe burn down the whole society. They are not primarily motivated by a paradigm or countervision of a good society. They just don't want to go on like this. And without knowing the concrete functioning of their society they resist it as they can and in predictably cultural ways.

Isolated events of political resistance fading into cultural insurgence describes the dominant left presence of our movement in America. Part of the left will find Benello interesting, but that interest will not be reflected in the kind of organizing he calls for. We just couldn't get our Atlanta troops or ourselves to Value Creating Society meetings, although many of us old timers might think we won't make it without that kind of community. It would probably be unwise for us to expend such energy today even if we could. Before beginning to consolidate we must expand our base.

I find myself then agreeing substantially with Benello's largely psychological and sociological analysis of our human situation in America. The satisfaction of our human needs he postulates must be met as we restructure this society. But they cannot be fully met today. We must have the revolution to know that kind of satisfaction. After all we work for the revolution because we know mankind cannot be happy without it.

We can only know the happiness that comes with doing what is required. We must channel the growing energies of cultural resistance in America into Institutional Resistance that exposes the domination of our lives in

real ways while projecting the beginnings of the community and freedom we are developing. We must polish our moral courage around the task of knowing the actual workings of this country so we can first make it stop and then make it ours. By the time the system stops, we will be in the majority and making it ours

will mean the people making it theirs.

The Wasteland Culture analysis can free us to participate fully in the radical negation of Institutional Resistance knowing that it is but the necessary transition to building the kind of world there's room to grow up in.

"In 1968 according to the National Police Agency, disputes which led to some kind of direct action occurred at 107 universities and colleges in Japan. Barricades were erected and buildings occupied at 26 of them.

More than 4000 police, or one in every 10 in Tokyo, were injured in clashes with students in 1968. One was killed by a paving stone dropped from a third floor of an occupied building. Five thousand students were taken into custody and probably at least as many were injured."

The Observer, Jan. 19, 1969

Reports:

VIETNAM : REPORT FROM PARIS

The importance of the American decision to stop all bombing must not be under-estimated. It signifies a major change of US policy. When the bombing began in February 1965 it was the first sign of an important American decision to widen the war, to americanise it. It was because Saigon had proved itself quite incapable of winning the war on the ground in South Vietnam, that a decision was taken for American intervention, much more directly than before. The bombing was an attempt to obtain a cheap victory from the air. The US High Command delieved that Hanoi would capitulate quickly and that the flow of supplies from the North would cease. This was a grave miscalculation both because supplies and men from the North at that stage were not crucial for the NLF, and because it did not work. The bombing failed to achieve its aim. Hanoi did not cry for mercy. It merely stiffened and enlarged its involvement.

For this reason, only three months later, when NLF forces were at the gates of Saigon, the US again had to change plans and from that time on there was a larger and larger flow of US troops into Vietnam and attempt to win on the ground. At the end of '64, the total was only 23,300 'advisers', by end '65, there were 184,000, end '66, 383,300, end '67, 466,000 and today, 540,000.

Three years and 8 months later the cessation of the bombing marks the end of the American attempt to get its way in South Vietnam by military means. Don't believe all this nonsense that the NLF and Hanoi has been forced to their knees. Johnson is back where he was in 1965, losing the war on the ground, but this time, he has decided to call it a day, and to seek a political solution. This is a decision that could have been taken, should have been taken in 1965. Thousands of young Americans, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese have paid with their lives for that postponement.

Intricacies of timing

I believe that the decision to stop the bombing and move to a political settlement was taken shortly after the Tet Offensive when it became clear that a further escalation of the war entailed a higher price than the American people, administration, and above all, financial circles, were prepared to pay. The delay has been due to the fact that Johnson was determined to make the greatest possible

political advantage of it. So the initial partial stop to the bombing had to come early enough to offset the candidature of Robert Kennedy, the increasing popularity of Eugene McCarthy, and the primaries. It was timed particularly for the Wisconsin Primary.

But the final cessation was kept for a time when it could give Humphrey the maximum aid in his bid for the White House. Hence the long months of delay. I believe that a last minute announcement on the eve of the election was much more useful for Humphrey than a move several weeks earlier, which people would have had time to digest. As it is, it probably got him nearer to the Presidency than he had ever dared to hope.

What it Means . . . for Saigon

The hardest pill for President Thieu to swallow is not the cessation of the bombing, though that is bad enough, but the admittance of the NLF on the same basis of anonymity as Saigon to the Paris Talks. The arrangement under which the United States was free to declare that she was not 'recognising' the NLF, and left Hanoi free to declare that she was not 'recognising' the Saigon regime was ideal in many respects and involves the one major concession from Hanoi. Saigon was asked to give no more than this. It is not surprising that Thieu, has been difficult, however, for the move to real negotiations is the writing on the wall for him. He has two alternatives — accepting a new, independent regime in the South, or trying to carry on the war without American aid. Both are horrible to him.

What has been interesting has been the lack of protest from ordinary people. Demonstrations have been few, and largely from catholic refugees in the South. There have been no demonstrations outside Saigon. The only people who stand to lose from the end of the fighting are the bourgeois gentlemen of Saigon and those who have profited from the enormous corruption that the American presence has fed and fattened.

What it Means for the NLF

Clearly the acceptance by the United States of an equal footing for the NLF and Saigon is a major victory for the Front. The press and politicians in Paris have been impressed by the quality of the NLF Delegation, just as six months ago they were surprised by the delegates from Hanoi. But the Front's decision to send a woman as the leader of the first group, was brilliant. Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh is 41 years old. She had spent three years in prison, under the French, when she was still in her teens. With Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the Front, she organized the demonstration of March 19, 1950, against American intervention. She was arrested again in 1951 and released in 1954, after the Geneva Accords. She is a member of the Central Committee of the NLF and has travelled abroad for them on a number of occasions. She led the delegation to meet women

from the peace movements in Paris in May, 1968.

For too long, the Front has been faceless. All too few people have been able to meet its leading people. For those who see the NLF as the 'Vietcong' — bands of 'savages' in the Vietnamese jungles, Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh, good-looking, charming and intelligent, is a great surprise.

Where do they stand ?

Their political position has been made very clear over the past year. It is significant that immediately after the Johnson announcement, the Front radio sent out a programme stressing the essential parts of the Programme published in September, 1967 which has the support both of Hanoi and of the Alliance of National, Democratic Peace Forces. This is what they will argue for in Paris:

- 1 The puppet government must be overthrown, the National Assembly dissolved and the Constitution and all anti-democratic laws abolished;
- 2 Free general elections for a new National Assembly, to be followed by a government of national unity;
- 3 An independent sovereign economy which will develop trade with the North and carry out agrarian reform, but it will not be fully socialized. Rights of ownership will be safeguarded;
- 4 All democratic freedoms, of speech, of press, of association, of creed, for parties, for trade unions, will be assured;
- 5 An amnesty for all those who have fought for, or collaborated with the United States and the puppet regime, who genuinely repent;
- 6 The programme confirms the right to unification of North and South, but visualises considerable delay. While it confirms that Vietnam is one, it also states that reunification will be realized step by step through peaceful means on the principle of negotiation between the two zones without either side using pressure, and without foreign interference. But it foresees economic and cultural exchanges and the restitution of posts, travel, etc.

What this means is that while the Front accepts that the North can speak for the whole of Vietnam, they visualise that a South Vietnamese State will exist, possibly, for as long as ten or fifteen years. This is important because it will allow the South to move gradually towards socialism, as the North has done, since its one disastrous error in land reform, which was quickly made good, and because there would be another major difference between North and South. It is believed that the North would remain in the socialist bloc, though accepting military dis-engagement. The South, on the other hand would be neutral, outside any alliance, and militarily disengaged.

Since the question of a coalition government raises great heat, both with the NLF and in Saigon, it is interesting to recall that one other proposal which has sometimes been discussed is for an interim

government of 'honest men'. Such a government, involving people from the Front and the Alliance, and from more liberal circles in Saigon, such as Truong Dinh Dzu, still imprisoned, might well solve the problem, pending the withdrawal of United States and allied troops and free general elections. Maybe this is why General 'Big' Minh is in Saigon?

What it Means for Hanoi

The ending of the bombing, followed by the ending of the war, will allow the Democratic Republic to go back to the task of building socialism in their country. But the bombing has created more than damage in their country. It has also enabled them to organize to a massive de-centralisation of administration, of industry, of education which is suited to their society, based very largely on the village. It is possible, indeed, likely, that a great deal of the de-centralisation will be perpetuated after the bombing which promoted it has ended.

But, in the meantime, there is massive destruction of towns and villages, roads and railways, factories, schools, pagodas and churches, to be repaired. The United States, which has been responsible for this, must be made to pay reparations, but, in this, the peace movements and organizations which have been sending medical aid, can give a lead. This is why the International Confederation for Disarmement and Peace has put forward proposals for a world-wide effort to rebuild North Vietnam and soon, we hope, when a cease fire follows in the South, South Vietnam as well. There the problem is not only the ravages of bombing, shelling, defoliation, but also the transplantation of hundreds of thousands of people, largely old people, women and children from refugee camps in the cities. They are people of the countryside and they will want to go back and must be helped to resettle.

"What has been done in Vietnam", said the International Confederation in its statements, "is also the responsibility of the world community. It is our duty to help to rebuild. We must take the lead and hope that the U.S. Government will follow our example. Furthermore, if this international effort starts immediately it can be a powerful obstacle to any resumption of the bombing."

Such a plan for reconstruction, firstly in the North, then in the South, must involve a much wider spectrum than the peace movements. It should bring in Governments, many non-governmental organizations, trade unions, youth and student groups, professional groups, cities, town and states. It should be not merely massive world-wide aid for rebuilding, but also a means to bring people together. ICDP is now discussing the proposal with other peace movements and internationals, and with representatives of the Vietnamese. It hopes to launch the scheme early in 1969. It will be a recognition of the moral responsibility of the whole world towards a people and a country which has suffered so much.

Another aspect to which ICDP has drawn attention is the question of an amnesty. In a Call to Release, it is demanding international support for an amnesty for all young Americans currently serving prison in sentences for refusing to fight in Vietnam, for those who risk imprisonment if they return to the United States, or because like Dr. Spock, they have supported draft resistance. But this appeal is linked to a similar call for the release of thousands of political prisoners in jail in South Vietnam, and those imprisoned or exiled in the Soviet Union for demonstrating in opposition to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

*by Peggy Duff,
general-secretary,
International Confederation for
Disarmament and Peace.*

REPORT FROM TORONTO

(November 1968): This fall in Toronto, the radical left was fragmented. The militancy prevalent in other places is reflected in Toronto, but there seems to be no broadly based and fundamentally political organization to focus it.

The October 26 day of protest against the war in Vietnam saw separate simultaneous protests, both with respectable-sized turnouts, mounted by the two most active organizations. The atmosphere was absurdly sectarian as the two groups formed up in different parts of the grounds in front of the Ontario legislature. The Vietnam Mobilization Committee, which seeks a broad coalition but is heavily influenced by Trotskyists, had the larger group of people and marched to the spacious square in front of City Hall. The Canadians for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam marched to the United States consulate.

Militant confrontations with the police on both marches produced, between the two marches, 34 arrests. The VMD, which had been refused permission to march down Toronto's Yonge Street, on the street, had some of its leaders try to do so anyway. Arrests at the CNLF demonstration came after leaders attempted to hold a rally on a sidewalk in front of the consulate, a sidewalk crowded with both CNLF supporters and a smaller but still substantial delegation of counter-pickets from the right-wing Edmund Burke Society. In my opinion, at least, neither the police nor the leaders of either demonstration can be held blameless in the clashes. The way in which mounted police were used is among the things for which the police can be blamed. But their repression did not become at all savage until leaders in both groups had attempted to use streets and leaders in a manner which police had good grounds for considering unreasonable.

Radical ferment

As fall wore on, though, a new, voluntary-membership radical student group called the Toronto Student Movement (not to be confused with the ultra-Maoist Canadian Student Movement) was beginning to make its presence known. Andrew Wernick, who had earned the reputation as SAC's chief radical, resigned from its executive to devote more time to the TSM; *Our Generation* associate editor Philip Resnick was also among leaders of the new group. (More about the TSM in later reports).

There were signs of ferment in the high schools. One of the most exciting developments of the fall came not at an educational institution for pampered suburbanites but at a technical high school for teenagers purportedly unable to cope with regular academic work. A student at Castel Frank was sent home for wearing his hair long; in the upshot, 333 of the school's 777 students stayed out of school for a day and a dwindling number stayed out for some time after that. There were meetings, delegations, demonstrations.

A few staff and leading members of the Ontario Union of Students (which is supported by university student councils) and the Highschool Union of Students (voluntary membership) were in close touch with the dissidents and exercised a kind of leadership. Authorities, of course, charged outside agitation. OUS people contended that their contribution was supportive, largely a matter of helping students unused to working verbally to articulate their cause.

Another comparatively bright spot was the beginning of organization and political activity on the part of United States exiles. The flow of draft resisters to Toronto continues. The Toronto Anti-Draft Program, an agency with a largely Canadian board of directors, recently estimated that 20 people a day show up in the TADP office seeking information. The number who actually immigrate and settle in Toronto would, of course, be much smaller.

A membership-based Union of American Exiles now has "about 350 to 400 people who know us and whom we see regularly," says spokesman Charles Novogrodsky, and the number is growing. The group publishes a small newsletter and maintains a seven-nights-a-week counselling office, both aimed at complementing the TADP's service with more in-depth counselling and mutual help. There has been debate in the union about whether it should stick to mutual

The CNLF is a group which has attracted public attention only recently. They are heavily influenced by Maoists but attract others too, including some who used to be affiliated with the now-defunct Student Union for Peace Action and have become more extreme since. The group, of course, lays considerable stress on their "clear line" and polemic against other left groups, especially the Trotskyists. It is heavily "Marxist" and heavily nationalist and anti-imperialist. Its supporters have recently been attempting to organize the formally unrelated Canadian Liberation Front.

It was an indication of the spirit of "disunity" that Toronto's Union of American Exiles, about whom more later, organized a separate Vietnam march Oct. 26, feeling that to endorse either of the others might split their own group. Theirs was in the morning, the other two in the afternoon, when exiles were urged to attend the march of their choice.

Campus Politics

Among students, political fragmentation left any potential student movement largely rudderless for much of the fall, at least so far as voluntary-membership organizations were concerned. The downtown newspapers worried about the possibility of violent eruptions on campus, but some radical students were more concerned about whether there would be any significant action at all. Student government made an attempt to fill the leadership gap left by the absence of a broadly-based radical organization. Much of the interest focused on the Canadian Union of Students, the Ontario Union of Students, the University of Toronto Students' Administrative Council—the last under the presidency of Stephen Langdon, who is often described as a social democrat.

Just as CUS nationally faced defecting membership, the U. of T. SAC probably had as much grief from its constituency as it gave the administration. In October, for instance, the university's graduate students society sponsored a referendum which went in favor of the graduate students' ceasing to pay fees to SAC. The exact results of that referendum were not known.

SAC's efforts in the fall were largely centred on questions of university government—largely presenting more hard-line counter-proposals to proposals by the university's clever, liberal president Dr. Claude T. Bissell, who towards the end of the summer had made a well-reported speech contrasting what he considered responsible campus reformists with campus revolutionaries. SAC argued that one committee should not have any representatives from the university's board of governors, that another committee should have equal representatives from students and faculty, that sort of things. However, SAC people were not insensistive to the argument that this sort of jockeying tends to be a liberal trap.

help or engage in politics, but Mr. Novogrodsky thinks that debate is pretty well settled in favor of politics. What kind of politics still is a question. Novogrodsky says the union now is thinking in terms of exile consciousness to a greater extent than Toronto-based exile workers have been doing. Previously, the emphasis was on integration into Canadian life and Canadian left politics.

"Counter-Institution"

A tall new building on Bloor Street, at the north of the University of Toronto campus, marks one of the new lights, on the Toronto scene. Towards the end of October, wind whistled through still unfilled window spaces and drifted plaster dust from unfinished hallways under apartment doors, but Rochdale College was occupied.

The college, a development from the Campus Co-operative movement and the genius of construction-wise Howard Adelman. Last year, a few seminars were held as a sort of pilot project in radical education for the college. Some people held high hopes for Rochdale's potential as a radicalizing institutions; others took a look at those who attended the seminars, dubbed the experiment Roachdale, and were more cynical.

Certainly there were all kinds of chaos this fall, both because of the nature of Rochdale and because builders were behind schedule in getting construction of the college finished, and construction workers and students found themselves in the building together—somewhat to the chagrin of both.

About 4,000 people applied for accommodation in the 18-storey college, registrar Jack Dimond reported. It could accommodate only 850 of them, 200 to 250 of whom were fairly full-time participants in Rochdale's little-structured educational program, the rest of whom were taking degree courses at the U. of T. or some other institution. In addition, about 300 people not registered at Rochdale were taking part in activities of the college.

Seminars sprang up under the Rochdale umbrella on a wide variety of subjects—from psychedelic music to the Canadian Indian, from creative writing to philosophy, from drama to pacifist-Marxist Brewster Kneen's Study of Institutions and Theology. Certainly love beads and bare feet are much in evidence around Rochdale—or at least were in the late fall; Toronto does have a winter. But the hippy thing by no means marked the political and intellectual limits of the college.

The counter-community model of politics is out of vogue in North America and elsewhere these days; the politics of confrontation is in. But Toronto seemed to be an exception.

by Harvey L. Shepard

REPORT FROM HALIFAX

(November 1968): The most immediate social question in Halifax is what some people call "the black problem." There are about 8,000 black people in the Halifax metropolitan area — the largest concentration in Canada. Their situation is quite comparable to the condition of black people in most U.S. cities — that is, complete subjugation in all important parts of life including employment, education, and housing. The integration and intermarriage that take place occasionally serve to mask the reality of the total situation. Until the past few years white Halifax could and did more or less ignore the whole matter. But this is becoming increasingly difficult as the repercussions of such a longstanding social ill begin to be felt. White Haligonians are now worried about it — all the more so since they do not, as a rule, understand what it is all about.

Three dimensional dynamics

What it's about is the combined effect of three major influences. But before outlining these, it is important to keep in mind the basic nature of this city. Heavily defense oriented, it is virtually a U.S. naval base. It is far removed from the largest centers of Canadian life (Montréal, Toronto) and there is actually more animosity toward "upper Canadians" than toward the U.S. In addition there is the very strong British-Scottish tradition, and some accompanying anti-French feeling. The result has been an extremely staid, conservative atmosphere in which criticism of the U.S. is barely tolerated, and the pace of thought and deed is slow, with very little infusion of new vitality from outside.

What has happened to change this? First of all is the speed-up in the over-all life of the city. The population of the metropolitan area has grown appreciably, and over a third of all Nova Scotians now live here. Most of these are crowded into the peninsular area which is the old city. It therefore resembles a larger center than it really is because of the high density of housing, extreme shortage of land, and the social problems that go along with these conditions. Housing is terrible (the lowest vacancy rate of any major city in Canada) with many families living in accommodations as crowded, miserable, and potentially dangerous as anything one could find in the ghettos of Detroit, New York, or the other riot-torn cities of the U.S. Last year three black people burned to death when their rat-trap home on a conspicuous corner of two old Halifax streets caught fire. However, there are no longer any strictly black ghettos. The community called "Africville" has been wiped off the map and the people moved into public housing or slums in other parts of the city. There was no way to preserve this community since the physical conditions were impossible of repair, but with it has gone a rich fabric of community life which these people had shared for a long time on the windy shore of Bedford Basin.

The city serves as the educational, medical, distributive, and administrative center of the Maritime region, and this function has been intensifying, so that a larger percentage of the city land is taken up by universities, hospitals, government offices, etc. This puts a further squeeze on the housing situation and on the taxpayer as well, since most of these are tax-free uses.

Into this situation came the second major influence of this period, the current Mayor, Allan O'Brien. He is probably one of Canada's most enlightened politicians — a humanitarian, with an ability to see through the complexities of municipal administration, and to use the available machinery, profitably. From this stronghold of conservatism he has little hope of being sent into Federal politics, since he is a member of the NDP, but local politics are non-partisan, and within this framework he has reached the high point of political power.

Third force

At the same time the third force is in motion — black power. This phrase means only one thing to most Haligonians. It means that agitator by the name of Rocky Jones. Actually Rocky has been working here since before the advent of black power. Like most leaders, he is a hard worker, a tireless talker, and a magnet for the energetic, angry young people. He is young himself, feeling his way, being shaped by the action that he is helping to stimulate. He is not a "man of peace", but not a Black Panther either. Subjected to all sorts of personal harrassment, he manages to stay calm in most situations. For some time he ran the Kwacha House — a gathering place for young people where they could come to talk with him and with each other, and to consider ideas for improving things. This work was supported by the Company of Young Canadians, but it folded because of the continual problems of police surveillance, complaints and attacks by those who considered it a disruptive influence. These discussions now take place on a larger scale in schools, churches, meetings here and parties there — a new militancy is coming forward.

The ultimate objective of the defenders of the system of course has been to silence Rocky Jones, to make him evaporate, as if the feelings he expresses would disappear along with him. But in the last year it has become apparent, at least to those who sincerely try to understand the people, that he speaks for a large part of the black community. Even the President of the NSAACP has recently echoed Rocky's statements about the very real possibility of explosions here. Gus Wedderburn, of this more conservative organization, still believes in the regular channels, and recently presented a brief to Nova Scotia Premier G. I. Smith, outlining the worst problems and suggesting legislative remedies. Rocky considers this sort of thing pretty much a waste of time.

by Irene Nichols

THE HEMISPHERIC CONFERENCE IN MONTREAL

To the extent that the radical press covered the Hemispheric Conference to the End the War in Vietnam it criticized it severely. In the SDS's *New Left Notes*, in a score of underground newspapers and periodicals the criticism was the same. The *Guardian* for example had former national SDS officer Carl Davidson cover the event. Amongst other things he said:

"The conference, apparently initiated by elements close to the Communist party, accomplished little else—unless managing to snatch boredom from the jaws of chaos is considered an achievement. What could have been an opportunity for strengthening the anti-war movement was terribly bungled. The Canadian leaders did not appear to understand the wide range of political forces active in the U.S. peace movement or the need to enlarge the conference leadership to encompass these views. The Canadian leaders not only disregard the US opinion that they considered "threatening" they apparently were also reluctant to accept the view of American CP members, some of whom had earlier dropped out of active organizing for the conference, because of the rigid Canadian attitude."

It can be added that many Canadian views were also isolated from the conference leadership.

The Conference brought together some 500 delegates. There was an official delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the South Vietnam National Front of Liberation. The Russians were to send a semi-governmental delegation but did not receive visas, partly because of the Czechoslovakia affair. It is important to note that the National Council of the Students for a Democratic Society (the leading new left organization in the US), the Southern Students Organizing Committee, Youth International Party, and the whole of the underground press did not sponsor the conference, did not send delegations, in fact they did not take the Montreal gathering seriously. The new left present at the conference represented largely non-SDS action groups at the local level mostly from the Bay and Berkeley areas. The Black Panthers, and a few SNCC people attended. It is significant that the Cubans did not attend.

The Organizing Committee of the Hemispheric Conference (O.C.) managed to involve a number of Quebec and Canadian liberals by means of embracing the small Québec NDP. As was predicted by some, the Hemispheric Conference is now a *permanent* organization. The O.C. had everything well organized including the control of literature sold, rigid voting procedures, workshops with specific themes. This structure was challenged on the first day and was quickly changed because of the tremendous opposition generated.

The Cubans did not come for a number of reasons. The composition of the Latin American delegations was clearly one, they were almost all pro-Moscow in orientation. But more important was

the Cuban suspicions that the Montreal meeting was a first step in establishing a propaganda centre giving a Soviet interpretation of what was happening in the Hemisphere, consequently rivaling OLAS (the political section of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America-OSPAAAL-known in short as TRICONTINENTAL based in Havana). OLAS/OSPAAAL have a revolutionary strategy for the third world propagating the ideas of Che and Debray.

If we divide our analysis of the Conference into three parts — before, during, and after we can begin by saying that :

The main criticism of the conference before it started came from non-aligned peace organizations and individuals, most of which support the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP), and the Moaists, Trotskists plus other left sects. The ICDP criticism suggested that the Hemispheric Conference was propagating a double standard. That is to say by not allowing any mention of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia at any level of the conference it implicitly refused to acknowledge that the international situation had profoundly changed since the invasion and that it is consequently not a good thing to have one standard to judge the behaviour of socialist countries and another to judge capitalist ones. The ICDP, unlike the WCP not only has mobilized world opinion against the war in Vietnam, but has done a lot to create pressure against the Soviet invasion against Czechoslovakia. Indeed after much representation the Conference finally agreed to allow Mr. Alfred Hassler a president of the ICDP to speak in Montreal about Vietnam, but also about the significance of the Soviet aggression. Two days before the conference began the invitation was withdrawn.

The criticism of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada, and the Young Socialist Alliance was that the Hemispheric Conference was not anti-imperialist and was controlled by Moscow revisionists.

During the conference several caucuses emerged : the Black Panthers who were angry at the fact that their leader Bobby Seale was not brought in as a speaker even though the conference publicity announced that he would attend. On Friday they stormed the stage to make their protest and denounce the conference organisers as racists. After much commotion the Organizing Committee raised the money and Seale came with this bodyguards. The Vietnamese held separate meetings with the Black Panthers and each pledged solidarity with the other. The result was that the Panthers went along with the Vietnamese final statement of unity. Indeed on Sunday they guarded the stage from assaults by other caucuses.

The new left caucus consisted of persons of various political shades including anarchists, liberation new left, radical pacifists, liberation marxists. Their criticism was that the conference was too highly structured, the established workshops were meaningless to radical organizing against the war and movement building, that the whole thing was grossly undemocratic, and that the conference was not anti-imperialist including Soviet imperialism.

The third caucus was called anti-imperialist consisting of Trotskists, Moaists, Internationalists. They want the conference to denounce American imperialism, victory for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia, and American imperialism in Quebec, Canada, and Latin America.

The fourth caucus was the Québécois who like the Black Panthers had national concerns, namely not enough French was spoken, and not enough French-Canadian speakers. They also wanted conference recognition for their cause and struggle. The Vietnamese meet with them separately as well and came to the same understanding as with the Panthers.

It is important to note that each one of these caucuses was ready to storm the platform to press their demands. The Blacks did it first with new left support. Consequently the Blacks received the most publicity and meet with the Vietnamese first.

The new left was largely neutralized with pleas of unity from the Vietnamese. Some of their demands were met on conference structure, but none of the positive work of the workshops the new left established ever got to the conference plenary sessions. During the workshops a lot of constructive discussion took place about both organizing and new values. The caucus pressed and a resolution was adopted which requested that all workshop resolutions be included in the Conference Resolutions book.

On Saturday the 'unity statement' was adopted 'unanimously' needless to say without discussion. The next day however the revolutionary left took over the spirit of the conference. For the first time, Che was mentioned, the Internationale was sung, clenched fists could be seen everywhere — all to the embarrassment of the Organizing Committee. But thanks to the Vietnamese, they did get their unity statement.

The kind of peace politics that the Hemispheric Conference has introduced into North America is the kind of politics associated with the World Council for Peace. The same organizing techniques were used, the same 'unanimous' statements adopted. This organisation represents since its founding after the Second World War a genuine desire for world peace, by supporting the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It represents the views of those people who are close friends of the Soviet camp. But this is only one approach to the problems of world conflict. The World Council of Peace has been, with the exception of a watery statement by two of its officers in their own name, silent on the question of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In profound disagreement with this approach to world peace and freedom are the non-aligned peace movements, and for additional reasons the revolutionary new left.

THE EDITORS.

BOOKS REVIEWED:

Phillip Bosserman, *Dialectical Sociology: An Analysis of the Sociology of Georges Gurvitch*, Porter Sargent Publisher, Boston, 1968, \$7.95. 316 pages.

The work under review here arrives at a propitious moment. For the first time in the post-war period, the dominant liberal biases of North American life are being challenged vigorously by a new radicalism that situates itself in a critical, anti-system perspective. Extra-parliamentary opposition has become a fashion, even in pragmatically moderate Canada, and opposition to the intellectual tradition of liberalism is growing by leaps and bounds. At university after university, the demand for a critical social science is voiced, not only by conscious radicals, but by "moderates" fed up with the vacuity of an approach that rationalizes an unreal, and therefore unacceptable, world.

Suddenly, there is an interest in alternative traditions. America's imperial past becomes fair game for revisionist historians concerned with challenging the liberal version of the Cold War and its origins. Canada's colonial tradition looms ever larger in the hands of critics determined to analyse Canadian non-nationalism and non-policy. Marxist historiography and sociology provoke genuine intellectual excitement in students fed up with systems theory and behavioral methodology. For many, interested in fundamental questions of value and purpose, "value-free"

liberal social science is left with a progressively shrinking fig leaf with which to cover its nakedness.

The search for alternatives leads naturally enough to Europe. Although many of the best-known contemporary European sociologists, e.g. Aron and Dahrendorf, are firmly in the liberal camp, they nonetheless have philosophical and historical perspectives which almost all their American counterparts lack. More importantly, there is a critical tradition in European sociology, much of it Marxist or neo-Marxist, but much of it unattached to the Marxist camp, which approaches social phenomena as more than grist for the monographic mill, and is concerned with global rather than fragmentary analysis.

Dialectical Sociology is the first analysis of the sociology of Georges Gurvitch to appear in the United States. Although Gurvitch lived in the U.S. during the Second War, and was the occupant of Durkheim's chair at the Sorbonne until his death in 1965, little of his work has been translated. For those brought up in the American sociological tradition, both his *La Vocation Actuelle de la Sociologie* and his *Traité de Sociologie*, remain *terra incognita*. Bosserman's study provides them with a useful introduction.

Contrast to American Sociology

Gurvitch did not merely belong to the category of critical sociologists; he could more correctly have been described as "the spirit who denies." No one was as acerbic in his criticism of twentieth century sociology going back to Weber, or contemptuous of the mindless empiricism that passes for knowledge in the U.S. For Gurvitch, Weber was a radical nominalist, who denied the reality of groups and classes, of a collective "We", as the subject of sociology. His concept of comprehension, by focusing on a subjective interpretation of the particular acts of individual persons, led to a series of non-objective ideal types linked to a spiritualized culturalism.

Weber's errors were compounded in the work of American sociologists such as Parsons, whom Gurvitch accused of hopelessly confusing the terms social system, social structure, and institutions. For Parsons, structure had become the ideal type of social system, providing institutional integration and equilibrium, rather than social change. Gurvitch, on the other hand, adopting Marcel Mauss's focus on "total social phenomena", postulated social reality as involving constant tension between stability and the creative act, between existing structures, and structures in the process of becoming.

The Purpose of Sociology

For Gurvitch, sociology was far different from the purely descriptive approach of American sociology. Where the latter was "merely forcing open doors that were already opened", sel-

dom probing to the lower depths of reality, the real vocation of sociology lay elsewhere. "Sociology", he stated in the *Traité*, "is a science which studies total social phenomena in the whole of their aspects and movements, by capturing them in micro-social, group, and global dialecticized types, in the process of becoming and falling apart."

Sociology was the queen discipline of the social sciences, concerned with the study of social phenomena through a multiplicity of times, and across cultural borders. It was properly concerned with economics, law, and politics, to name but three branches of knowledge, without thereby becoming imperialist towards them. It was concerned with all stages in social life, the astructural, the structurable, as well as the structured, and sought the generality in each. Its method was dialectical, concerned with both partial and global structures, with the continuities and discontinuities in social patterns, with civilization as well as with its particular structures. Above all, sociology had to avoid mummification, and had to recognize the hidden character of reality, that social phenomena were often but the manifestations of volcanic forces that lurked underneath.

Gurvitch went on to develop an extremely complex approach to these phenomena, through two-tiered vertical and horizontal schema. In the vertical, he set forth ten levels of social reality, ranging from morphology at the top, through unorganized collective behavior, through collective attitudes, creative collective behavior down to the collective mind, interpenetrating

all the others. Thus, Southern attitudes towards the Negro form a *collective Gestalt*, and affect the social organization and social roles in Southern society. Creative collective behavior represents the stage "where innovation, choice, invention, . . . in short, the degrees of human freedom . . . are partially exposed to view.", e.g. during the Russian Revolution. The collective mind, a concept borrowed from Durkheim, became for Gurvitch a consciousness in which individual and collective were fused, not by destroying one or the other, but by establishing a dialectical relationship among the three poles of collective consciousness, the I, the Other, and the We. The collective mind was not simply identified with Logos, as it had been in the case of Durkheim, nor was it viewed as transcendent. It operated at both the total and partial levels, and was itself plural, although united, even as the total social phenomena were woven into a complex, but unified web.

At the horizontal level, Gurvitch distinguished between the microsocial, the group, and the global level. His analysis of social groupings, especially classes, was cogent, and went far beyond the role theory literature that dominates American approaches to the question. Gurvitch was able to summon up a European historical tradition in which classes had operated as empirical realities, and as self-contained structures for centuries. The reality of classes could not be wished away in industrial societies, although the degree of class consciousness varied in intensity. "Social classes", Gurvitch declared, "are

particular empirical groupings that are dispersed and characterized by their super-functionality, their tendency to have a developed structure, their resistance to penetration by the global society, and their radical incompatibility with other classes." Class was a privileged vehicle for understanding the whole of society, even if Gurvitch rejected the larger claims of Marxism.

At the global level, Gurvitch rejected any attempt to distinguish between society and culture. History and sociology together studied social phenomena, but the former was essentially interested in the continuity between various structures, while sociology emphasized the discontinuities. Gurvitch delineated ten global-type societies in which human liberty has been present as a causal force from charismatic theocracies down to the developed capitalist and planned societies of today. His own option was for a planned society, in which principles of decentralized, pluralistic collectivism would predominate, aspects of which he found in Yugoslavia, Scandinavia, and even Britain, but there was no final ideal type of global society.

The Dialectic

Gurvitch's concept of the dialectic, even more than his construct of social reality, is of particular interest, however, to those in search of alternative sociological traditions. For Gurvitch, all experience was dialectical, constantly changing, never simply contained. Contradiction and complementarity marked social life. On the one hand, extreme polarization might occur, as between individual and society, or technology and other cul-

tural works. On the other, mutual implication might exist, as between the social and the psychological. Or relations might be ambiguous, e.g. elements of spontaneity and order might be found within the same structures.

Explanation in sociology did not depend on causal laws, indeed these were extremely rare. Instead, sociology must be engaged in analysing each social element in relation to its larger context, and must take every depth level into account. Sociology had, in particular, to depend on history for help, "For it is from the total concrete situation and its strictly singular, rigorously non-recurring causality... that one can arrive at certain explanations which are more in keeping with the human condition." Moreover, sociology was dependent upon philosophy for its conceptual framework, and both had as their common field of study *la condition humaine*.

There is much in Gurvitch's panorama of social reality that can serve us in good stead, beginning with the concept of total social phenomena, and continuing with Gurvitch depth sociology. Phillip Bosserman has done a good job in elucidating them, and one can only wish that more of Gurvitch's work would be translated for the English-speaking reader.

But there is both more and less to Gurvitch than Bosserman has told us, and this is of supreme importance in appraising his ultimate importance. Bosserman focuses on Gurvitch's conceptual apparatus, and as a result cannot do full justice to the intellectual traditions on which

Gurvitch draws. For example, Gurvitch does not situate himself within a Marxist framework, but this is in no small part because he draws upon other elements in the French socialist tradition, especially Proudhon. If his political commitments were to the left, he retained a belief in intellectual pluralism that in turn shaped his vision of a socialist society. He recognized the deeply liberating character of the revolutionary process, without thereby becoming a blind adherent of History or Party.

This openness on Gurvitch's part makes him potentially attractive to contemporary radicals, even as the openness of Gramsci's Marxism has appeal far beyond the ranks of socialism. Gurvitch's dialectic may not be Marx's, but it could help to elucidate the nature of consciousness in advanced industrial societies. His focus on total social phenomena does not square with Lukacs's conception of the same in *History and Class Consciousness*, but is still attractive, especially when placed beside the barren furrows of American sociology.

Yet Gurvitch was too much the loner, and his work reflects it. His conceptualizations came quick and easy, yet they are difficult to grasp, and at times written in a private language. If Durkheim left behind him Halbwachs and Mauss to carry on his work, it is difficult to see what disciples Gurvitch will have. Dialectical hyper-empiricism has no clear intellectual constituency.

Thus, Gurvitch, while of interest to those seeking a critical social science, has not become a guiding luminary. While he saw clearly the defects of descriptive

this thesis is closely linked with *another*, also found in different forms in Marxism and existentialism, "that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself" (p. 49). This they oppose to the view that there is a "human nature in the sense of a biologically fixed substratum determining the variability of socio-cultural formations" (loc. cit). The notion behind the term 'externalization' is that man to a significant degree makes his own "nature", or human norm.

But beyond externalization, there is 'objectivation', the process in which the forms of interaction that men create harden by 'habitualization' into institutions, and acquire a reality which stands over against men as a constraint and limit. And this process is considerably strengthened by the third moment of 'internalization', whereby the objectivated social world is made part of the consciousness and self-consciousness of those who grow up within it.

The danger in forgetting that these three moments make up the entire process whereby man is related to society is that we come to look on our social world as having the permanence and immutability of a fact of nature, something which was always so, and will be ever unalterable. We are in danger of forgetting that men have made these institutions, and can thus change them. This process Berger and Luckman call 'reification', after Marx. The critical dimension of their work could be summed up in this way, that it systematically combats our tendency to reify our social world.

The terms in which they ac-

count for the social construction of "reality", of the "knowledge" which must be acquired, distributed and believed if we are to act out our roles in the social drama, are such as to inculcate scepticism, to make us take an ironic distance from the roles we play and the ideas that justify them. Sociology is in this sense necessarily a critical discipline. Those who are fully exposed to it can no longer go on playing the game with the same "sérieux", the same total involvement as before.

To some extent, of course, any sociological theory will probably make the student more conscious of the world he lives in, and in this sense more "distant" from it. What makes Berger and Luckman's view critical in a more meaningful sense is that it tends to make us acutely aware of how bogus much of our socially created "knowledge" is, particularly our justifications of the way things are. Berger and Luckman don't state this explicitly, but it seems a necessary consequence of their explanatory model that the "knowledge" which makes up any official version will try to anchor itself in the "nature of things" in order to give itself credibility and authority. And in so doing it will ipso facto foster reification. The sociologically alert man cannot therefore contemplate his society without a certain ironic distance.

It is not surprising therefore that Berger and Luckman refer with approval to Sartre's analysis of "mauvaise foi" (in *l'Être et le Néant*) and the "practico-inert" (in *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*). The partial convergence of his views with those

of Sartre is made even clearer by Berger in his *Invitation to Sociology*. (Cf. pp. 142-5 of the Anchor Books edition in his *Invitation to Sociology*. New York, Doubleday, 1963). To believe the official truth of any past or existing society (and perhaps of any possible society) is to hide the open choices before us behind a barrier of reification, and hence to be to this extent in "bad faith".

Sociology in this perspective is therefore critical in a way that the mainstream of the discipline, on this continent anyway, is not. For unlike any functionalist theory, it does not tend to make sense of the institutional structure of any society. On the contrary, it is more likely to point out the nonsense and the humbug, as we have just seen. And it is sharply opposed to any purely structural sociology on the grounds that this later "is endemically in danger of reifying social phenomena" (p. 186). Berger and Luckman's approach constantly throws into relief the way in which men make and sustain the society which shapes them.

The nature of man . . .

Since we don't get this kind of book very often, it may seem churlish to criticize; but I think that the only adequate homage to this kind of effort is to extend the dialogue further into the realm of fundamental questions which Berger and Luckman have helped to re-open for us. And in so doing we come across one basic question which is left unanswered, or at least is not explicitly answered, and that is the question about the nature of

man, of this subject and object of history who is caught up in this triple process of externalization, objectivation and internalization. To this objection, we might make two answers on Berger and Luckman's behalf, and a good look at these should bring out what is at stake here.

The first answer would be to say that the authors were right not to reply to this question, for to do so would be to assume that there is such a thing as an ahistorical human nature, and to deny one of their most important insights, that man produces himself in history — an insight they owe to both Marx and phenomenology. But this would only be true if we insisted on a fixed ahistorical formula as an answer to our question, of the kind that would have been given before Hegel. But it is possible to answer this question in another way — the way that in fact both Hegel and Marx did answer it — by trying to define that towards which man is developing in history. No assumption is made that man has been like this from the beginning, is like this now, and will always be so. Quite the contrary. But the attempt is to read in the very acts by which man rebels against the given world and fashions his history, to read in other words in man's rejection of his present condition the kind of social world that he is striving to create, and in which he would no longer need to rebel.

. . . and philosophy of history

The answer to this question, in other words, if we are not to

fall back into the atemporal reifications of classical philosophy, must be in the form of a "philosophy of history", that is, an interpretation of the "text" of history which attempts to define the forces or tendencies underlying human change. A tall order, indeed; and it might seem presumptuous in the extreme to criticize a work which presents us a comprehensive framework for the sociology of knowledge for not also giving us a philosophy of history! Certainly it would be if one were asking for definitive doctrines in both these fields; but for some tentative approximations we not only can, but *must* ask.

For the question of a philosophy of history is one of those which sociology cannot help answering, by the very logic of its own questioning; it has only the choice of doing so consciously or semi-consciously; and this in the same way and for the same reason that any sociological theory must provide arguments for some set of values, even if the current fetish of neutrality insures that this will almost always be done in the twilight zone of semi-consciousness. For the very way in which one tries to account for change, for the rise, transformation and fall of social structures, involves one willy-nilly in the question of what human beings seek, what their needs are, how these needs and goals change, and therefore what meaning historical change has for men.

Berger and Luckman don't escape this logic. There is an implicit philosophy of history in this work; and its broad lines can already be described in what was said above.

In the beginning primitive human society is the domain of almost total reification. All the features of the social world are thought to be part of the order of things, divine or natural (if indeed, this distinction has any meaning in primitive society). The development of human society provides greater and greater opportunity for 'alternation', the process whereby a man "converts" and the world he accepts as real is transformed. But in Berger and Luckman's account of this process, it involves a new "socialization", in some ways a re-enactment of childhood, and hence requires that our critical intelligence be out-manoeuvred, even if it is we ourselves who are responsible for the manoeuvres.

In the course of development, this process too will thus be undermined, and will open the way for the kind of "cool" alternation typical of modern society (p. 172), wherein men "internalize different realities *without* identifying with them" (loc. cit, stress in original). The way is thus open for that critical distance, that irony vis-à-vis one's rôle in society, which is indeed the response of the sociologically educated man.

My claim is that Berger and Luckman do give us hints towards a philosophy of history, one in which development is seen as creating the conditions for dereification, and for irony as an expression of human freedom (which is not at all to say that history in this sense "develops" unilinearly). But these remain hints, that is, the theory is nowhere explicitly stated, but arises out of their account of institutionalization, and legitim-

ation, and even more out of their account of the mechanisms of "the maintenance and transformation of subjective reality", by which we go on believing one version of things or are converted to another, both of which involve the out-manoeuvring of our critical intelligence. To frame it in our original terms, Berger and Luckman's answer to the question about the "nature of man" is that he is a being who makes his own social reality and hence himself, and who falls victim to his own creation in the form of reification, so that his house always tends to become his prison. He takes a great step forward, and becomes more authentically himself when he is able to throw over this reification, and to take a critical distance from his social world.

Well, one might ask, what is wrong with this answer, apart from the fact that it is not stated explicitly? Perhaps nothing is. But the point is that we are here at the centre of one of the most important issues of modern philosophical anthropology. For there are broadly two types of answer to this question. One defines human nature not in terms of any content, but in terms of a formal character, that men are free to make themselves, and remain so whatever they choose to be. This answer, which we could call 'existentialist' (even though it long antedates modern existentialism) is the one which Berger and Luckman opt for. The other defines man in terms of certain privileged goals. It is one form of this answer that I claim we find in Marxism.

At this point we can set aside a second possible answer to my objection to Berger and Luck-

man, the claim that the question about human nature is one which belongs to psychology. It is true that many of the ahistorical conceptions of man have their natural home in psychology, but the kind of answer we are looking for here is one which falls fully into the province of the study of man in society; it straddles the gap between the disciplines.

For the man whom we might seek to define in terms of his privileged goals is a social being; his relation to others and to society enters into the very definition of these goals. Indeed, it is now accepted by everyone that our identity as human beings is formed in our relations to others; and Luckman and Berger, following Mead, give a special importance to our relations to "significant others" in early life. If we ask about the nature of the being whose identity is thus formed, we are not asking what he is *before* he enters into these relations, or *in abstraction* from them. For there is no such thing as a human identity which can be defined in abstraction from the relation to significant others, (this is an idea implicit in Freudianism for which Berger and Luckman don't give it adequate credit). Rather we are asking what kind of relations define an authentic identity for a man, one which does not imprison or destroy him in some way.

And this is where the two basic options above issue in two different types of answer to this question. The existentialist option sees an identity as authentic not in virtue of its content, but in virtue of the way we live it. Whatever we are and whatever rôle we play in life, it should be

with irony. The "essentialist" option looks rather for an identity, and thus a form of social life, to which a man could fully give himself without irony.

We shall probably never be able to answer the question which of these is ultimately right. Probably neither is alone. But we cannot avoid the issue if we want to study man in society, and even less if we want to transform society. For these two options open two very different directions of change. The "existentialist" one opens the perspective of liberation of the human agent at the moment of choice. Freedom is expressed in the capacity to choose, and hence to gain the critical distance from reality necessary to choose. This is the line of the radicalism which seems to be dominant in the U.S. new left today.

The other option looks towards the transformation of society so that it becomes the expression of freedom, which is here therefore defined less in terms of choice than of realization. Free men are those whose surrounding reality reflects them. This is the line of socialism, and of course, one of the most persuasive argument against it is that a doctrine of this kind is the official ideology of the Soviet Union.

To the greater part of the Left in the Western world, it seems obvious that neither of these approaches is adequate

alone; and hence the attempt of thinkers like Sartre, for instance, to wed existentialism and Marxism. Whether this can be done or not is very much an open question. The attempts so far are not re-assuring. But any serious effort must really measure the weight of both sides. And this is what is so unsatisfying in most of the current writing and rhetoric about "participatory democracy". The problem cannot be solved by verbal magic with the words 'bureaucracy' and 'participation'.

And it is in the light of this debate that Berger and Luckman's work could have made an even greater contribution had they brought the issue of "human nature" explicitly to the fore. As it is, they leave us by implication with the perspective of individual self-liberation through irony (which means of course, through the creation of a society in which irony is allowed to flourish). But those who want to know what kind of society we could create so that ironic distance should become less necessary will find no help from this book, unless it be the implication that their question is, in all likelihood, based on an error.

Prof. Charles Taylor
McGill University and
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Mordecai Richler, Cocksure, McClelland and Stewart,
Toronto, 1968, \$5.95, 250 pages.

When Isaac Bashevis Singer, the Yiddish writer, came to McGill last year, he spoke mostly about writing, and in particular, about the possibilities for a continuing Yiddish literature, as well as the whole problem of what we know today as "Jewish literature" — that arbitrary collection of novels and articles, mostly American, mostly recent, whose authors have been assigned the role of spokesman, in some sense, for the Jews.

He spoke first of all, of the necessity for any good writer to have an "address", a sort of spiritual home from which he draws sustenance, but from which he always takes a certain distance, defining himself in opposition to it, as well as in connection with it. He insisted on this point, relating all great literature to this necessity, until half his audience (in Hillel House's dining room) was basking in warm post-prandial nostalgia for nineteenth century Lublin, while the rest of us began feeling more and more rootless and shallow.

No doubt this happens every year at McGill around High Holiday time, but what was surprising, perhaps especially for a Gentile, was Singer's remark, in answer to a question, that of all the critics of his work, Mordecai Richler was the one who understood him best.

The surprise does not lie, I think, in the implausibility of the remark — I am more than prepared to believe it. It lies rather in the sudden realization that Mr. Richler, in the course of his fictional career so far, has slowly abandoned the concern, the involvement, the understand-

ing that gave value to his earlier works, and that could have made his recent works more than exercises in practised pyrotechnics, in technical polish. The feeling grows, through the barrage of articles, reviews, and casuals he seems to be publishing everywhere, that somewhere along the line, whether for love or money, or perhaps out of despair, Mordecai Richler has copped out.

In the beginning . . .

In 1956, Nathan Cohen, the Toronto critic, interviewed Richler, and asked him about his writing:

COHEN :

You referred to the fact that you're fascinated in writing about the breakdown of values. Does this mean that you yourself have no values, or is there a set of values you feel should emerge from the breakdown?

RICHLER :

I think that what is emerging from this breakdown is a much more complicated and closely held personal standard of values . . . What I am looking for are the values with which in this time a man can live with honor.

This search was most successfully put into fiction in his second novel, *Son of a Smaller Hero* (1955), was picked up again, in a less satisfying way in *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz*, (1959) but hasn't really been touched since, certainly not in his subsequent novels, *The Incomparable Atuk* (1963) and the justpublished *Cocksure*. *Atuk* is a cream puff of a story, and although *Cocksure* had its genesis in an excellent, and more serious story entitled "Mortimer Griffin, Shalinsky, and How They Settled the Jewish Question", it too has

avoided the kind of engagement (fictional not political) that one expects from a good writer — and Mr. Richler is certainly one of the most accomplished in Canada.

It might be appropriate, then, to compare his early novel *Son of a Smaller Hero* with *Cocksure*, to get an indication of the transformation that has taken place.

The Contest

SOASH is the story of twenty-year old Noah Adler, who feels, at the beginning of the novel, that he must break off from his family in Montreal's former Jewish ghetto if he is to make something of himself. His family is dominated by his grandfather, a rigid and religious man who cannot tolerate any breach of the faith or the ingrown community. Noah sees what has happened to his father, Wolf, under the thumb of the old *zeyda*: far from becoming the partner the old man has said he would be, he is still, in later middle age, a truck driver, trying desperately to get a raise.

Wolf's wife, who has come to marriage with high hopes, since her father was a respected holy man and a scholar of influence, vents her frustration on her unfortunate husband. Noah, caught in the middle, leaves home and becomes a taxi driver, with the vague idea of completing school at night. Through college, he meets and falls in love with the (Gentile) wife of a teacher. Soon, he begins to feel towards her those ambivalent feelings of attraction and resentment that today we associate more with young black men, who sometimes covet white (Gentile)

women because they embody a standard of beauty, the same standard they are discovering in art, music, literature. At the same time, they are ashamed of their attraction, because they see that in the process they have lost their identity and their self-respect.

So the love affair cannot last, it cannot be the answer, and Noah drifts, confused, until the final irony of his father's death, the secret greed that is transformed by the community into personal and religious heroism, reveals for Noah the bankruptcy of the old order. In spite of this, he finds himself carrying out the religious prescriptions for mourning with an emotion that surprises and shames him, and that because she can only interpret it as hypocrisy or weakness, causes the final break with his Gentile mistress.

The dilemma of attraction and rebellion strikes deep in the novel, sometimes in a raw and awkward way, but it gains much strength, as George Woodcock suggests, from the depth of the author's involvement, from his real concern with his characters and their fates. The seriousness can be seen in the epigraph chosen for the novel — Dostoevsky's well-known phrase, "If God did not exist, everything would be lawful". It conveys, not celebration of freedom, but a profound sense of loss and rootlessness. At the end of the novel, indeed, the tensions are left unresolved as Noah decides to leave Canada. It is possible that at that stage no other answer was possible for him — or for the author.

That there is a clear affinity between Mr. Richler's concerns

in this novel and the themes present by Singer in his talk, can be easily seen. What is lacking here, though, is that sense of distance, of being in your world but apart from it, that would have enabled the author to transform raw feeling, however well-conveyed, into a complete fictional world, legitimate and compelling in itself, and the technical skill to make it an important novel. But whatever its faults, at least the novel is a serious one, and merits serious attention.

The disappointing end

What is one to say of *Cocksure*?

Mortimer Griffin, the prototypical anti-hero, has all the disadvantages one could imagine: he is a WASP, a prosperous editor in a publishing house, has a pretty blond (if skinny) wife. How will he make it in the chic London scene, dominated by those pushy Jews? His wife cuckolds him with his best friend Ziggy Spicehandler (real name Gerald Spencer), and same friend has just made an underground movie which *clearly* hints that Mortimer is a homosexual (see how he eats that banana!). The Jews say he's anti-Semitic, those really in the know say he's an anti-Semitic Jew, and even the sexy Negro librarian is all caught up in the anti — Jew black power thing, and won't fulfill his little fantasies.

And so on. I won't reveal the plot, because it contains some delightful surprises, and Mortimer Griffin's anguish (I wanna be a *mensch*!) deserves to be savored fully.

Yet what is one to say? That it is funny? That its inversion of a theme long favored by some American writers who are Jews, Philip Roth and such, is an exceedingly clever invention? That the technical accomplishment of the book places Mr. Richler firmly on a level with Terry Southern? So what?

I confess to be left with a bitter taste. Somehow, though I should be satisfied with funny entertainment, it just won't wash. For the tensions that are apparent in Richler's early work, not to mention the ones that exist in the real world, are largely evaded by this book. This type of all-encompassing satire, this plague-on-both-your-houses attitude provides only a release of tension, not its resolution. The serious moments are drowned in the guffaws, and in such a situation we are left, as in *SOASH*, not with an ending, but another flight. As in *Catch-22* old anti-heroes never die, they're just whisked away.

This type of humor, while good enough in itself, is ultimately trivial, and trivializing, especially when Mr. Richler could spend his time on better things. In this instance, as in so many others today, the search for or the positing of new values is transformed into a concern to catch the flavor of a style, to throw a good curve ball or elevate some other peripheral concern to world importance. The area where one has to lay oneself on the line in one's activities shrinks to invisibility beneath the put-ons.

Perhaps one has to protect oneself in this way. Perhaps one has to retreat, to retrench, in order to "live with honor" in the

smaller, more manageable space that remains. It seems that for Mr. Richler this retrenchment is necessary, at least for himself. I am not so sure, and I doubt whether a writer with any self respect can maintain such an attitude. And what's more, Mr. Richler really knows it too.

Reviewing George Plimpton's *Paper Lion* for the *New York Review of Books*, he expresses much of what I feel about *Cocksure*. He feels guilty, he says, like having been to a movie on a fine summer afternoon, and goes on:

"An earlier generation of American writers had to test themselves not against Bart Starr and Archie Moore, but the Spanish Civil War and the Moscow Trials. In Europe, looking for a change, Isaac Babel rode with the Red Cavalry. George Orwell went to Wigan Pier, and then to Catalonia... One day, I fear, we will be put down as a trivial, peripheral bunch. Crazy about bad old movies, nostalgic for comic books. Our gods don't fail. At worst they grow infirm. They suffer pinched nerves, like Paul Hornung, or arthritic arms, like Sandy Koufax."


Admirable as sentiment, but finally rather smug. Mr. Richler protests too much. Somewhat like a fellow at a meeting I once attended, who jokingly paraphrased St. Paul: "Lord, make me a saint, but not yet!" And he was answered from the Talmud: "If not now, when? If not us, who?"

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OUR GENERATION

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Toronto, Buffalo

Leila Berg. *Risinghill: Death of a comprehensive school.*
Penguin Books, London: 1968.

Mrs. Berg authors children's books and with her art has painted a slightly childish ikon of the Archangel Michael Duane ramming the beam of liberty down the maws of the Inner London Education Authority. One expects her academic hero to awaken the Sleeping Beauty of democracy with the kiss of his shining virtue, but democracy preferred her sleep—and Duane's.

Mr. Duane headmastered the school of a London slum, mixed in race, in means, and in hopes. His brilliant record placed him naturally at the head of the new Risinghill Comprehensive School, an inchoate amalgam of fear, of tyranny, and of human nature. Duane refused to beat his students into becoming the accomplices of their own enslavement, and from this was sown the staff resentments which killed the school.

In abolishing corporal punishment at Risinghill, the headmaster outlawed the most exterior form a systematic degradation of the student, of a legalised assault by the powerful upon the defenceless. And with the despotic school system stripped of its mask and of its weapon, the teachers, the administrators, and the State inspectors were compelled to deal with the student as with an equal. The equality made their alienation obvious, and multiple.

Teachers could not stomach

their being responsible to the students whom they were too often accustomed to provoke. Staff trained in one-sex schools subtly set up the sexes one against the other by caning the boys more conspicuously and more often than the girls. The boys began to resent the girls as the source of all their troubles. The staff further divided the students by criticising the values of their slum parents, fearing the intrusion of real life into the stilted schools, and by refusing to discuss a student's progress with his parents.

The traditionalist staff beat the students hard, however piously and officially denied by the London County Council which hypocritically circulated a confidential document to new teachers (a "Welcome to Teaching" brochure) informing them that, "Two canes, a larger and a smaller, are approved." The justification for the beating lay in the argument that slum life on the outside was difficult, and the students had to be readied for it. Unwittingly, they were a step away from admitting that school and society are sister links in the human chain, and that if the school were truly to be democratic, its neighbourhood and its society need be democratic too.

When Duane scratched the democratic veneer, the authoritarians bared their claws. The

violence of the system buoyed them up in their attacks against a participatory school that was beginning to involve the parents in a neighbourhood education. Authority decided to close Rising-hill, without ever once consulting either students or parents, as if it did not regard them. Outraged, the parents formed deputations to open the question for discussion with the authorities. The answer was succinct, and for once, honest: "You surely don't think these deputations will get you anywhere? The decision has already been taken. This three months for the appeal to be considered, these invitations to state your case, that's just papering over the cracks in the walls of democracy." Frustrated with her freedom, one teacher pathetically exclaimed, "We have a right to be led."

This passively being led negates the very life-force which grows, changes and adapts. The authoritarian mind sits in the hot bath of its fear, hoping to curb the qualms it has about being destructive and violent, baptising with the name order the fetters it clasps around the spirits of the young. The universe has order, though little comfort. Those young bodies have order too, if not armchair passivity, that thrusts upon the most rigid of teachers the need to deal in either a life-affirming or a life-destroying manner with the spontaneity and the experimentation that health requires to be free from death.

Nor was it only the Whigs who feared the noisy order of naturalness. The Labourites, the Socialists and especially the Communists on the staff were the most inflexibly authoritarian.

Soldiers of the International

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**University of Toronto Press
Toronto, Buffalo.**

The Left, with sickening regularity, opposed force to freedom when it had a word. It never occurred to these wolves in libertarian sheep's-skins to parry for a school that preserves both order and spontaneity.

Method is an order, and freedom can be a teaching method in an anarchistic order. Kees Boeke in the Werkplaats school in Holland used precisely that method, freedom, to create the spontaneity and the order that characterise his experiment. He was convinced that an order built on force strangles naturalness, and to it he preferred the moral pressure healthily applied by a student's peers in group discussions to maintain the order which permits life-functions. Principal Boeke humbly insists that, "The spirit is not something in me. I am just like a catalyst, taking no part in the process but helping to make the right development possible. It is only that I try not to meddle with the children, not to hinder what is in them from growing."

This trust presumes of course that what is in the children growing is valuable in itself, and is good, apart from what any and all ideologies would do to mold such growth to specific ends. Authoritarians of all colours object that such free growth will permit students to go hog-wild. And hog-wild they will go, until they tire of chaos and find in the richness of their own spirits the natural order that alone can give them blood for growth. For people so unaccustomed to freedom, the transition is needfully

turbulent, and no less so for the teachers who resent the human equality of their students.

Leila Berg's partisanship, faithful and necessary as it was, left the deeper issues of education and liberty still too inchoate for expression. Her preoccupation with fertilizing the reputation of Mr. Duane has barred her from richer soils. The approach is visceral, and unhappily of too limited an analytical importance. Worse, it smacks of injustice and conceals a hatred for school authorities in the apparent compassion for the students. The aim is right, but need it nail a target?

The issue, of course, is not Mr. Duane, the L.C.C., or Risinghill, but the concept of man and his society. The illusion, that the education of the people *IS* democracy, is cracking under the realization that that is "not necessarily the same thing as the democratic and comprehensive education of the people", as observes Martin Small in his excellent Risinghill article, *Anarchy* 92.

Leila Berg, in painting us the ikon with the disdain for the lower classes and their culture that the teachers and the administrators used to silence Michael Duane with, has at least reminded us once again, by its passionate case against corporal punishment, of Tolstoy's remark, that the only difference between culture and education is violence, for culture is force, and education, liberty.

Kenneth-Charles Du Puis
associate editor

Richard I. Evans, *Dialogue With Erik Erikson*, New York Harper and Row. 1967. 142 pages.

THIS book is part of a wider documentation programme which aims to capture on film and in interview, the contributions of important contemporary personality theorists. The author has already dealt with Jung, Jones and Fromm and studies of Skinner, Allport and Gardner Murphy are planned. The present volume presents psychoanalyst Erik Erikson — the philosopher of youth.

It is in many ways a frustrating book. In barely a hundred pages of text the conversation skitters over the entire range of Erikson's multiferous interests: the developmental stages of normal personality, the differences between Ghandi and Hitler, the cross-cultural study of child reading practices, and the psychology of non-violent social protest, to mention only a few. There is surely a difference between a television interview and a scientific text. A television interview is an ephemeral happening which stimulates and suggests, leaving the viewer with a certain emotional aroma as it were, or with a sense of presence but with little factual information; on the other hand the essence of a scientific text is precisely to present information divorced as far as possible from the personality of the writer. The weakness of this project is that it presents a television script as though it were a scientific text.

Assets of book.

But there are some positive features. For example, one gets insight into the relationship between Erikson's interests and his

life experience. He was particularly concerned with the problem of identity and with that peculiar blurred state of consciousness in which so many contemporary young people find themselves — the state which he labelled "identity diffusion". Should I follow my artistic self or my scientific self? Shall I stay in or drop out? Who is it that I want to be like? Where can I find a significant crusade? Erikson was born a Dane but went early with his parents to Vienna where he grew up during the emergence of Nazism. He married an American girl and emigrated to the United States in 1934. He confesses that these cultural shifts and his puzzlement over whether he was a Dane or an Austrian or an American had a good deal to do with his preoccupation with the problem of identity. But ethnic diffusion was not his only problem. He started out as an artist in Vienna but soon became a practicing psychoanalyst. Still unfulfilled, he made thorough going excursions into cultural anthropology (unlike most analysts he was not satisfied to be an armchair theorist but made field trips to study the Sioux and the Yoruk), into sociology in his studies of social movements and political leadership, and into religion and historical scholarship with his studies of Martin Luther. Certainly Erikson must have been very familiar with the anguish of identity diffusion himself before reaching his highly successful personal synthesis.

His personal identity struggle made him uniquely sensitive to

the problems of contemporary youth. Our culture presents no easy solution to young people as to what they should be or what they should do. One can't just take an identity off the rack; each one must be tailor made. The primitive adolescent is taken off into a remote forest retreat where his ego with its childhood concepts is reduced to a jelly by terror at the hands of masked men who wield circumcision knives. And then the ready-made identity is imprinted like a seal in wax, and a new adult emerges from the tribal assembly line. We have no adolescent initiation and no pre-fabricated adult roles.

Social Roles and Social Values.

Our age and culture is different not only in the tremendous diversity of occupational

roles but in the fact that many roles undergo radical changes during a lifetime and some may even become obsolete. These uncertainties no doubt are the sources of some of the anxieties of our youth. But there are others which are even more fundamental. Many very basic roles must be thought through again. What is it to be a man or a woman, a father or a mother? Among other innovations, the Pill has radically altered the sexual game. What is the rationale for "attack" and "defense" and what now is the case for chastity?

Nor are role changes the most fundamental. Once unquestioned concepts and values require radical revision. War and peace, nationalism, pride in a large family and other notions which

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once gave life meaning and purpose are no longer valid. In fact some have become positively malignant. Erikson puts it well:

Man has become divided into pseudo-species, and in the present era he is trying to overcome one of the last forms of pseudo-specieshood, namely nationalism. The tribal animal is on the defensive, just because more inclusive ideologies are being formed. Reactionary rage equipped with atomic weapons may mean the end of man just when for the first time he has a chance to become one species. Just how to form a wider identity — that now becomes the problem of youth.

We must not be taken in by words. They are no longer the solid cobblestones of our world; they have become quick sand which will no longer bear our weight. We can no longer ask "Do you think war is ever justified?". For instead we are inadvertently asking, "Is annihilation justified?". Nor can we now ask, "what are we willing to sacrifice for the sake of peace?". The question has become, "What compromises will we make for survival?"

As a mating reflex, an eel if stroked along its sides with a stick will coil itself around the stick; and if the stick is replaced by a red hot poker it will, in the grip of its antique reflexes, still coil itself. In a similar way, old thought habits have become malignant in our world and we will be no better than eels if our youth do not rapidly divest themselves of the outmoded patterns of their adults.

New Initiations.

In this context, how are we to regard the present epidemic of youthful drug-taking, the

hippie scene and the mushroom of psychedelic communities? In some ways these are analogous to the adolescent initiations of other cultures. Since the wider culture does not impose these rites of passage, our youth have invented them again. Instead of the isolated forest glade, the site of operations the pad in the dim hearts of our large cities. The time is prolonged. Instead of a month or two as in most cultures, our self imposed rites which may take a year or perhaps longer. But then as we have already noted, the psychological processes are enormously more complex. In place of the terrifying masqueraders, our youth have discovered the much more dangerous use of chemical substances to reduce their ego's to the primordial ego-plasm. It seems that one of the important functions of these drugs is to wipe the mental slate clean. The user is released from the dead weight of words, concepts and role that are irrelevant to the contemporary world. As the pace of social change increases and with increased knowledge of these of chemical substances (so that they can be employed without risk), they may be of great importance to help free ourselves from the barnacles of the ages. They may help our youth to find Erikson's wider identities. Our greatest need is to find ways for producing citizens of the world. In this quest, it may be necessary to forgo for a generation or two, the forward thrust of scientific invention. Some have been critical of the psychedelic and mystical interests of our youth saying that if your best students adopt these modes of thought and behaviour, they cannot engage in

the scientific quest. This may be true. But such criticism seems to be a clear example of ell-reflex thinking. Our whole culture may have to enter a moratorium for a generation or two to accomplish the tremendous work of achieving a genuine world ci-

tizen identification. We must remember that the question has now become, "What are we willing to sacrifice for survival?"

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Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics*, University of Toronto Press, \$7.50, 273 pages.

If Gad Horowitz, in his definitive account of "Canadian Labour in Politics", had done nothing more than detail the history of Canadian unions' political activity, his book would have been mildly interesting, but not very important. The machinations of union leaders, the petty quarrels and suspicions between unionists and non-unionists in the inner councils of the CCF and later the New Democratic Party, the struggle between socialists and communists within the labour movement — these things become rather tiresome when recounted so exhaustively.

But Horowitz happily does not confine his exposition to doctrinal wranglings and personal-ity conflicts. He probes deeply into motivations, and into major political developments. He sets the study of labour's relationship with socialism in the broad context of the evolution of the Liberal and Conservative parties in Canada. In doing so, he reveals how the various parties interact with one another — particularly the Liberals and the CCF-NDP, whom he sees in a state of "antagonistic symbiosis".

The main strength of the book is its brilliant opening chapter, which is really a long, self-contained essay analyzing and comparing the fortunes of socialist parties in the United States and Canada. This chapter sets the background for the detailed account of Canadian Labour's involvement in politics, which is the main body of the work, and for the closing chapters in which the author assesses the future prospects of the NDP.

Although the middle portion of the book is sometimes heavy going, it does contain several flashes of Horowitzian insight. One highlight is a penetrating explication of the causes of recurring tension within the CCF-NDP between unionists and farmers, between unionists and academics, and between unionists and socialist politicians. Anyone active in either labour or the NDP can attest to the accuracy of Horowitz's diagnosis of these tensions.

Theoretical basis of book

The provocative opening chapter is a projection of the "frag-

mentary ideology" theory first propounded by Louis Hartz in *The Liberal Tradition in America*. Hartz argued that the new societies founded by Europeans are "fragments" thrown off from Europe, and that their political systems have been determined by the predominant ideologies of their founders. In most cases, these ideologies have not been representative of the entire political spectrum for the mother country — i.e., from right to left, tory, liberal whig, liberal democrat, socialist. The settlers represented only a fragment of the spectrum. For instance, Latin America and French Canada are "tory fragments", founded by adherents of the feudal values of the hierarchical community, and their point of departure from Europe was prior to the liberal revolution. The United States and Canada are "bourgeois fragments", founded by champions of liberal individualism who left the tory end of the spectrum behind them.

Because the stimulus to change and to develop future ideologies comes from the continuous interaction between the four elements of the political spectrum, the ideologies of the new societies, as Hartz sees them, have tended to congeal. The absence of a tradition of political diversity leads to intolerance. The ideology of the founders is enshrined as the one true national creed. The classic example is the United States, where Lockean individualism has become the "American way of life" and all other political beliefs — socialism as well as communism — "un-American".

Comments Horowitz: "To be an American is to be a bourgeois liberal. To be a French Canadian is to be a pre-Enlightenment Catholic. To be a Boer is to be a pre-Enlightenment bourgeois Calvinist. The fragments escape the need for philosophy, for thought about values... Ideologies which diverge from the national myth make no impact; they are not understood, and their proponents are not granted legitimacy. They are denounced as aliens, and treated as aliens, because they *are* aliens."

When a fragment attains the size and power of the U.S., its reaction to the rise of "alien" philosophies in other countries is one of either isolationism or messianism, along with a prevailing climate of hysteria.

Socialism, as an ideology, is compounded of "the corporate-organic-collectivist ideas of toryism and the rationalist-egalitarian ideas of liberalism." It requires the presence of the other three elements in order to develop these characteristics.

Because a tory fragment like Québec develops no whig liberalism, "it does not develop the democratic liberalism that arises out of and as a reaction against whiggery; therefore it does not develop the socialism which arises out of and as a reaction against liberal democracy... In the bourgeois fragment, the situation is the reverse: the radical-rationalist-egalitarian component of socialism is present, but the corporate-organic-collectivist component is missing, because toryism has been left behind... Socialism withers because there is no sense of class..."

The sense of class

The absence of this "sense of class" in the United States, and to a somewhat lesser degree in Canada, explains the weakness of socialism on this continent. "Liberalism sees life in society as a competition among individuals; the prize is individual 'achievement' or 'success'; equality is essentially equality of *opportunity* in the struggle for success. The emphasis is on the individual; there is hardly any perception of 'the common good' as something more than the sum of individual goods."

Thus the government in a bourgeois liberal society, prodced from the left to eliminate social inequalities, will respond by providing a welfare "floor" so that no one need fall out of the race for success. It will also try to remove unfair advantages by destroying monopolistic privileges.

"In a society which thinks of itself as a community of classes rather than an aggregation of individuals, the demand for equality will take a socialist form: for equality of condition rather than mere equality of opportunity; for co-operation rather than competition; for a community that does much more than provide a context within which individuals can pursue happiness in a purely self-regarding way."

The hard reality that socialists on this continent must face, however, is that they live in a liberal bourgeois society. The beliefs and tenets of the bourgeoisie permeate every aspect of the North American culture, including its educational system, its

news media and its art and entertainment. Its citizens, no matter what their class, absorb and accept bourgeois values from the cradle.

The nature of Canadian mainstream politics

In such a culture, a socialist party must battle against the mainstream to establish itself and win support. With the populace conditioned from birth against its philosophy, its chances of achieving major party status — while still remaining a *bona fide* socialist party — are extremely remote. The temptation to swing closer to the centre to attract more middle-class votes is difficult to resist among those party leaders (and aspiring leaders) for whom power is the overriding goal. Unfortunately, voting support won in this way is most unreliable. It comes mainly from disaffected Liberals, and tends to gravitate back to the Liberal fold at the first sign that that party has gained a more progressive platform or leadership.

The success of the Liberal party over the last 60 years may be ascribed to its arrogation of the political centre, and to the classless appeal of the centrist policies formulated by Mackenzie King.

Perfectly attuned to the country's bourgeois culture, these policies "draw lowerclass support to the Liberals away from the left, and higher-class support away from the right. This forces the left and right parties themselves to emulate (to a certain extent) the Liberals' classless strategy. The Conservatives transform themselves into Progressive Conservatives. The CCF trans-

forms itself from a "farmer-labour" party into an NDP calling for the support of 'all liberally minded Canadians'."

This interaction, of course, works both ways. Whenever the CCF-NDP or the Tories have adopted policies that proved widely popular, the Liberals have not hesitated to usurp them, even if it meant moving temporarily more to the right or left. As a result, they "present an ambivalent conservative-radical image; they attack the Tories and the status quo, but they also defend the status quo from its socialist enemies."

By protecting the centre from the challenges of other parties on both sides, the Liberal party has made English Canada unique as the only society in which the centre triumphs over left and right.

Contrasts with USA

Nevertheless, socialism in Canada has made much more progress than it has in the United States. There are several reasons for this. *First*, the Tories who fled here from the U.S. during and after the Revolutionary War provided in Canada that ultra-conservative element to which socialism is a reaction. *Second*, many of the immigrants to Canada from Britain and other European countries were socialists who brought their philosophy with them. *Third*, the Canadian political system is conducive to the formation of new parties, while the American system discourages them. *Fourth*, the rigid party discipline implicit in the Canadian-British system does not allow the broad divergence of

views that the are embraced by the two major U.S. parties.

It was inevitable, then, that organized labour in the U.S. would align itself with and try to influence the Democratic party instead of attempting the herculean task of organizing a labour party. The American system lends itself to this kind of political action by unions. Horowitz also points out that "the type of young radical who became a socialist in Europe became a New Dealer in America... (but) the young men who became New Dealers in the United States became CCFers in Canada."

As a consequence, the Democrats in the U.S. have swung further left at times — and especially in the days of the New Deal under Roosevelt — than the Liberals have dared to do in Canada. Faced with the much stronger socialist challenge in this country, the Liberals under King, Laurier, Pearson — and even Trudeau — have felt obliged to fill the role of defenders of property and champions of free enterprise, and to attack excessive reliance on the state.

The Liberals and NDP

"The Liberals," says Horowitz, "have not been a party of innovation. As a centre party, they have allowed the CCF-NDP to introduce innovations; they have then waited for signs of substantial acceptance by all strata of the population and for signs of reassurance against possible electoral reprisals before actually proceeding to implement the innovations. The centre party recoils from the fight for a contro-

versial measure; it loves to implement a consensus." Only in this way can it avoid antagonizing its "business-sponsored right wing."

A permanent interdependence has thus evolved between the Liberals and the CCF-NDP. "The Liberals depend on the CCF-NDP for innovations; the CCF-NDP depends on the Liberals for implementation of the innovations... The centre and the left dance around one another, frustrating one another and living off the frustration; each is locked into the dance by the existence of the other."

Many attempts have been made over the years by the Liberals to break out of this "antagonistic symbiosis" — by trying to crush the socialists when they seemed weak, or by coaxing them to merge with the Liberal party when they were strong. As the chief source of CCF-NDP support, the unions have also been subjected to Liberal blandishments over the years. Left-wing Liberals realize that their party is too conservative to appeal to unionists, but they argue that labour, working inside the party, could convert it into a genuine party of the left.

The unions don't buy that argument. They know they could never be the dominant force within the Liberal party. They are not inclined to abandon an already established socialist party for the dubious advantage of vying with powerful business interests to swing a centre party to the left. As Horowitz puts it, "The question 'why does labour support the CCF-NDP?' becomes misleading because the interlocking, the vesting of interest has

reached the point where labour, in a sense, is the CCF-NDP... The unions have an investment (years of effort, loyalty and enthusiasm) in the party which they will not lightly withdraw."

Frank Underhill and other Liberal theorists have been trying for years to move the Liberal party to the left, believing that, if it were to become a left party, organized labour and other left elements would join it. What they fail to realize is that the Liberal party will not become a left party unless these elements join it, and they will not join it because it is not a left party. This vicious circle will persist as long as the NDP remains a potent force in Canadian politics.

The NDP and Unions

How long will this be? Horowitz sees no early demise of the NDP, nor does he see any prospect of an NDP breakthrough to major party status. A socialist party in Canada operates under many severe handicaps. Horowitz lists the most outstanding:

1. The country's bourgeois liberal, individualist culture militates against the growth of socialism.

2. In an anti-class society, any party vulnerable to the charge of being a "class party" finds it difficult to extend its appeal to other classes.

3. Conflict within the NDP between unionists and non-unionists hampers effective organization. Wrangling over alleged "labour domination" or, conversely, inadequate labour support, undermines morale and impedes united action.

4. Conflict also persists within

the party between the "dreamers" and the "doers" — between those committed to preserving the purity of socialist dogma and those willing to compromise on policies and principles to win more votes.

5. Many international unions have prohibitions in their constitutions against partisan politics and affiliation of their locals to a political party. The traditional non-political policy of the craft unions in particular has kept most of them aloof from the CCF-NDP.

6. Many unions hesitate to support a party they categorize as "a loser". Labour support is dependent on party victories; party victories are dependent on labour support. Labour's "success psychology" helps to keep the party unsuccessful.

7. The conversion of the CCF into the NDP had two motives: to increase labour's involvement, and to broaden the base of party support among the general public. The trouble is that, the more the party becomes identified as a labour party, the more difficult it becomes to enlist support from other sections of society.

Despite these handicaps, Horowitz agrees that the NDP has no choice but to intensify its efforts to attract more unionists. "A party of the left in any developed country in the West must of necessity depend for funds on the labour movement and must be at least partly controlled by trade unions. A socialist party may be harmed, when unions are unpopular, by its close association with them in the public mind. But without them it cannot exist, it has no basis for existence. The solution

to the problem lies not in the loosening of union-party links, but in the improvement of the image of the unions."

Given the anti-union bias of the mass media in a bourgeois society, improving the unions' image to any significant extent is not something that lies within the capacity of either the NDP or the unions themselves. The adverse effects of the union-party link will therefore persist.

Non-union party officials complain that these adverse effects are not being offset by the limited funds, affiliations and votes that the labour movement has so far provided. Less than 20 percent of the CLC's 1,500,000 members have been affiliated to the party and less than one-third of them vote for the NDP. Financial support from the unions, while substantial, has fallen well short of party leaders' expectations.

"It would be unfair, however," says Horowitz, "to blame labour leaders for the NDP's failure to become a major party. The reasons for that failure are to be found elsewhere... Voting habits are not easily changed. The NDP seems to have the nearpermanent allegiance of something like 15 percent of the electorate; the remaining 85 or so percent seem to be rather solidly attached to the other parties... Nothing the socialist party *itself* does can greatly increase its strength. Unless there is a startling new development, some sort of crisis, *outside* the socialist party — a crisis severe enough to shake up Canadian voting habits — the NDP will probably not achieve major party status."

Not many NDP activists are likely to agree with that assessment — at least, not publicly. Obviously many of the party's leaders, both provincially and federally, are sustained only by the hope that a takeoff to major party status is within their ability to ignite.

There are many others within the party, however, who feel that it plays a sufficiently important role in Canadian politics as a minority party — as an innovator and popularizer of progressive policies, and as a left-wing pressure group. Even hard-headed union officers, despite their "success psychology", value the NDP as their spokesman and defender in Parliament and in the provincial legislatures. Their

backing of the NDP would not slacken, no matter if Horowitz's discouraging outlook could be proved beyond doubt.

As Horowitz himself remarks in concluding his study, "minor party status is better than nothing. For consolation, the socialists need only look southward."

His book is not only a stimulating and informative account of "Canadian Labour in Politics", but a masterly analysis of Canadian political ideology. It is required reading for anyone wishing to understand the motivations and undercurrents that shape political developments in this country.

*Ed Finn,
trade unionist*

BOOKS RECEIVED

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China: Co-existence or Containment, by R.J. Lifton (1968, 146 pp, \$2.50)
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Canadian Institute of International Affairs

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Trudeau, A Man for Tomorrow, by D. Stuebing & al. (1968, 190 pp, \$1.95)
The Student Revolt, by H. Bourges (Jonathan Cape, 1968, 144 pp, \$6.00)

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Soldiers Against the State, by J.S. Ambler (1968, 364 pp, \$1.95)

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